NATO DIVIDED, NATO UNITED

THE EVOLUTION OF AN ALLIANCE

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NATO Divided, NATO United

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To Debbie, Josh, and Cris

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Preface

NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) war against terrorism that had begun on I I September 2001 inspired a brief spirit of unity in the alliance. Invoking Article 5 was a fitting response to the assault against the United States. But the spirit did not last long. Within a few weeks the old fissures within the alliance reemerged, threatening once again to dissolve an entity that had survived over half a century. In the first two generations of NATO's existence, the Cold War with the Soviet Union had been the major purpose of its existence. But since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and of the Russian empire itself, NATO has struggled to seek new raisons d'etre, and has succeeded to some degree in finding them in crisis management in Europe and in areas beyond the boundaries of the alliance. The absence of a traditional enemy to serve as a centripetal force, along with the recognition of the United States as the lone superpower, has placed a focus on internal troubles of the alliance that had been obscured in the past by the presence of a common enemy in Soviet-led Communism.

This book is a history of NATO that concentrates on the differences within the alliance, particularly between the United States and its European partners. Most studies of NATO have centered on the East-West conflict, on how NATO coped with and ultimately triumphed over its Communist adversary. Too little attention has been paid to West-West conflicts that arguably have been more frequent and often more bitter if not more dangerous than the struggle with the Soviet Union. Differences among the allies began with the formation of the alliance itself. Some of them were resolved over time; others persisted and remain in place more than 50 years later. Many of them related to "out-of-area" issues in which the Soviet Union was not involved or only peripherally concerned.

At the heart of the differences within NATO was the transatlantic gulf between the United States and its European partners created by the disparity in their respective resources and in their respective outlooks on the world. These differences are at the center of NATO's difficulties today. How the

alliance managed the unequal relationship in the past may offer insights into the common ground the alliance partners can identify in the twenty-first century. If NATO is to survive, solutions will have to be found. This history places in the foreground issues that the Cold War had relegated to the background.

I want to express my gratitude to a few of the scholars who have influenced my thinking and my writing on NATO history. Charles G. Cogan has produced a series of important studies in Franco-American relations, and his recent book on "The Third Option" was particularly valuable to me in this project. Robert S. Jordan has been an early contributor to NATO historiography, notably in his insightful institutional studies of the offices of the secretary-general and supreme allied commander. Pierre Melandri's doctoral dissertation at the Ecole Normale Superieure on the United States and European unification from 1945 to 1954 was a pioneer effort in this field that influenced my approach to the subject. Frank Ninkovich has integrated diplomatic with intellectual history in his scholarly work. His survey on Germany and the United States after World War II made a deep impression on me. Stanley R. Sloan has been more than a "government" historian of NATO. His two books building on Harlan Cleveland's "transatlantic bargain" have illuminated the continuing significance of the alliance, and have helped mold my judgment of NATO's history. Of all the conferences that have been held on NATO's past, present, and future, none has produced more impressive results than Gustav Schmidt's monumental three-volume history of NATO.

In addition to the foregoing scholars, I should like to recall with gratitude, once again, individuals and institutions who have nurtured my studies: S. Victor Papacosma's Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union at Kent State University, my NATO history classes at Georgetown University, and Alfred Goldberg's Office of the Historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). I want to thank Dalton West and Carolyn Thorne of the OSD Historian's Office for supplying me with NATO information from contemporary news sources. I would add a special note of appreciation to Steven L. Rearden for his willingness to read my writings with good will and an expert eye. I have profited too from Stanley Kober's

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Abbreviations

NATO AND ARTICLE 5:
2001 AND 1949-1950

The savage attacks against the United States on I I September 2001 marked a milestone in the long history of the Atlantic alliance. The terrorist destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City and partial destruction of the Pentagon in Virginia, along with the failed assault against Washington targets, left over 3,000 dead in the ruins of the towers, in the corridors of the Pentagon, and in the fields of westem Pennsylvania. It also galvanized the Atlantic alliance. For the first time, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked in defense of an ally under attack.

The invocation of Article 5 evoked memories of the difficult days of 1948 when that article was the subject of agonized debate among the framers of the treaty. For Europeans this was the most important product of the impending alliance between America and Europe. For the first time since the termination of the Franco-American alliance in 1800, the United States, through this article, was abandoning its tradition of nonentanglement in European political and military affairs. If any member were attacked, it could be assured that the United States would respond differently from its responses in 1914 and 1939. The message was that an attack against one would be considered an attack against all; an attack against Paris or London would be considered the equivalent of an attack against New York or Chicago. The venerable American tradition of isolationism had been breached when the treaty was signed on 4 April 1949.

Or so it seemed. West European governments, worried about the threat of Communist subversion internally and Soviet aggression externally, had hoped that their efforts to unite under the Brussels Pact of March 1948

would have moved the United States to join the Western Union that the pact was creating. Their leaders recognized that the promise of economic aid under the Marshall Plan of 1947 could not succeed unless their countries felt politically and militarily secure. Only an American guarantee could serve this purpose, and such prominent statesmen as British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin and French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault had consciously modeled their Western Union along the lines the United States had laid out in the Marshall Plan, namely, showing evidence of self-help in individual member nations and economic integration into a new European community.

It required more than a year of intense negotiations before Europe could satisfy America's requirements, and even then questions about the credibility of the American commitment remained unanswered. Although the United States had no doubts about the seriousness of Europe's plight in 1948, it was uncertain about the course it should take to address it. Simply joining a European alliance seemed too drastic a step given the nation's history. Secret meetings in the Pentagon in late March 1948 of American, British, and Canadian representatives resulted in a recognition that some form of security organization was necessary in light of the inability of the United Nations and the Western Union to provide security for the West.

But the Truman administration had to cope with more than opposition from the old isolationists who were a rapidly diminishing presence in American life after World War II. It had to consider the articulate reservations of the military establishment, which feared that an open-ended military commitment to Europe would extend the responsibilities of the armed forces beyond their capacity to fulfill them. Additionally, there was a gnawing suspicion that European allies would draw military supplies and equipment from the limited budget the government was willing to allocate to the armed forces. Arguably, the most inhibiting factor in America's hesitation was pressure from former isolationists now joined with former adversaries in the belief that the UN charter was the key to a new world order. Arthur H. Vandenberg, a former isolationist senator, displayed the zeal of a reformed drunkard when he demanded that any treaty with Europe would have to conform to the terms of the UN charter.

The Truman administration's caution about the extent of the nation's commitment to the defense of European allies was reflected primarily in the language of the treaty. It was no coincidence that the UN charter was connected to as many articles as possible-Articles 1, 5, 7, and 12-as well as to the preamble of the treaty that specifically endorsed the principles of the charter. This was to assure Congress and the American public that the treaty's purpose was not only to support the aims of the world organization but to conform with its restrictions as well.

The treaty's managers sought to portray the alliance as a regional organization under the auspices of the UN charter, even though an identification was literally impossible. A regional organization had an obligation to report its activities to the Security Council where the Soviet Union held a seat and veto power. If NATO were a regional organization under Chapter VII, Article 53, it would have lost its primary purpose, namely, to build a defense structure that would not be subject to Soviet interference. The assumption of its founding fathers was that NATO was needed to counter Soviet obstructionism in the United Nations. Ultimately, the only article in the UN charter that applied to the North Atlantic Treaty was Article 51-the right of individual and collective self-defense-which would have been operative independently of the charter. This subterfuge seemed necessary to win Senate ratification of the treaty.

The issue of UN identification was not the only evasive gesture taken by the treaty's framers. Even more glaring was the name of the new alliance-the "North Atlantic" Treaty Organization. By emphasizing the Atlantic character of the alliance, the United States was further distancing itself from the Western Union and placing it inside a traditional American context. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted, Europe would be joining America, not vice versa, as the scope of the Monroe Doctrine was widened to embrace the eastern shores of the Atlantic. The ocean itself had shrunk to the size of the Caribbean Sea as a consequence of modem technology. Given this concern, the membership of Canada, and even of Iceland, assumed an importance in the composition of the alliance that they might not have had in other circumstances. Isolationism may have dissolved as a vibrant ideology but its memory lingered on. When the Senate finally

accepted the treaty by a vote of 82 to 13, the minority led by Republican Senator Robert A. Taft, vainly sought to scrap a binding treaty in favor of extending unilaterally to the Europeans the putative protection of the Monroe Doctrine.

Insulating the treaty against isolationist critics, however, was not a preoccupation of the diplomats preparing the terms of the treaty in Washington in the summer of 1948. If the European delegates to the Washington conference had their choice, NATO would have consisted only of the United States, Canada, and the five signatories of the Brussels Treaty. Reluctantly they acceded to the admission of Norway, Denmark, and Iceland as stepping-stones across the Atlantic for the delivery of American military aid. Denmark's Greenland and Norway's control of the Norwegian Sea, along with the geographical position of Iceland, were vital transatlantic links. Similarly, Portugal's Azores made that nation an acceptable candidate despite its lack of a democratic government.

If Portugal under a dictatorship was an undesirable ally, Italy in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea was an equally unlikely member of an "Atlantic" alliance. Its presence as a charter member was a product of the combined influence of the United States, which valued Italy as integral to Europe's defense, and France, which wanted to counter the northern tilt the Scandinavian members would give to the organization. A further concession to France was the inclusion of the Algerian departments north of the Tropic of Cancer within NATO's boundaries. It was obvious that in creating an organization that claimed to distinguish itself from conventional alliances, the diplomats sweltering behind closed doors in the heat of a Washington summer engaged in conventional trade-offs.

But the heart of the negotiations lay in what Canadian diplomat Escott Reid called "the pledge." This was, of course, Article 5. Everything else was subordinate to this vital assurance in European eyes. It mattered little to Europeans what name was attached to the alliance, and although it mattered more that increasing the membership to 12 could lessen the value of American military aid, this too was a price worth paying. But concessions were palatable only if the core principle of the alliance remained intact. The

appropriate language-again from a European perspective-was already available in Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty. It stated clearly and simply that an attack against one was an attack against all. That this language was unacceptable to the United States was the nub of the controversies over the terms of the treaty.

The problem over Article 5 remained unsettled at the end of the Washington meetings in September 1948. It was not to be settled before the presidential election of that year. Given the expectation that Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate, would defeat the incumbent in the presidential race, there had been no urgency-from an American perspective-about completing the text before this anticipated victory. The assumption was that a pro-treaty Republican would have less difficulty in winning ratification of the treaty than his predecessor would have had.

The surprise victory of President Harry S. Truman did not immediately advance the treaty's prospects. Not that the Democratic leadership was opposed; the isolationist wing of the Republican Party was more of a problem in this regard. The difficulty in the winter of 1949 derived from the arrival of a new leadership team in the State Department and Senate. The Democrats won control of the Senate, which meant that Tom Connally succeeded Arthur Vandenberg as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Dean Acheson replaced Robert Lovett as chief U.S. negotiator for the treaty. Both lacked their predecessors' familiarity with the details of the negotiations and the close working relationship between the administration and the Senate, even though they supported the need for a treaty. Personalities made a difference. Unlike Lovett who courted Vandenberg, Acheson considered him a windbag and treated him accordingly. He was, as Acheson once noted, the only person he knew who could strut while sitting down. Connally, jealous of Vandenberg's influence, was an equally difficult partner.

The upshot was a fresh look at the text, particularly at Article 5, which they felt needed a better choice of language to assure that military action would not be an automatic response to an attack against an ally. The constitutional process whereby Congress was vested with the power to

declare war had to be respected. But an immediate reaction was precisely what the allies were demanding. It required the semantic agility of George Kerman, the father of the containment doctrine but a skeptic about its military dimension, to come up with a suitable compromise. Instead of the allies taking "forthwith such military or other action ... as may be necessary," the adjective military was finessed by "including the use of armed force" to follow "such action as it deems necessary." Individual members were presumably free to fashion their response to an attack according to their respective national interests.

This was not an ideal solution but it was the best that the Europeans could get in 1949. What may have tipped the balance in favor of the American-oriented text was a recognition that the president's powers as commander-in-chief could evade, or at least dilute, the constitutional prerogatives of Congress. There were precedents sufficient to give the allies confidence in the credibility of the American commitment. President Woodrow Wilson in 1917 was able to bring the nation into World War I despite a strong isolationist pull against involvement. And, in the nineteenth century, President James K. Polk manipulated Congress into declaring war against Mexico by dispatching troops to a disputed territory in the expectation that the Mexican army would fire the first shots.

The unanticipated consequences of these tortuous negotiations emerged as ironies in 2001. The entire allied effort 50 years before had been to convert the United States into an active partner of Western Europe. Only through this linkage were the Europeans convinced that their publics would feel secure enough in the face of Communist hostility to take advantage of the economic aid offered under the Marshall Plan. The impact of Article 5 was psychological rather than military; the image of U.S. B-29s armed with atomic weapons in the air 24 hours a day was an illusion, but it was a comforting one to the European allies in 1949.

In 2001 it was the United States, not Western Europe, that was under attack, and the assistance of the allies was more psychological than military. The dispatch of five NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) to patrol the Atlantic coast was a boost to American morale as

much as it was an earnest of Europe's support. If there was no question about the allies mobilizing their armed forces once Article 5 was invoked, it was partly because this was not an appropriate response to the war against the al Qaeda terrorist network. Moreover, the careful text that the Americans had crafted in 1949 permitted a selective interpretation of how any ally should respond to an attack against another member. Opening air space, providing intelligence, and dispatching anti-chemical warfare teams were all legitimate ways of interpreting Article 5 in 2001.

From April through July 1949, the treaty was ratified by each of the member nations without difficulty. For the Europeans this process not only carried a sense of relief but was also a prelude to the activation of Article 3, which was a particular priority for France. This was the article that would offer U.S. military assistance to the alliance members under the rubric of "mutual" aid. So important was the perceived need for this aid that the Brussels core nations presented a laundry list of items to be supplied only one day after the signing ceremony in Washington. And so eager were the Europeans for military equipment that Article 3 seemed to have been almost as important to them as Article 5. In any event, their demarche discomfited the Truman administration, which felt that their requests were premature at the very least, and perhaps somewhat unseemly. It was as if the Europeans were too impatient in their zeal to take advantage of America's largesse.

Such was the American reaction; it was anything but premature to the allies. In anticipation of the completion of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Western Union's Defense Organization (WUDO) had established committees in the summer of 1948 with the express purpose of presenting their military needs to their future ally. This difference in perspective suggests that a transatlantic fissure developing at the onset of the alliance would expand into other areas over the years.

The Brussels Pact members did receive grants of military aid before the end of the year, but not until the administration and the Senate had attached conditions that did not conform with the spirit of the alliance. When Europeans banded together in 1947 to promote economic cooperation, their intention, spurred on by their American benefactor, was to break the old

pattern of zero-sum relationships among the nations. But this was not the way the United States intended its military aid to be distributed in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act in October 1949. There was a bilateral dimension in "mutual" aid that the allies did not welcome but had to accept.

It took two months-from August to October-and some panic in the Senate over news of the Soviet detonation of an atomic device before the United States was prepared to release funds. Moreover, there were two conditions that the beneficiaries had to meet before the one billion dollars in military assistance would be granted. Both of them portended future difficulties in transatlantic relations that have never been fully resolved.

One of them involved the alliance's need to develop a strategic concept for potential military activity against an adversary. There was nothing unreasonable about this Senate demand. It conformed with the proceedings of the first North Atlantic Council meeting in September 1949 when regional planning groups were established under the aegis of its military units: the Defense Committee composed of defense ministers, the Military Committee represented by chiefs of staff of the member nations, and its Standing Group-the military leaders of Britain, France, and the United States-which would implement the plans of the Military Committee. The lesser allies could hardly object to this arrangement; they were well represented in the Military Committee and in the regional planning groups as well as in the Defense Financial and Economic Committee (DFEC) in Rome and the Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB) in London.

What displeased all the allies-the larger as well as the smaller-was the distribution of forces in the strategic concept. The role of strategic air strikes would be filled by the United States, tactical air by Britain, and ground troops by the other members of NATO. There was a logic to placing strategic air action in American hands, given the reality that only the United States possessed aircraft armed with atomic weapons. Nevertheless, the allies were discomfited by the recognition that they would serve as cannon fodder in the event of a Soviet attack. American airmen in the skies above the battle would be less subject to casualties than the European troops on

the ground below. Echoes of dissent over this division of military labor could be found a half century later in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

While there were credible reasons behind the strategic concept, there was less understanding about the second caveat placed on military aid. The United States insisted on some form of reciprocation for the aid it was donating in the form of base rights on the territories, particularly in the colonial territories of the allies. The argument for such concessions, in Tunisia or Morocco, was that American air bases would serve the alliance and facilitate the military aid the nation had promised. If the sense of national sovereignty was offended, its abridgment could be rationalized.

It was more difficult for the European allies to accept the bilateral nature of the grants. The detailed arrangements of the dollars dispensed were made not by NATO as an organization but by an arrangement between the donor nation and the recipient. This bilateral approach was to ensure that the funds would be properly expended, but inevitably it created friction between the United States and its allies. The American missions in European capitals were intrusive. They were frequently too numerous. The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Oslo, for example, was larger than the entire Norwegian Foreign Office. In larger capitals, their diplomatic status smacked of imperial arrogance. The sensitive French insisted that "advisory" be removed from the title of the inspection mission, and the British insisted that military personnel wear civilian clothes. The aid missions were embarrassments to the European governments, even as they attempted to mitigate them. To add injury to insult, aid was slow in arriving and often inadequate to the country's perceived needs.

American insensitivity to European sensibilities was not confined to monitoring military aid. At the meeting of defense ministers in April 1950, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson shocked and outraged his Dutch counterpart when he recommended, in the course of refining the strategic concept, that the Netherlands turn over its naval responsibilities to the British. The Dutch minister in turn surprised Johnson with the observation that Holland had a naval tradition equal to that of Great Britain, and in fact had swept the English ships from the English Channel in the seventeenth

century. Nor were American leaders sufficiently sensitive to the fragility of Western Europe's efforts at economic recovery. Pressing the allies to expend more on their military defenses failed to take into account the jeopardy that diversion of finances might place on their economic recovery programs, which were embodied in the Marshall Plan. In brief, the American tradition of nonintervention may have been breached by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, but old habits of unilateralism died hard, and new assumptions of superiority based on prerogatives of power created an imbalance in the alliance that might have doomed it in its infancy.

WI.:. preserved NATO in that first year was a fitful recognition on the part of the Ui 'ted States that its behavior reflected serious shortcomings, and required a willingness to repair damages it had inflicted. For example, over the years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come up with scenarios on war with the Soviet Union. The predominant one that they brought into the alliance was the impossibility of defending the European mainland from a Soviet ground attack. In their ShortTerm Defense Plan, they postulated defense at the perimeters-the Pyrenees, the Suez, and the British Isles. From these bases NATO could mount an attack on Soviet Europe much as the allies of World War Il did against Nazi Germany less than a decade before. To Europeans, a defense plan of this sort revived memories they would prefer to forget. Liberation after another enemy occupation was unacceptable. The populations of Europe, particularly of France, would opt for a proCommunist neutralism rather than undergo the replication of World War 11. The gloomy judgment in Paris was that the Americans would be liberating a corpse.

The United States understood and responded to this concern with a revised plan-the Medium Term Defense Plan (MDTP), which NATO adopted in the spring of 1950. The blanket of NATO responsibility would be extended to the Rhine. This was not a wholly satisfactory solution; it left the Netherlands, divided by the river, uncertain of the alliance's protection. Although it also excluded a divided Germany, the continuing presence of allied occupation forces, particularly American, was a source of at least temporary solace. The tensions between the senior and junior partners in the alliance underlay all NATO activities. The initiatives inevitably were the

product of the American conception of the alliance's interests, and the Europeans for the most part had no choice but to comply with them. That the United States was sensible to some of their concerns when they were raised loudly enough helped lend an aura of success to NATO's first year.

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IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR: 1950-1958

The unifying force in the beginning of NATO's history was the Korean War. Initially, it activated many of the doubts that American behavior had fed before 25 June 1950. Asia and the Pacific had been the traditional focus of American foreign policy; none of the elements of nonentanglement or of isolationism was attached to this part of the world. The United States had been a player in Asia throughout the nineteenth century, and it seemed probable to many European observers that the nation would turn its back on Europe and focus once again on Asia.

These fears proved to be groundless. Rather than retreat from Europe, American policymakers envisioned the North Korean invasion of South Korea as part of the global Communist assault against the West. The Truman administration assumed that Stalin had incited the North Koreans to test NATO's resolve. Although this proved to be an inaccurate reading of the complicated politics of the intra-Commu- nist world, it was sufficient to equate a divided Germany with a divided Korea. If the Communists succeeded in controlling the Korean peninsula, they would then unleash the Communist forces of East Germany to attack West Germany. In this context, the United States not only led a coalition nominally under the auspices of the United Nations in defense of South Korea but felt it necessary to build up sufficient strength in Western Europe to cope with an anticipated Communist attack from the East. East Germany, like North Korea, would serve as Soviet surrogates. Rather than abandon NATO and Europe, the United States embraced the alliance and intended to fortify it and reshape it as a military organization.

Western Europeans should have been grateful for the American reaction, and up to a point they were. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 had been renewed shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War, but with a minuscule increase in the amount of monetary contribution. In the summer of 1950, Congress added 4 billion new dollars to the support of Europe's military defenses. Gratifying though this show of support was, America's heightened awareness of Europe's vulnerability brought discomfort and confusion to the alliance. In increasing aid, the United States required its allies to assume a proportional burden. But this expectation raised the danger that additions to their military budgets would jeopardize the economic recovery that the Marshall Plan had fostered since 1948. The United States was asking too much of its allies. It could afford to put into effect the findings of National Security Council document NSC 68 that had advocated in the spring of 1950 a massive increase in the nation's defense budget to cope with an impending Soviet invasion. Before the Korean War, President Truman had been wavering over whether to accept this recommendation; after June 1950, the administration felt it could do no less. And the NATO allies who would bear the brunt of a Communist assault should do their share. The United States could afford this buildup; the allies could not.

But raising the level of military assistance and increasing defense budgets were minor elements in the changes NATO would undergo and in the traumas they could cause the allies. The Korean War transformed the alliance into a genuine military organization. Until June 1950, there were only the trappings of military underpinnings of NATO-military committees, regional planning groups, even a military production-and-supply board in London and a Defense Financial and Economic Committee in Rome. They were going through the motions of military preparation. There was little coordination among them; the extended spread of their locations suggested a political rather than a military justification for their presence. What mattered in the first year of NATO's history was the rubric of America's commitment that would shelter all its members. This permitted the Europeans to accept the difficult terms of that commitment.

The post-Korean environment brought some changes that the allies welcomed. Before the end of 1951, a year-and-a-half after the war began, NATO had a supreme allied command in Europe, headed by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, a supreme allied commander for the Atlantic, coherent military commands in Europe, and the impending admission of two new members-Greece and Turkey. In this period, plans were underway as well for a civilian secretary-general to replace the foreign and defense ministers who lacked the time to devote to NATO affairs. Their deputies lacked the authority to coordinate NATO activities efficiently in the Deputies' Council that had been established in May 1950. To give additional credibility to the military character of the alliance, the United States in the winter of 1951 agreed to dispatch four divisions to Europe not only as a deterrence against Soviet aggression but also as an earnest of NATO's ability to turn back a Soviet invasion.

If these reinforcements-political and military-had been the totality of NATO's transition, the allies could have managed the additional burdens on their economies. But in the process of enabling NATO to meet a Soviet military chal lenge, the United States created new divisions between itself and its allies. These involved, for the most part, the two major European powers, Britain and France, and to a lesser extent the smaller members, who felt excluded from the decisionmaking process.

BRITISH GRIEVANCES IN THE 1950s

British "Greeks" versus American "Romans"

Of all the allies, it was the United Kingdom that believed itself to be the most intimate partner of the United States. Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin had taken the initiative in pushing America out of its isolationism after the collapse of negotiations at the foreign ministers meeting with the Soviet Union in London in December 1947. In January 1948, his speech before Parliament advocated a union of European nations as evidence of their

seriousness in breaking with their tradition of internecine conflict and demonstrating that Western Europe was ready for a political counterpart to the economic reconstruction sponsored by the Marshall Plan. His conception of the Brussels Pact two months later was to have the Western Union serve as a vehicle for the United States to join the new organization.

The Truman administration's endorsement of the Brussels Pact did not include American membership. But British hopes were buoyed by the subsequent Pentagon conversations with the United States and Canada in late March 1948 resulting in a confidential understanding that an Atlantic security organization would follow in the near future. It is worth noting that France was excluded from the Pentagon meetings on the grounds that Communist influence in its government precluded confidentiality. Ironically, it was the British mole, Donald Maclean, serving as the rapporteur of these and other meetings, that permitted the Soviets to know the inner workings behind the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty. British leadership in the ongoing negotiations in Washington and in the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO), both moving simultaneously if not cooperatively in the summer of 1948, went unchallenged. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, not General Jean de Lame de Tassigny, was chairman of WUDO's Commander-inChief Committee.

In this setting it is understandable that British leaders would identify a special relationship with the United States that would make the United Kingdom primus inter pares in Europe. Indeed, the sentiment prevailing in Britain in the 1950s, expressed by such political figures as Harold Macmillan and by British pundits of the distinction of Alistair Buchan, was that the British would serve civilization as Greeks to the American Romans. In other words, Britain may have lost an empire but not the wisdom, as in the case of Greek slaves, to guide the powerful and relatively ignorant Americans, the Romans of the twentieth century, in the ways of diplomacy

Bevin and his colleagues were mistaken. The Americans had no intention of serving as surrogates for the strong but immature Romans. Their leaders, tested in World War 11, came to the conclusion that the Old

World diplomats, especially those of Britain in the 1930s, had failed to deal with the Fascist menace successfully. Americans could do better and did not need the discredited diplomacy of Europe to manage the Communist threat. The British were the "Greeks" who had successively departed India, Greece, and Palestine in the years immediately preceding the Atlantic pact. No American statesman expressed the devaluation of British statecraft more succinctly than former Secretary of State Dean Acheson who outraged Britain in 1959 with a speech at West Point in which he observed that the British had lost an empire without finding a new mission. The "special" relationship obviously had its limits.

The limits of British influence over American foreign policy in NATO were evident early in the history of the alliance. The leadership Britain had exercised in 1948, when Britain was a key partner in the Pentagon conversations and when the Western Union's headquarters was in London, dimmed by 1952. NATO's headquarters was transferred from London to Paris under pressure from the American ally to appease the French partner. The transfer was not in the British interest. Similarly, Britain was frustrated by its inability to secure a major command as NATO was reorganized in 1951. That Britain with its long and distinguished naval tradition should have assumed that the Supreme Command of the Atlantic would be assigned to a British admiral was only logical, a counterpart to the American general as supreme commander in Europe. To the dismay of the British government, and particularly to the admiralty, the command went to an American, Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, with the headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia.

There was more frustration for Britain when it was denied a Mediterranean command, under Lord Louis Mountbatten in Malta, which might have had a standing only slightly inferior to that of Eisenhower's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in Paris. Instead of enjoying an autonomous role in the Mediterranean, Mountbatten was required to report to Eisenhower through the southern command headquarters in Naples, headed by an American admiral. The most that the British could salvage from a distribution of commands in 1951 was the assignment of the Channel Command, an obvious sop to British pride. It

was also an accurate judgment of the disparity between the American and British military establishments.

The special relationship suffered further setbacks in NATO's first decade, but none was more humiliating than the American reaction to Britain's effort to retake the Suez Canal by force in 1956. Egypt and the canal were not within the scope of NATO's responsibility, as defined in Article 6 of the treaty. It became, however, one of many "out-of-area" problems that affected both U.S. relations with its allies and occasionally the survival of NATO itself. The colonial empires of NATO allies had presented problems in NATO's first generation involving Portugal, Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In fact, even as the North Atlantic Treaty was being framed in the early spring of 1949, American demands that the Netherlands accede to Indonesian independence generated resentment in The Hague that could have kept the Dutch out of the alliance. Only the intervention of Britain's Bevin eased American pressure at that critical moment.

The Suez Debacle

The Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal was a more severe challenge to the alliance. In a bid for leadership in the Arab world as well as an assertion of Egyptian nationalism, Nasser took over an operation that had been built and controlled for almost a century by Britain and France. For the British, the canal was a vital link to what remained of their empire in Asia. The Eisenhower administration had appeared to share the concerns of the allies but when it came down to possible military action against Egypt, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was evasive about the American position. He wanted to work within the framework of the UN charter to undo Nasser's seizure of the canal. Distrustful of Dulles's intentions, Britain and France joined with Israel in October 1956, without informing their American ally, to wrest the canal from Egypt. Israel, under constant threat of Egyptian aggression, successfully crossed the Sinai, defeating the Egyptian army as it moved swiftly toward the canal. The British and French naval invasion, however,

stalled before it could retake it, allowing Egypt to appeal to the United Nations for support against aggression from two major NATO partners.

The result was the near destruction of the alliance as the United States sided with the Soviets to oppose the Suez operation. It was a painful moment for all the allies because the abortive invasion of Egypt coincided with Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt against the Warsaw Pact. Instead of condemning the Soviets' brutal actions in Hungary, NATO found itself on the defensive as the Communist world condemned the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt in the United Nations. Given the strong position of the United States on the illegal use of force, it felt compelled to join the Soviet adversary in the UN judgment against its NATO allies. America's condemnation was all the more galling because it spoiled an opportunity to place the Soviet Union on the dock before the bar of world opinion over its behavior in Hungary. Both Britain and France succumbed to this combined pressure and retreated from the canal. Not surprisingly, Israel, which had the most justification for striking at its Egyptian enemy, received the harshest treatment from the United Nations as it surrendered the security it had hoped to gain from occupying the Sinai.

Prime Minister Anthony Eden resigned under criticism from liberals critical of gunboat diplomacy and from conservatives critical of the failure of that form of diplomacy. Still, Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan, enjoyed a close relationship with President Eisenhower, stemming from the camaraderie of World War II, that helped repair the relationship between the two nations. A case may be made that the relationship, having survived the Suez crisis, was stronger at the end of the 1950s than it had been at the beginning of that decade. Despite periodic tensions, Anglo-American ties dating from World War II remained strong in such areas as intelligence and technology, symbolized by Britain's being granted access to nuclear information in 1958. Congress amended the 1946 McMahon Act, which had proscribed dissemination of nuclear information to all foreign nations. The ongoing challenge of the Soviet Union, emboldened by its success with Sputnik, the first earth satellite, in 1957, drew the United States closer to Britain, as did Chairman Nikita Khrushchev's efforts to drive the Western allies out of Berlin in 1958. Arguably, General Charles de Gaulle as

president of the new Fifth Republic was another unifying force, given his opposition to the "Anglo-Saxon" domination of NATO. Whether these centripetal forces were sufficient to justify a meaningful "special relationship" remains open to question.

THE FRENCH MALAISE IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

There was similar ambivalence in France's attitude toward the senior partner. It was a complicated mix of appreciation for American leadership against the Soviet threat and potential German revival combined with resentment over a superior civilization's dependence on a parvenu nation's power to surmount the challenges of the postwar world. The respect was usually grudging, and gratitude rarely acknowledged. If France had to accept America's bounty, it wanted to be sure that American assistance would be used to make France the leader of the European allies.

The Treaty of Paris (1778) and the Treaty of Washington (1949)

A comparison between the Treaty of Paris in 1778 and the Treaty of Washington in 1949 may have some legitimacy. In both cases the lesser power was dependent on a great ally for its immediate future-in the American case, independence from Great Britain; in the French case, protection in an Americanled alliance against both the Soviet Union and Germany. Although there were some obvious differences-the United States was an emerging nation, while France had been the premier power in Europe-the similarities in behavior were striking. Neither country gave suitable recognition to the contributions of the other. France's intervention was a critical factor in the success of the American Revolution. Yet the leaders of the new nation not only distrusted the senior ally but completed its treaty of independence without consulting France, and then sought to terminate the entangling alliance without consideration of the sacrifices the ancien regime had made on its behalf.

Something of this spirit prevailed in France's attitude toward the United States after World War II. If an alliance had to be made, France should be the primary recipient of American aid without regard to the sensibilities of the benefactor or of the other beneficiaries. It distrusted American motives much as the American revolutionary leaders had doubts about the beneficence of its French ally. They feared a secret plan to restore a French empire in America despite the French monarchy's disclaimers. Similarly, the French saw behind America's support an imperial design that justified France's lack of gratitude for U.S. aid.

Arguably, the most telling link between the French of the eighteenth century and the Americans of the twentieth century was the willingness of the senior partners in each circumstance to accept the distrust, the selfishness, and the ingratitude of the junior partners in the treaties. Two distinguished economists-Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhouser-proposed an explanation for the willingness of the senior partners to accept the lack of support for a common policy by the junior partners. This lay primarily in the larger stake the greater power has in the purposes of the alliance. The lesser ally could often pursue its own national interests even when they conflicted with the general welfare of the alliance or even with the national interest of the senior partner. This was manifestly true in 1782 when the American peace commissioners in Paris made their own arrangements with Britain without informing their French benefactor. Rather than punishing the United States for this behavior, the French foreign minister accepted the treaty initialed by the Americans and even provided new loans to the young nation. The reason simply was that to abandon the treaty of alliance would encourage an undesirable Anglo-American rapprochement.

In the negotiations over the North Atlantic Treaty, French representatives insisted on measures that irritated the American partner. Initially, France opposed enlarging membership beyond the five Brussels Pact members. But when the United States insisted on including the Scandinavian countries, France reversed its objections to Italian membership, largely to redress the northern tilt Denmark and Norway would present to the alliance. It also secured the inclusion of France's Algerian departments north of the Tropic of Cancer within NATO under

Article 6. This was not an addition that the United States wanted, but one it had to accept to satisfy the French constituency.

The ability of the lesser power to manipulate the greater was most visible in the aftermath of the Korean War. America's decision was to treat West Germany as a potential victim of Communist aggression in much the same way that it judged the war in Korea. Was Stalin testing America's ability to resist an invasion in a divided peninsula? The nation's response was to take no chances in the likely event that the North Korean invasion of South Korea was a proving ground for an East German invasion of the West, both orchestrated by the Soviet leader. Consequently, the United States demanded of its allies a buildup of their armed forces commensurate with the threat they faced but did so without sufficient recognition of the limits of their abilities to finance increases in their military establishments.

Yet this was not the core of France's reservations about American demands. Its primary concern was over the apparent need for NATO to accept German rearmament as a significant part of Western defense. From the American perspective this was a logical step. German resources were necessary for NATO to cope with a Soviet invasion that was anticipated as early as 1952, and certainly no later than 1954. For France, the prospect of Germans in uniform once again so soon after World War 11 was unacceptable no matter how vital the need of a rearmed Germany. Furthermore, the American demand for a German contribution seemed to be a repudiation of the many assurances American leaders had given on demilitarization as well as denazification of Germany.

The United States, France, and the European Defense Community

Other European allies, former victims of Nazi aggression, shared French uneasiness about the American demands, but it was France that articulated opposition at the New York meeting of the North Atlantic Council to what Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson had put into a "single package": namely, massive American aid in return for German troops. One French delegate called Johnson's proposal "the bomb in the Waldorf." The result

initially was a stalemate at the New York meeting of the North Atlantic Council in September 1950. France could not accept a German military contribution to NATO even if the new Federal Republic formed in May 1949 was fully purged of Germany's Nazi past. The impasse was broken in the following month when a more flexible secretary of defense, General George C. Marshall, replaced the less experienced Louis Johnson. The latter's frosty relationship with Secretary of State Dean Acheson had been a source of friction within the Truman administration even before the outbreak of the Korean War. With Johnson's departure, the Acheson-Marshall partnership opened new opportunities for accommodation with France.

In this improved atmosphere Jean Monnet, a respected French economist and proven friend of the United States, proposed the Pleven Plan (named for the premier of France at the time) to place German troops at the service of NATO under safeguards that would appease the uneasy French. Under this plan, German soldiers would not serve as a separate national force, but would be placed in a European army in units no larger than that of a battalion. Monnet, a proponent of an evolutionary approach to European unity, saw this arrangement as a military counterpart to the economic integration of Germany's and France's coal and steel production in the Schuman Plan of May 1950. His ultimate objective was the creation of a united Europe in which the old enmities of France and Germany would be permanently buried. The Pleven Plan would be a functional step toward his goal.

The initial American response was negative. The plan seemed unworkable with Germans represented in only battalion strength. The compromise of the Spofford Plan, named for Charles Spofford, the U.S. chairman of NATO's Deputies Council, raised the German membership from battalions to regimental combat teams but did little to still American skepticism about both the viability of the plan and France's reasons for advancing it. Acheson was convinced that it was a device to postpone if not to negate the needed German contribution to Europe's defense. Although his estimate was accurate, at least as far as the motives of the French

government were concerned, American reservations did not matter. The United States had to accept the French terms-and more.

If German rearmament was the quid in the Franco-American relationship, the re-creation of NATO as a military organization under a Supreme Allied Commander in Europe was the quo. German units available for the defense of Europe would serve under the Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the liberator of World War II. This was the price the French demanded for their concessions on Germany, and the Americans paid it at the Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1950. It was at this session that NATO was reorganized into a credible military entity. Over the following two months the United States underscored its commitment to France's concerns by the agreement of the U.S. Senate to dispatch four divisions to Europe. The American pledge had been largely psychological until the winter of 1951. It became a military reality under French pressure for a vehicle to contain a German contribution.

In the short run at least, the junior partner had achieved its goals at the expense of the senior. France had balked at German rearmament until the United States had agreed to change the nature of its role in Europe. Its own modest concession was only on paper. It required a year-and-a-half of hard bargaining before France would sign the treaty establishing the European Defense Community (EDC) wherein the members of the Western Union, minus Britain, would join West Germany and Italy in an integrated military establishment. The armies of its members would serve under the aegis of the SACEUR. An elaborate governing arrangement was put in place as part of the new community. It would contain an executive authority, a council of ministers, and a court of justice. Although most of the members of the EDC had reservations about one or more of its terms, they all were prepared to ratify the EDC treaty with its 132 articles and associated protocols-except France, its originator.

It disturbed France that Great Britain did not intend to join the EDC. The United Kingdom did sign protocols guaranteeing its association with the Euro peans in the event of a crisis. These promises were never strong

enough to calm French fears of just what impact the 12 German divisions-out of 43 in the EDC force-would have on its own national security. France could never bring itself to ratify the treaty despite repeated assurance of British support.

Signed in May 1952, the treaty died at the hands of the French National Assembly in August 1954, two-and-a-quarter years later. In this interval, France identified new problems growing from fear of rising inferiority to the German military as the Indochina war absorbed its energies. The result could be loss of economic as well as military leadership. Equally important was the blow to French pride in the absorption of its army into a supranational force despite additional protocols that were added in 1953 to preserve the integrity of France's armed forces. Even these were not sufficient. When Premier Pierre Mendes-France pressed for one more protocol at an EDC conference in Brussels in August 1954 to assure passage in the National Assembly, it was one too many for the allies. If accepted, the supranational elements in the community would be removed, a veto would be introduced, and responsibility for collective European defense specifically assigned to the United States and Britain. They rejected the package of amendments and the National Assembly in turn terminated the EDC on a procedural maneuver without debate or vote. What was central to France's rejection was the dilution of French sovereignty implicit in the EDC.

Mendes-France himself may not have been opposed to ratification; his subsequent acceptance of the Federal Republic's admission into NATO by way of an enlarged Western European Union (WEU) suggests that he would have accepted German rearmament. The key to solving the German problem was the involvement of Britain in an enlarged Western European Union that would not only include West Germany but condition its membership on renouncing production of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and on placing its armed forces directly under the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). These were the terms of the London and Paris agreements in the fall of 1954 that brought Germany into NATO in May 1955 through its membership in the WEU. The way was now

reopened for the functional integration of Western Europe that Monnet began with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950.

A new era of Franco-German cooperation had begun that would be further advanced in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that created the European Economic Community (EEC). These developments should have been greeted with appreciation by the American partner. European integration was a long-standing objective of American statecraft. It ranked with the containment of Soviet Communism as a means of ending once and for all the internecine wars in Europe. In practical terms, a united Europe should be able to confront the Communist menace without the United States assuming the economic and military burdens of the post-World War II years. Yet the course of Europe's progress inspired considerable doubts in Washington, particularly because it seemed to be under the dubious aus pices of France. From the outset, the Truman administration suspected that the Pleven Plan and the subsequent EDC were simple devices for France to increase the quantity and quality of American aid. But because there was no alternative to the French proposal as far as the German question was concerned, the Acheson State Department gave its support and eventually its enthusiasm for the EDC.

The Republican administration under President Eisenhower was even more supportive of the EDC than its predecessor had been. This was not because of a reevaluation of France's purposes behind the new community. Rather, it was largely a consequence of the weight the influential secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, exercised in favor of the EDC. He believed that harnessing German resources to NATO was the most effective way of preventing the revival of German militarism. In these expectations he fostered a close collaboration and friendship with the powerful German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. The German leader was sensitive to the inferior role France wanted his country to play in the community. He had to fend off criticism from nationalists on the right, who feared that bending to French pressures would prevent recovery of territories lost to the Communist bloc, and neutralists on the left who feared that binding Germany to the West would either provoke Soviet retaliation or sacrifice an opportunity for reunification. What Adenauer wanted was recovery of

German national dignity while tying the nation to the West in such a way that Germany would never again be a threat to world peace. In these goals he had the wholehearted support of Secretary of State Dulles.

Given the empathy of the U.S. State Department with the position of Adenauer's government, the early suspicions of France's intentions revived. As France stalled in its ratification of the EDC treaty, demanding more and more amendments, Dulles became increasingly impatient with French tactics. By 1953 the Eisenhower administration had become fully convinced that the EDC was the only practical route to German participation in Europe's defense if only France would overcome its objections. In a widely publicized speech in December 1953, the secretary of state threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" of America's support of France. Such a reappraisal could bypass France if the allies chose to allow German rearmament under a special defense agreement. American unhappiness did not stop with suggestions of collective NATO action. If France ultimately scuttled the EDC, Dulles seemed to be willing to make a bilateral alliance with Germany irrespective of French concerns. And in this prospect he had the full backing of the U.S. Senate, which, by a vote of 88 to 0, endorsed a German-American special arrangement.

When the worst scenario appeared to materialize in August 1954, Dulles's anger was directed against Mendes-France. He was willing to believe, for the moment at least, that Mendes had made a deal with the Soviets to kill the EDC in return for Soviet support for France's departure from Indochina. Although the French premier did not merit Dulles's distrust, the tense relations after the demise of the EDC placed the alliance itself in jeopardy. It was at this point that British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was credited with coming up with a device to use German resources and at the same time do so with France's concurrence.

Only one month after the French Assembly acted-or refused to act-a nine-power conference composed of the Western Union countries, Germany, Italy, the United States, and Canada met in London to resolve the problem. It had to be done outside NATO's institutional framework because German accession to NATO would have been impossible under the

alliance's rules. Any one member could have stopped the process, and France might not have been the only ally to cast a veto. But by enlarging the Western Union to include Germany and Italy, France would have assurances that had been lacking before, namely, Britain's participation and the aforementioned restrictions on German military involvement. Here was the vehicle that permitted Germany to join the alliance with France's approval.

In these negotiations the United States played a minor role-at least on one level. It did not initiate the solution. In fact, it took Dulles some time to overcome his suspicions of Mendes-France's government and to realize that much of what he had wanted from the EDC would be available in the circuitous path to German membership in NATO. German troops would be in the service of NATO even though there would be no separate German military staff; unlike the forces of the other allies, Germans would be assigned to and deployed directly by SACEUR. Not until the winter of 1954-1955 did the secretary of state appreciate the steadfastness of Mendes-France in winning the National Assembly's reluctant approval of the Federal Republic's admission into NATO via the expanded Western European Union. The effort cost the premier his position.

The American role in the solution to the German question is still shrouded in some mystery. In the course of Mendes-France's visits to the United States in the 1960s, long after he was out of office, he was asked about Eden's initiative in formulating the London agreement, an initiative, incidentally, for which Harold Macmillan also claimed credit. Mendes-France responded that it was not a British idea; it came from France. The former premier said that Dulles was too angry with him to receive any new ideas from a French minister. Hence, he turned over the proposal to Eden in the expectation that a British sponsor would be more acceptable to the American partner. In so doing, Mendes-France disclosed that France was not opposed in principle to German membership in NATO; it was the terms of the EDC that were indigestible to the National Assembly.

Where then does the United States fit into this European picture? The course of events in the fall of 1954 suggest that the United States was an

onlooker, a belated supporter of actions taken by its junior partners, largely because it had no choice. It seemed to have been just a single member of the Nine-Power Conference, not its dominant figure. Consequently, a prominent British scholar, Alan Milward, has judged that the United States was essentially irrelevant in the solution to the German problem. This was a European problem, solved by Europeans.

There is some validity to this argument. Certainly the passions manifested in the State Department and the Congress did not deflect France from its course against the EDC. Nor did the United States pick up the pieces afterward. Yet Europe was constantly looking over its shoulder as it worked its way out of the conflict between France's concern for security against revival of German power and the Federal Republic's concern for equality in the alliance. The Cold War remained a focus of all the allies despite hopes that Stalin's successors would ease East-West relations. Only the United States could ensure stability while the European allies wrestled with the Franco-German issues. Granted that Dulles was not the prime mover in the fall of 1954, if the United States had opposed the agreements leading West Germany's accession to NATO, the London and Paris agreements would not have succeeded. The American imprimatur was a necessity.

The United States, France, and Indochina

Of all the problems in Franco-American relations in the 1950s, Indochina was the most enduring obstacle to harmony between the two allies. The German problem did come to a conclusion in 1955 while Indochina, like other out-of-area issues plaguing NATO, festered in French consciousness into the next decade and beyond. There was no Jean Monnet to deflect American pressure. France felt itself a victim of American manipulation in Indochina when it abandoned the peninsula in the Geneva Conference of 1954.

Indochina was a NATO problem from the inception of the alliance. For France the alliance was a seeming lifesaver for its stake in Southeast Asia. When World War II ended there had been hopes both in Indochina and

among its friends in the United States that an independent new nation would be established. France, on the other hand, was put off balance by American sympathy for anticolonial movements in Asia; President Franklin D. Roosevelt opposed French resumption of its colonial rule after Japan had been ousted and applauded the efforts of the popular nationalist leader, Ho Chi Minh, to remove French colonialism permanently from Indochina.

France resisted its ouster, asserting that it had eradicated colonialism by including the three associated Indochinese states-Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodiain a French Union under their own ruler, Emperor Bao Dai. But the most compelling argument for France in its relations with the United States was the Communist label attached to Ho Chi Minh. As confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union spread after World War II, the transformation of an anticolonial rebellion into a Communist drive for power resonated positively in the United States by the time NATO was formed.

France's success in winning American support for its war in Indochina was secured by its claim to be fighting a war against international Communism. This reasoning became all the more important when the Korean War placed the United States in a similar position. An equation was made between the war against Communism in northeastern Asia and the war against Communism in southeastern Asia, both orchestrated, it seemed, by the Soviet Union. What many Americans had considered a nationalist rebellion against French domination before 1950 became a partner of the Communist challenge to the West. France in its own way was attempting to resist the tide of Communist expansion much in the way the United States and the United Nations were resisting North Korea's invasion of South Korea.

The critical link between NATO and Indochina developed from France's derailing of American demands for a military buildup in Europe by claiming that its war in Indochina was serving the common cause. When the NATO allies at the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council in February 1952 agreed to raise 50 divisions in Europe, the United States made known its intention to provide $200 million in military equipment for

use in Indochina. If there was any doubt about the equation of military aid to Indochina with France's participation in Europe's military effort, the State Department dispelled it by admitting that the United States had to be prepared to assume an increasing share of France's burden in Indochina. The reason was clear. If Washington did not help, the weapons the French would supply to the Indochina war would be at the expense of their NATO commitments, particularly to the EDC.

The connections between NATO and Indochina became more entangled when France used the meeting in Paris of the North Atlantic Council in December 1952 to make specific the intertwining of its struggle against Communism in Asia with NATO's in Europe. Under French pressure, the council passed a resolution proclaiming that the French campaign in Indochina was in "fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community" and so "deserved continuing support from the NATO Governments" It is worth noting that the United States in the Korean War never won-or asked for-this kind of NATO blessing, although it received passing mention in the resolution. That war, however, was in its last phases, and might have elicited negative reactions from the allies if it had not been conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

Immediate increases in American military aid to the French forces in Indochina signified a practical application of the NATO resolution. But France had won only a pyrrhic victory in its successful exploitation of weakness in Europe and Asia. The end result of its war was a catastrophic defeat for France in the loss of its garrison in Dienbienphu in May 1954, consequent blaming of the United States for the disaster, and subsequent surrender of all Indochina at the Geneva Conference in July of that year. The two allies exchanged increasingly bitter charges. Having undertaken the supply of the French army in Indochina, American military advisers also offered advice and guidance on the assumption that France's difficulties stemmed from strategic as well as tactical errors. As French leaders boxed themselves in at a putatively impregnable stronghold like Dienbienbphu, they blamed Americans first with unacceptable interference with their campaigns, and then with failure to fulfill promises of sufficient military assistance. The American military team on the ground in turn concluded

that the French generals' unwillingness to follow their advice led to their defeat.

A spate of mutual recriminations came after Dienbienphu. The atmosphere was clouded by the French accusation of betrayal when the United States refused to employ its nuclear weapons to help the beleaguered ally at its moment of crisis. If such a promise was made, it was so vague that it could be credibly denied. Such was the case. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that a commitment to the use of nuclear weapons was never made. France, in the judgment of the U.S. government, was responsible for its own plight. The French military in particular did not accept this denial, and the country's political leaders were convinced that American behavior at the Geneva Conference confirmed their belief that their ally purposely undermined French defense of Indochina.

It was obvious that the United States was the primary actor at Geneva in the effort to extract France from its plight in Indochina without conceding victory to the Communist adversary. To effect this result, the cooperation of the two Communist powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, was required. The Soviets were willing to support the United States on this issue because they anticipated benefits from the dissolution of the EDC. Moreover, they, along with British representatives, would serve on a commission to observe compliance with the terms of the Geneva agreement, giving them a visible presence in Southeast Asia. China was less happy with the outcome of the conference but was pressed by the Soviets to accept it. From the American standpoint the results were positive. The victorious Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh did not take over all Indochina. Laos and Cambodia became separate independent entities although Vietnam was divided at the seventeenth parallel; the northern half would become North Vietnam under the control of Ho Chi Minh. But south of that line an independent South Vietnam would decide for itself in a free election whether it would unite with the North.

It was France that felt slighted in these arrangements. The temporary new government of South Vietnam would be headed by a nationalist, Ngo Dinh Diem, who had a history of anticolonial and anti-French activities. In

French eyes, Diem was an American surrogate, which confirmed their suspicions that the United States engineered their ouster from Southeast Asia in order to replace France as the "colonial" power in Vietnam. Although this interpretation may be written off as a species of paranoia, the subsequent history of Vietnam and the American relationship to the new state gave credibility to French accusations of collaboration with Diem. The promise of a free election was not realized, in good measure because the United States feared that Ho Chi Minh's popularity as a nationalist hero would have won over South Vietnam, creating a unified Vietnam on Communist terms.

To bolster South Vietnam against subversion from frustrated Communist supporters, the United States initiated the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), with Asian members drawn from Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan but also including an ambivalent France as well as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The professed mission of the new organization was to contain Communist expansion in Asia as NATO was doing in Europe, but without the integrated command organization the Atlantic alliance had assembled. But SEATO's most immediate function was to issue a protocol placing a vulnerable South Vietnam under its protection.

France would neither forget nor forgive American behavior in 1954. The Indochina trauma poisoned Franco-American relations in the Fourth Republic and provided a major justification for Charles de Gaulle's treatment of NATO in the next decade. For France, the Indochina humiliation at the hands of the United States was replicated at Suez in 1956. Unlike in Britain, there was no rapprochement with the United States after that debacle. Instead, there was an anticipation of further American animosity against French interests in the more sensitive area of Algeria in the late 1950s. The Algerian demand for independence was sparked by Indochina's success, even though Algeria, unlike the Associated States of Indochina, was integrated into metropolitan France. It did not escape French attention that there was an articulate lobby in the United States, with which such prominent figures as Senator John F. Kennedy was associated,

that promoted an independent Algeria. The legacy of resentment carried over into the Gaullist years of the 1960s and beyond.

The Attitudes of Smaller Members

It is hardly surprising that the allies outside the leadership circle would nurse their own resentments; the Military Committee, for example, encompassed all the members except Iceland, but only Britain and France joined the United States in its Standing Group. And it was not just United States behavior that disturbed them. As early as the winter of 1948 when the Brussels Pact was in process, the Low Countries had to raise their voices to receive equal treatment from the British and French allies. But inevitably it was the United States that bore the brunt of their criticisms. Their complaint essentially centered on the failure of the senior partner to consult with the smaller nations in the alliance. Although NATO prided itself on its decision making by consensus, "the NATO method," consensus was reached either by unilateral actions or by confining consultation to the major powers. The smaller nations were left on the sidelines. To remedy this situation, the North Atlantic Council, in May 1956, established a committee of three foreign ministers from Italy, Canada, and Norway to advise the council on means of advancing cooperation within NATO to produce greater unity. The report of the Committee of Three in December of that year went no further than to ask the secretary-general to develop proposals that would implement their recommendations.

Coming as it did in the year of the Suez crisis, the discontents of the smaller nations received minimal attention at the time. Although their concerns about neglect were genuine, the Scandinavian countries had been able to leverage their influence from the beginning to act successfully against the preferences of the United States. They were important cogs in the U.S. plans for supplying Europe's defenses, and as such required concessions not given to other allies. Yet they entered the alliance negotiations at the end of the process, partly because of the reluctance of the core Brussels Pact signatories to enlarge the membership, partly because of the possibility of Denmark and Norway-with Sweden-entering into a Nordic Pact. Under Swedish leadership, this group counted on American

assistance to make their defense plans viable. When the United States refused to accept the arrangement, Sweden opted for neutrality in the Cold War, leaving Norway and Denmark to join the Atlantic pact.

Norway with its historic ties to Britain was more anxious than Denmark to participate in NATO. The latter had a long tradition of neutrality, even though like Norway it saw that neutrality violated in World War II. Norway, however, was the one NATO ally in 1949 that had the Soviet Union as a neighbor, which intensified its awareness of potential Soviet aggression. In 1948, a provocative Soviet demand for a nonaggression pact with Norway had been a factor, along with the Communist coup in Prague, that accelerated the conclusion of the Brussels Pact. Still, there were significant reservations in Norway's and Denmark's adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty that earned them the name of "footnote" members.

Given Norway's northern border with the Soviet Union, the Norwegians wanted to be assured that no NATO troops would be stationed on their land except under threat of war. Until then all military exercises by the allies on Norwegian territory would be held 250 miles from the border. Denmark, less vulnerable to Soviet pressure, joined Norway in denying NATO the deployment of atomic weapons on its territory as it deferred to neutralist sentiments in its legislature. The United States did not welcome these footnotes, but had to accede to them as the price of Scandinavian participation in the alliance. As in the case of France in this period, the Olson-Zeckhouser thesis was applicable; the smaller nations with a different stake in the treaty forced the senior partner to permit a degree of independence it otherwise would not have granted.

Such freedom was not always in evidence. Another Scandinavian ally, Iceland-with a special isolationist tradition created by is location-caused a crisis when it attempted to follow its own path in 1956. Not that Iceland was unfamiliar with wartime exigencies. When Denmark was overrun by Nazi Germany in World War II, the United States occupied Iceland to keep it out of German control, but this was a special circumstance. In 1949 Iceland tried to write into the North Atlantic Treaty a neutral status if it became a member. Although this reservation was unacceptable to the

United States, Iceland managed to extract an understanding that there would be no bases and no arms unless there was danger of invasion. The Korean War came to Iceland in the form of a defense agreement with the United States in May 1951. It stipulated that the United States would come to the aid of Iceland in accordance with its responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty and that Iceland would make available its defense facilities.

Under this arrangement the American military was based primarily in the area of the Keflavik airport in numbers that loomed large in a population of little more than 150,000. And when the Korean War wound down two years later, the U.S. forces became a ready target for a coalition of the liberal Progressive Party, the Communist Party, and the National Preservation Party that had won an impressive victory in the 1953 general election on the strength of its opposition to the U.S. defense forces in Iceland. In the next two years there was expectation that the United States might withdraw from its base at Kleflavik as the Cold War seemed to thaw under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. The Soviet decision to give up its naval base in Porkkala, Finland, provided an impetus for pressure to remove the Americans from the country. The rising discontent with the American presence conformed with the nation's historic isolation and present condition as the one ally in NATO without an army.

By June 1956, a coalition of Progressives, Social Democrats, and Communists took over the government and called for the implementation of a legislative resolution in March calling for the withdrawal of the United States military forces in Iceland. The State Department adopted a deceptively mild line in dealing with this challenge. Just two years before, Dulles had been prepared to take drastic measures against French intransigence over the EDC. In the case of Iceland, however, he appeared ready to accept the demand despite the obvious threat both a Communist-influenced government and the vulnerability of the North Atlantic sea lanes posed to the NATO defense posture in the North Atlantic.

Two significant factors lay behind the U.S. tolerance of Iceland's behavior in the summer and fall of 1956. One was a confidence that the departure of U.S. forces would have a damaging economic impact on the

country, raising questions among those affected about the wisdom of its government's decision. A few weeks after the government reversed its position the U.S. International Co-Operation Administration announced a loan of $4 million. The other was the united stand of the NATO allies against withdrawal of American forces. Conscious of Soviet suppression of the Hungarian rebellion in October, Iceland changed its mind. The Suez crisis in 1956 gave special urgency to NATO's plea. Iceland's positive response and its rejection of the Communist role in its government was a relief to all the members.

Iceland's behavior suggests both the lengths and the limitations imposed on a small and, in this case, a very minor ally as it pursued its own interests. The limits and freedoms of all allies-large and small-were evident in the discontents of the 1950s. Each of the European members had its own grievances against American leadership in NATO, and each in its own way made them clear to the senior partner. At no time did any member consider disengagement from the alliance, even Iceland in 1956. The Cold War in the background always provided a check on transatlantic passions. The partners managed to work out most difficulties through "the NATO method" of consensus. And where difficulties appeared irreconcilable, they were bypassed in the hope they would dissipate in time. Tensions seemed highest not over conflicts of national interests but over perceptions of the weakening of the American pledge after Sputnik in 1957.

3

THE GAULLIST DECADE: 1958-1968

That General Charles de Gaulle as president of France under the new Fifth Republic was the leading European challenger to American primacy in NATO during the next decade is not open to doubt. His towering presence dominated Europe's relations with the United States, even as many of the European allies resented France's pretensions in this period. His rise to power from the ashes of the Fourth Republic coincided with the perception of American vulnerability to Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile attack generated by the successful launching of its earth satellite, Sputnik, in October 1957. It was a shock both to Americans and Europeans to experience a potential enemy flying the skies over their countries. Not even American efforts to demonstrate that its missile technology was actually more advanced than the Soviet counterpart or its quick dispatch of nuclear stockpiles to Europe were sufficient to erase the trauma caused by the Soviet exploit.

Until 1957, the United States had been considered invulnerable to any potential Soviet aggression. Unlike Europe's, its territory was beyond the adversary's range, and its promise under Article 5 to respond to an enemy assault credible. The Soviets could not touch the United States while the Soviet Union and its allies were restrained by U.S. nuclear power based in Europe. It was under this rubric that the NATO allies found a sense of security and achieved economic prosperity. They accepted an inferior role despite all their discontents over American control of the alliance. It is worth observing that the titles and authority of Supreme Allied Commanders were given to American leaders while the Europeans had to settle for the role of Secretary-General. The former were military figures,

the latter civilian. Moreover, the generals were usually figures of international fame and influence. General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Lauris Norstad often seemed to be the equals of European heads of government. The secretaries-general on the other hand were prominent figures, but usually only within their own nations. Lord Ismay (General Hastings Lionel Ismay), the first secretary-general, was a wartime aide of Winston Churchill; Paul-Henri Spaak and Dirk Stikker were political leaders in Belgium and the Netherlands, respectively, but not in the class of an Eisenhower.

European concession to American superiority was the pattern of the 1950s. Would the American commitment to its allies remain intact when the United States could be the object of an enemy attack by means of the new missiles? Repeatedly during his presidency de Gaulle answered this question negatively. It seemed illogical, he proclaimed, for any country to place the security of others, whether or not in an alliance, over its own. Would the United States consider an attack against Paris the equivalent of an attack against New York when New York was as exposed to enemy action? He never framed his question quite this baldly but the implications were always there. More specifically, he reminded the allies about America's interests in Asia and the Pacific being older and more constant than its involvement with Europe. The Vietnam War in which the United States was increasingly entangled was his case in point. Among its other instructive uses he cited it to question the wisdom as well as the geographical direction of American policy. Given doubts about the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Europe, de Gaulle saw France assuming the leadership in Europe that the United States had held in NATO's first decade.

FRANCE AS COLD WAR MEDIATOR

De Gaulle's actions in the 1960s proceeded on the assumption that the Soviet threat of aggression was seriously diminished. Although he considered the Soviet Union a nuclear power on a par with the United

States and its intentions no less hostile to the West than it had been in the past, he recognized that it was no longer the expansionist state it had been a decade before. Its retreat from belligerence over Berlin in 1959 and again in 1961, along with its literal retreat from Cuba in the missile crisis of 1962, encouraged de Gaulle not only to equate the two superpowers in their relation to Europe but also to claim that a Europe under France's direction could play a significant role in mediating between the two. It was this claim that lay behind de Gaulle's assertion that France's arms were poised to counter challenges from every "azimuth."

It was unlikely that he genuinely considered the United States, given its history in NATO, posing the same kind of military threat as the Soviet Union. But his image of the two adversaries suggested more similarities than differences. An anecdote circulating in Europe in the 1960s referred to a dangerous world in which two Caliban monsters, in the Shakespearean image, required the civilizing functions of an Ariel to keep the p. ace. In this context the distinctions between the United States and the Soviet Union disappear, and the European Ariel becomes the key to moderating if not terminating the Cold War. De Gaulle's France would be the center of a European order in which the nations would recognize Paris as the arbiter of Europe's interests. Europeans in general approved the implied flattery even if they might dispute the position of Paris as the capital of this new Europe.

De Gaulle moved gradually but inexorably toward his goals in carefully calibrated steps. The first was to confront the Anglo-Saxon powers with a plan for a triumvirate in which France would join the United States and the United Kingdom to direct NATO affairs. This would presumably correct a situation in which the "NATO method" of consensus on decisions had conferred too much authority on the smaller nations. It is not surprising that the United States and Britain rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would distort the nature of the alliance even if it improved its efficiency. Nor is it likely that de Gaulle was surprised at this reaction; it confirmed his judgment that NATO was a ward of Anglo-America and that France could not achieve equality under this arrangement. He justified rejection of British membership in the EEC in 1962 by his conviction that Britain would be America's Trojan horse in his projected European order.

The Force de Frappe

Having failed to win over the United States to his version of a reorganized NATO, de Gaulle moved to accelerate the development of nuclear independence through France's force de frappe. Although France's nuclear program originated in the frustrations of the Fourth Republic, it was an important gauntlet he was laying before the senior partner. The United States vigorously opposed the proliferation of nuclear weaponry, and made its views clear. In a major speech at the Athens meeting of the North Atlantic Council in May 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara antagonized both the British and the French by criticizing their pretensions to a nuclear capability, but it was the French force de frappe that he found the more unacceptable. From the American standpoint, no other NATO member should find it necessary to have nuclear weaponry; the U.S. nuclear arsenal was more than sufficient to serve all the others. Indivisibility of command was the key term in the secretary's lexicon to avoid conflicting strategies in preparing for a nuclear war. If competing nuclear forces operated independently, the results could be disastrous. Not only would small nuclear powers find building their arsenals expensive and prone to obsolescence but they would lack credibility as a deterrent. Understandably, de Gaulle believed that he was the target of McNamara's peroration.

France made it clear that it did not accept America's objections. Taking the offensive against the American case, French military intellectuals rejected the notion that France would be the Soviet's first victim in the event of a nuclear war, and that its small nuclear capability would be quickly wiped out in the event of a nuclear war. On the contrary, they suggested the prospect of destroying even a limited number of Soviet cities would serve as a force of dissuasion. National nuclear arms, no matter how small, would strengthen deterrence by instilling a sense of insecurity in the minds of a potential aggressor. What was really at issue in French eyes was a transparent American attempt to block France from achieving an element of equality with the United States in NATO and to undermine its leadership in Europe.

The Gaullists could also appeal to fellow Europeans by pointing out that the American insistence in adopting "flexible response" in place of "massive retaliation" against acts of Soviet aggression put the defense of Europe at risk. By keeping nuclear weaponry under sole American control, the United States intended to render it unusable as a weapon of war on the assumption that a nuclear war would be too destructive to initiate. Herein lay the reason for flexibility that would emphasize conventional forces to be used in the event. Only as a last resort would nuclear arms be activated.

France won considerable support from the allies by exposing this strategy as a betrayal of Europe. Given the territorial proximity of Warsaw Pact armies and the putative inadequacy of NATO ground troops, the only guarantee of European security lay in the deterrent power of a low nuclear threshold, not the high threshold urged by Secretary McNamara. De Gaulle was able to use the Soviet-American Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 as proof of his argument. This was an example of the United States going over the heads of the allies to reduce nuclear arms, and in doing so reduce as well the deterrent function of the nuclear weapon. France and most of the allies were not reconciled to the alternative to nuclear weaponry that McNamara advocated in 1962, namely, building up conventional forces both to deter aggression and to defeat an attack if it occurred. Despite American claims to the contrary, such a buildup would be too expensive and probably futile in the face of Soviet conventional strength.

America's failure to impress the French on nuclear matters was only to be expected. Too much had been invested in the force de frappe to convince France to abandon its nuclear program. American opposition was simply another piece of evidence in the case against the hegemony of the transatlantic ally. France's independence of the United States required keeping is nuclear weapons outside NATO's integrated command.

France Leaves SHAPE

It was only a matter of an appropriate time before de Gaulle detached France from SHAPE. He had begun the process by signaling the Soviet Union that France would follow its own course when he removed the

French fleet from the Mediterranean theater in 1959. The slogan Mediterranee aux Mediterraneens (The Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans) was his assertion of French preeminence in the area as well as an assumption that the warships of both superpowers would be excluded from the sea. Four years later he removed the French Atlantic fleet from the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT). In refusing to have France participate in "Fallex '66," NATO's annual military exercise, he seemed to have completed preparations for full withdrawal from the military structure of the alliance.

By the end of 1965, the time at last was ripe. The Cold War had sufficiently thawed for overtures to be made to the Soviets; the German neighbor had accepted France's leadership in Europe through a treaty of cooperation with Adenauer; and the Algerian war had been liquidated. In March 1966, de Gaulle sent a letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson requiring that all NATO commands on French territory be removed within a year's time and that all French personnel would leave their SHAPE posts. The deadline of a year for the United States to pack up its men and materiel and get out of France was insultingly short. But at the same time, the French made it clear that they would not denounce the alliance but would separate participation in the treaty from membership in its military organization.

There was shock and anger in Washington, although the former reaction was less understandable than the latter. The French president had supplied enough signals of his intentions to cushion the surprise when the final action was taken. In fact, American reaction was mixed. The most vehement protests came from such Francophiles as Undersecretary of State George Ball, who felt personally betrayed by France's behavior. He wanted to challenge the legality of de Gaulle's cancellation of agreements that provided for two years' notice before termination. If Ball could have had his way, the United States should retaliate by challenging the legality of the eviction from its bases in France and denying the French access to NATO intelligence sharing. With some bitterness he wondered if the French wanted to evict as well the bodies of American soldiers who had died in two World Wars. The most serious NATO riposte, however, was to remove not

only the military headquarters from France but the political as well. NATO's new home was to be in Belgium.

Undoubtedly, France did do damage to NATO's defense capabilities in the short run. The sheer physical effort to transfer supply lines into Germany from an Atlantic route via France to North Sea ports in Germany was not only costly but disruptive. Yet it did not generate the kind of hostility that could have led to France's isolation if not ejection from the alliance. (There was no mechanism to throw out a member.) In fact, de Gaulle's posture, as pointed out in another context, always had admirers, particularly from Europeans who shared his resentments of American dominance. Diplomats, such as NATO's Secretary-General Manlio Brosio, had deep ties to France and were not anxious to move the office from Paris to Brussels. And ironically, Americans who, unlike Ball, were ordinarily hostile to French pretensions, welcomed de Gaulle's action as an occasion to reduce American obligations and place greater responsibility on Europeans for the defense of their territories. From another perspective, Secretary of Defense McNamara dismissed the military significance of French participation and saw an opportunity in its departure to streamline the NATO defense system, making it more efficient and less costly. President Johnson himself accepted de Gaulle's decision with equanimity, at least publicly, on the grounds that the French president was not going to change his mind whatever arguments may be made.

The alliance survived the French challenge, partly because de Gaulle, his grand gestures notwithstanding, kept French forces in Germany, although not under NATO's provenance. He also kept French air space open to NATO aircraft. Moreover, France continued to be represented in every NATO military headquarters, although its representatives were identified as "missions" not "delegations." The French president had no intention of severing his ties with the alliance.

In retrospect, his challenge failed to discredit America's leadership of NATO. Success for his aspirations to replace the United States as the paramount influence in Europe depended on Germany as a junior partner. Up to a point the close links between de Gaulle and Adenauer, solemnized

in the Franco-German treaty of cooperation in 1963, gave substance to French hopes. But although there was German dissatisfaction with America's management of the Berlin crisis in 1961 and with Secretary of Defense McNamara's preference for a high nuclear threshold of response to a Soviet attack, Germany was not prepared to substitute American leadership for a less credible French defense capability. Nor were the smaller allies comforted by the prospect of a Gaullist Europe.

In some respects NATO felt liberated by the departure of France from its military structure. That country was rarely in step with its allies. By absenting itself from the new SHAPE headquarters in Mons and from meetings of the International Military Staff in Brussels (which had replaced the three-nation Standing Group in 1966), France freed the United States from having to deal with French obstructionism in the Defense Planning Committee. Its self-propelled removal from SHAPE also opened the way for a more harmonious collaboration between the United States and the smaller members of the alliance in the Nuclear Planning Group, established in the year France expelled NATO military bases from its soil.

SKYBOLT AND THE BRITISH TRAUMA

Of all America's partners in NATO, the United Kingdom should have been the most secure and most supportive. Amendments to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946 had ensured its role as a nuclear power, and the United States seemed prepared to make a distinction-if not a new, special relationship-between Britain and the Continent. But the nuclear issue would cast a pall over this relationship in the 1960s as it raised once again the issue that also agitated Germany and France: dependence on the United States for the nation's nuclear security. Each ally reacted to America's dominance in a different way, but none was more explosive than the Anglo-American wrangle over Skybolt in the early 1960s, at least not until de Gaulle's withdrawal of France from NATO's military command in 1966.

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, like Churchill, the son of an American mother, was the archetype of a cultivated Briton who expected to use the more powerful but less sophisticated Americans to achieve British national ends. He had understood from his experiences in World War II that the best way to deal with Americans was to thrust them into the limelight while the British set the agenda in the background. Macmillan, however, was no cold-blooded Machiavellian. He genuinely respected the abilities of both Eisenhower and Kennedy and believed that his friendship with them, patronizing as its undertones might be, would serve the interests of both countries.

The Skybolt was to be an example of mutual advantage. It was an airlaunched ballistic missile intended by the U.S. Air Force to be carried by strategic bombers. As such, it would be a competitor to the Navy's Polaris, the submarinelaunched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), and would permit the Air Force to fit into the space age without surrendering its manned bombers. Begun in 1952, it was originally considered too far beyond the current state of the art to be developed, but after the technological breakthroughs in that decade, the Eisenhower administration approved its development as a weapons system in 1960, although without a commitment to its production.

Once this decision was made, none of the auguries boded well for the Skybolt. The Air Force dismissed the Army's and Navy's questions about feasibility and costs as the original estimation of $180 million rose to $391 million by mid1961. The original operational date of May 1962 was stretched to October 1964. Given these problems, the Air Force had to contend with pressures from civilian as well as from military analysts to cancel the program. It resisted these pressures successfully at first, propelled by its eagerness to have under its own aegis a strategic IRBM capability comparable to the Navy's ability to launch a missile from a submarine.

What McNamara found as he entered office in 1961 was a weapons system that the Air Force celebrated as a two-state, solid-propellant missile delivering its warheads to a maximum distance of 1,000 nautical miles

when launched from a B-52 or a British Vulcan bomber. The checkered history of Skybolt was not lost on McNamara, particularly that of its escalating costs. While he was skeptical about the Air Force's claims, Britain's enthusiasm for the weapon was a card the Air Force could play when it encountered pressure over costs and feasibility. Skybolt promised to answer Britain's growing problem of financing a credible independent deterrent as an alternative to the costly and obsolescent Blue Streak, a liquid-fueled ballistic missile. Britain consequently canceled its missile in favor of purchasing the American weapon.

It should have been obvious that if this deterrent on which the British had placed high hopes were to be abandoned, the Kennedy administration would have to conduct extensive, careful political and military discussions with the Macmillan Cabinet before taking such a step. These did not take place. Instead, the relationship suffered from a lack of comprehension of just what commitments were made in the Eisenhower administration by both the British and the Americans. What would the British offer in exchange for benefits gained by their access to Skybolt technology, which they expected to acquire at little expense to their economy? Although they would contribute funds toward the development of the weapon, there were no charges for the research that would go into the program, according to an agreement signed between the U.S. Air Force and the British Ministry of Aviation in 1960.

In return for this largesse, Eisenhower had understood from a meeting with Macmillan that the United Kingdom would furnish berthing facilities for U.S. submarines on the Clyde River in Scotland. This was the president's understanding but unfortunately not the prime minister's; Macmillan was determined that the Holy Loch site not be regarded as a quid pro quo, and he even congratulated Defence Minister Harold Watkinson on managing to separate the two issues. Yet there was some ambiguity about the terms of the agreement when Macmillan noted in his memoirs that the Clyde was to be available as a Polaris base, and that Eisenhower had assured him access to the Polaris missile itself if necessary.

Britain succeeded in securing the promise of a new weapon system if Skybolt should fail to serve its purpose. This much emerged from the opacity of memoranda and the haze of an imperfectly remembered past. The ally achieved this commitment without a written guarantee of a U.S. base in Scotland.

Given McNamara's unhappiness with the absence of any British contribution to research and development costs of the Skybolt, it was hardly surprising that any political fallout in Britain from the cancellation of the weapon was not his primary concern. A string of failures of test launches in 1962, accompanied by misleading Air Force press releases about delivery schedules, increased his doubts about the feasibility of Skybolt. Conceivably, the secretary of defense might have been more tolerant of experimental failures if the costs had been more bearable. In the context of interservice rivalry at the Pentagon, the defects of the program weighed more heavily on the secretary's scale of priorities than the sensitivities of the British partner. The result was a decision to cancel the weapon system in November 1962.

The immediate consequence was anger and panic in London, even though McNamara did speak informally to his British counterpart about the decision. The British were appalled, and their press accused the United States of betrayal. Having abandoned their Blue Streak, they would be left without a credible nuclear deterrent, and were quick to suspect an American conspiracy to downgrade Britain's nuclear capability.

The Kennedy administration was initially perplexed over the British reaction. Neither the British defense minister nor the British ambassador in Washington had given indications of their distress over the loss of the Skybolt, perhaps out of traditional British sangfroid. There should have been greater appreciation of the British political culture than McNamara and his colleagues exhibited. British leaders felt themselves besieged by hostile forces, whether it was Dean Acheson proclaiming the end of the British empire or de Gaulle preparing to keep Britain out of the European Economic Community. But to McNamara British behavior was mystifying. He thought it was clear to them that problems with the program doomed the

Skybolt, but if they wished to assume the costs they could continue its development. There was no excuse for Britain at any time in the Kennedy years not to recognize the American reservations about its future. Kennedy then was taken aback when Macmillan told him at the Nassau conference in December 1962 that Britain would not have cancelled the Blue Streak in favor of Skybolt unless there were an alternative missile system.

Ironically, the alternative was available, even if the willingness of the transatlantic partner to grant it was not appreciated at the time. The United States agreed to sell two Polaris submarines to Britain, each with 16 missiles. Here was a weapon system superior to the Skybolt that should have satisfied British aspirations as well as their concerns. The only ostensible drawback was the requirement that the British nuclear fleet would be assigned to NATO, a precedent that could be a model for a European nuclear force. But this restriction was not binding: the British could withdraw their nuclear force from NATO when they decided that their national interests were at stake.

There was no simple zero-sum balance in the Skybolt affair. If it was ultimately a British success, it had a limited scope. Macmillan gained a better weapons system, but with a price to be paid beyond the costs incidental to purchasing the Polaris missile. The Skybolt affair only reinforced de Gaulle's determination to pursue a separate path for France; this would have happened irrespective of the outcome at Nassau. Nor was it responsible for Britain's exclusion from the Common Market in 1963; this too was part of de Gaulle's grand plan. Rather, the incident underscored the decline of Britain as a world power and its consequent dependence on the United States for its "independent" nuclear deterrent.

For the United States the Skybolt fiasco offered a case study of a preventable mistake. Its origin lay in the absence of centralized control in the Pentagon that permitted the Air Force to make its own agenda without appropriate checks. McNamara deserved credit for canceling a failed program, but he did so without sufficient recognition of British pride. The president's offer of the Polaris missile came across as an impulsive gesture certain to complicate relations for both countries with their NATO partners,

even though the Polaris substitute had been enmeshed in Eisenhower's negotiations with Macmillan. Without fully appeasing the British, the Polaris exchange accentuated the problem of how to deal with those members, particularly in view of the ambitions of West Germany, that did not possess nuclear weaponry. It helped solidify a Franco-German connection that might have had negative consequences for the United States.

There was another dimension to the Skybolt crisis that never rose above the surface of negotiations. This was the current of mutual suspicion that was a legacy of the Suez crisis, as historian Ronald Landa has observed. On the one side, Americans were wary of British duplicity, a fear of being manipulated; on the other, the British doubted the dependability of Americans, a fear of being abandoned in a crisis.

THE MULTILATERAL FORCE AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

Although France's constant dissent from American positions in NATO was accepted as normal and Britain's distress over its junior partnership seemed under control after 1963, West Germany's Federal Republic posed increasingly pressing questions about America's nuclear stance. West Germany had been admitted into the alliance by the back door of the Western European Union, and one of the fees for membership was abjuring the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Dependence on the United States for its nuclear defense inevitably strained the relationship. More than other major powers, Germany was sensitive to any deviation from America's rigid nuclear policies of the 1950s.

German uneasiness was manifested in the wake of Sputnik's success in 1958 and in its concern over U.S. management of the Berlin crisis in 1961. When the Soviets threatened in 1958 and again in 1961 to turn over their control of East Berlin to the German Democratic Republic, they awakened German fears about the constancy of the American commitment to the

ultimate reunification of Germany. If the United States, Britain, and France-the Western victors of World War II-accepted the legitimacy of East Germany, they would have violated the Federal Republic's reasons for embracing the Atlantic alliance.

The first Berlin crisis ended without resolution in the Eisenhower years but revived more dangerously as the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, tested young President Kennedy. What bothered the Germans was the contrast between the initial stridency of Kennedy's hard line on rebuffing the Soviets' demand in July 1961 and his seeming complacency in accepting the Berlin Wall that propped up the East German regime in the following month. Despite desultory challenges to East Germany's periodic claims of sovereignty over Berlin, the Kennedy administration appeared to buckle under Soviet intimidation. This was the perception of such leaders as Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin.

The second Berlin crisis underscored Germany's concerns about its position in the alliance. Adenauer continued to brood over the inadequate U.S. response to the building of the Berlin Wall. German dissatisfaction was exacerbated by American demands for raising conventional force levels and the concomitant elevation of the threshold of a nuclear response in the event of a Soviet attack. Underlying their reservations was a painful awareness of dependence on American nuclear missiles for defense of the nation. Increasingly, there was pressure in the Federal Republic for a more active voice in determining the use of nuclear weapons, particularly those stationed on German soil. Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss displayed a Gaullist perspective when he implied that Europe needed its own deterrent in the event that the Soviets would threaten them but spare the United States in a deal over the heads of Europeans. Strauss was not alone in raising American concerns that the Federal Republic might follow a Gaullist if not a neutralist path over its perceived nuclear vulnerability.

Arguably, the fundamental purpose of the Multilateral Force (MLF) was to satisfy Germany's sensitivities over its lack of control over nuclear weaponry. The issue was the use of the weapon, not whether Germany would become a nuclear power in defiance of the agreements under which

it entered NATO. In retrospect, there was a striking similarity in NATO's history between the European Defense Community (EDC) in the early 1950s and the Multilateral Force a decade later. Both were experiments in the integration of national forces that could have been powerful agents in advancing the cause of a United States of Europe, and both were intended to tap German resources in the service of NATO.

There were differences as well. The EDC would end the destructive rivalry between France and Germany, while the goal of the MLF was to undercut German ambitions for a national nuclear capability. By the 1960s the European Economic Community had facilitated Franco-German integration with considerable success. The issue of an independent German nuclear force did not exist in the 1960s. But in both cases the focus was on the role of Germany. The MLF was to give the Germans a sense of equality in the alliance by their possession of a European nuclear weapon, in company with the other allies.

As it developed in the transition from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration, the MLF would consist of 25 surface vessels with mixed-manned crews, carry 8 Polaris A-3 missiles with a range of more than 2,500 miles. This fleet would be assigned to the two supreme allied commands covering the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The key to its success was to be the joint ownership and custody of the nuclear weapon. German membership in this force was the critical factor not only because its participation would divert their attention from the British and French nuclear systems, but also-from an American perspective-would be a vehicle for pushing Germans and other allies into helping finance the MLF.

None of these plans materialized despite the hopes raised in the United States that the question of nuclear sharing would be solved. Part of the problem derived from the conflicting aspirations of the American authors of the MLF. Supreme Allied Commander Lauris Norstad offered a version that would make NATO itself a fourth nuclear power with its own land-based medium-range mobile ballistic missiles (MRMBMs) under the authority of the SACEUR. In some respects, this was a version of Kennan's dumbbell

conception in the 1940s and of Kennedy's Grand Design in the 1960s, with its two transatlantic pillars undergirding the alliance.

The Norstad plan as such never had much chance of realization. Norstad himself as an Eisenhower acolyte was not a popular figure in the Kennedy circle. His reputation was not helped by his continuing support for a low nuclear threshold in the event of a Soviet attack at a time when McNamara was pressing Europe for a flexible response. And despite his considerable influence in Europe, neither France nor Britain was interested in promoting a European nuclear power unless in the former case France was its center. The British were still nursing hopes for invigorating its special relationship with the United States rather than with Europe; nor was Congress willing to abandon the McMahon Act, which denied to Europeans (except the British) access to American nuclear facilities. Only Germany warmed to the proposal, and this receptivity was enough to alarm other allies. Even if the Supreme Allied Commander was an American, the prospect of 15 fingers on the nuclear button was unacceptable to Congress.

An additional obstacle to Norstad's ambitions lay in a rival plan launched by the State Department almost simultaneously. A bipartisan group of Eurocentric officials, led by Robert Bowie, director of Eisenhower's Policy Planning Staff, saw in a multilateral force an opportunity not only to soothe German sensitivities by making the Federal Republic a partner in a European nuclear community but also to make the MLF into a stepping-stone toward an equal partnership with the United States. They won the sobriquet of "theologians" when these enthusiasts for European unification transformed the Norstad plan into an ideal that would realize the aims of the old EDC even as it lured France from the force de frappe, harnessed British energies-in the form of their aircraft-and neutralized German pressures for their own nuclear deterrent. Although the State Department plan was concocted in the Eisenhower administration, it won a fervent believer in the Kennedy years in the person of Undersecretary of State George Ball.

The MLF did take shape in the early 1960s in a maritime form in the aforementioned surface fleet with its jointly owned Polaris missiles. It

progressed to the point of actually delivering one mixed-manned ship, but no more than one. The idea held some appeal to a practical manager such as McNamara who envisioned the MLF as a quick fix for a variety of NATO problems, not least of which was the German Gaullist question. His was a limited enthusiasm after the major allies did not warm to the plan. De Gaulle could not be lured out of the force de frappe and into a NATO force; the MLF to him was simply another weapon in America's effort to control Europe. Nor would Macmillan's Britain exchange its nuclear deterrent, limited though it was, for loss of identity inside the MLF. As the British prime minister once commented to Ball, "You don't expect our chaps to share grog with the Turks, do you?" Only the Germans welcomed the prospect, an attitude that created more problems than it solved. German access to weapons, no matter how carefully insulated, still could send tremors down European spines and agitate the Soviets as well.

The major drawback, however, was the implausibility of the MLF. There was a sleight of hand about its operation. The Europeans were invited to purchase the missile, but the warhead remained in American hands. In this context how meaningful was a "European" nuclear missile? Only the true believers in the Kennedy administration were convinced that it could work, and they did not include the secretary of defense or the national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy. The MLF was put on the back burner in the Johnson administration despite efforts of the "theologians" to revive the program.

The British made an apparent effort to keep it alive by proposing first an alternate MLF plan based on a nuclear force with American MRMBMs already in Europe and Britain's Polaris submarines joining an allied force of surface ships. This Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) would include an advisory group composed of France, Germany, and Italy to participate in conventional as well as nuclear planning. It was likely that the British initiative was to seek a way of scuttling the MLF without assuming any blame. In any event, the MLF was never formally disbanded; it just disappeared in 1965 in increasingly vague rhetoric. Neither the MLF nor the ANF appeared in NATO communiques in that year. The muddled conception with its internal contradictions solved neither the German nor

any other problem when France left the organization. The nuclear weapon was a continuing obstacle to transatlantic comity in the mid-1960s.

THE HARMEL INITIATIVE AND THE SMALLER MEMBERS

The failure of the MLF to resolve any of the transatlantic problems accentuated the need for some other means of satisfying Europe's sense of isolation from the decision-making process in NATO. It was the smaller allies who felt most distant from American planning. The larger members-Britain, France, and Germany-suffered frustrations in dealing with the United States, but at least they were the focus of American attention. Belgium and Denmark were not. Their constant complaint was the lack of consultation. This had been clearly expressed in the Wise Men's report in 1956, but it was not taken seriously. The Suez crisis drowned out their voices at this time. Conceivably, the MLF would have given them greater influence if it had materialized, but even this was questionable.

The departure of France from the integrated military structure along with the MLF's demise parenthetically had a positive effect on those countries that had felt ignored in the past. First, the absence of France at the table breathed new life into the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) that had been established in 1963 under the secretary-general to deal with military affairs. Similarly, with France out of the picture, the Standing Group in Washington, composed only of American, British, and French members, was replaced with an integrated International Military Staff in 1966, with headquarters in Brussels. This move did not guarantee the kind of consultation the allies wanted but at least it gave them seats at the table, an asset they did not enjoy in the Standing Group.

But the primary change benefiting the smaller nations derived from Secretary McNamara's initiative to extract from the moribund body of the MLF some form of nuclear sharing. Arguably, the most concrete by-product of the French departure was the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group

(NPG) in 1966. What the MLF could not accomplish-supplying a NATO vehicle for sharing nuclear knowledge and nuclear decisions-the NPG did, up to a point. The new committee did not have the scope of the MLF, but its relatively modest aspirations offered a better chance for success. Its origins may be traced to McNamara's proposal made at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Paris in May 1965, before France left the integrated command, to seek ways to have allies participate in nuclear planning, including the role of strategic forces. Not until France had left SHAPE in 1966 could the new policy be put into place.

As in the case of the MLF, there was an element of deception in the promotion of the NPG. The Johnson administration hoped to coax the allies into believing they were now fully involved in nuclear planning. Without the handicap of the MLF's high visibility, where the gap between promise and fulfillment was easily exposed, the NPG meetings indulged in generalities that could become specific in the future. The allies' ultimate acceptance of the strategy of "flexible response" was quickened by America's openness to consultation in 1967, even though the assignment of studies for their own sake often seemed to be the main order of business.

The fact that the United States did not share full information, let alone control, over nuclear weaponry was less important to the smaller members than American willingness to give them relative equality with the larger allies. This positive response to their demand for consultation made it easier for NATO to approve officially in December 1967 the doctrine of flexible response (MC [Military Committee] 14/3), raising the threshold of nuclear response, which the United States had been urging since the beginning of the Kennedy administration. NATO's acceptance signaled a renewal of faith in the American connection to Europe. If the allies-large and small-were still unwilling to spend the funds needed to support a major part of flexible response an increase in conventional forces-they recognized at least the value of a graduated rather than an automatic response to Soviet provocation.

It is noteworthy that the North Atlantic Council's decision in favor of MC 14/3 accompanied the acceptance of the Harmel report on "The Future

Tasks of the Alliance" The Harmel initiative, too, was a by-product of France's departure from the organization as well as a measure of American responsiveness to the concerns of the smaller European members. When the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel proposed a broad examination of the future tasks facing the alliance in December 1966, France was too distracted by the fallout from its disengagement to raise difficulties about a possible political reorientation of the alliance. But the meaning of the Harmel report signified more than the diminished role of France in the alliance; it represented, as did the NPG and the resuscitated DPC, the new authority of the smaller nations. The participants in the Harmel exercise were repeating the appeal of the Wise Men of 1956-Lester Pearson from Canada, Halyard Lange from Norway, and Gaetano Martini from Italy-who tried in vain to tell the larger powers that their voices should be heard. In 1967 their voices were heard and attended to.

The smaller allies won not just a vague promise of future consultation but a specific program that elevated detente to the level of defense as a major function of the alliance, The key statement in the Harmel report was its pronouncement that "military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary." This was a new approach to the Communist adversary that had implications the United States and its allies would not have anticipated at the beginning of the decade. One of them was the expectation that the Cold War was steadily waning, and the smaller nations led the alliance in asking members to recognize the change. In fact, de Gaulle himself, early in the 1960s, operated on the assumption that the Soviets were no more a danger to Europe than the United States. This was not quite the same as a mutual relaxation of tensions that characterized detente because the United States remained a benign presence in Europe from the perspective of the smaller powers; "defense," after all, was part of the Harmel promise, and this required continuing American support.

As important as any other question is why the United States accepted, if not embraced, the Harmel recommendations. More than just a wish to appease the smaller members accounted for its attitude. It did not represent a recognition that the Soviets had abandoned their expansionist ambitions, despite the assumptions of some of the European partners-large as well as

small. American behavior at the end of the 1960s was a product of vulnerability, different from that at the beginning of the decade but just as important in the shaping of its relations with European partners in NATO. In 1960 the United States had to cope with Europe's fear that the Soviet mastery of intercontinental ballistic missiles would undermine America's credibility as defender of Europe. De Gaulle prospered at this time by stoking those fears, and the United States was forced to devote special effort, as in the MLF campaign, to restore Europe's faith in the transatlantic protector.

By 1968 Europe felt it could live with the Soviets and worried, often schizophrenically, about the rashness of American leadership that could have consequences for the European allies. This was demonstrated by the American absorption in Vietnam, creating a situation in which Europeans doubted the stability of American leadership and at the same time worried about the diversion of its energies in Southeast Asia to the detriment of its responsibilities in Europe. American impetuousness could threaten detente and its diversion of resources from Europe to Asia could threaten defense, the twin pillars of the Harmel report.

EUROPE AND THE VIETNAM WAR

The Vietnam War did not descend on NATO like a bolt from the blue. As noted, Indochina had been part of NATO's consciousness ever since France had equated its war against Communist insurgents with NATO's containment of Soviet expansion in Europe. Its link was not enough to prevent France's defeat in 1954 despite the extensive military assistance granted by the United States. And when the Republic of Vietnam replaced France's presence after the Geneva Conference, the United States was blamed for imposing its own puppet regime as part of America's imperial ambitions. From the Gaullist point of view Vietnam was a symbol of America's domination not only of Southeast Asia but of Europe as well.

De Gaulle's carefully planned withdrawal from NATO's military structure had its counterpart in France's efforts to intervene in the Vietnam conflict as South Vietnam descended into chaos after the overthrow of the Diem family in November 1963. He stepped up his campaign for a neutralist solution to the struggle between North and South Vietnam by supporting influential South Vietnamese military figures, former members of the French colonial establishment in Indochina, who pressed for this approach. If this objective had been reached, de Gaulle would have regarded it as suitable retribution for America's ouster of France from Indochina in 1954. But even though he failed to remove the United States from Vietnam, he could savor some Schadenfreude as he watched the Americans dig themselves deeply into the Vietnamese quagmire.

Given France's special ax to grind, it is important to learn how much influence de Gaulle's attitude had on other NATO allies. Certainly, his argument that America was not serving the alliance's interests by focusing its attention on Asia found some resonance in NATO circles. Moreover, there was a growing consensus in Europe that the Soviet Union, after failing to budge the United States from Berlin and succumbing to American demands in Cuba, was no longer the same order of danger to European security that it had been in the 1950s. Khrushchev's bellicose language masked his reluctance to push the West into war. A third Gaullist case against America carried less weight in the late 1960s than it would have early in the decade: that America's vulnerability to Soviet attack had impaired the credibility of the "pledge" of 1949.

Despite the alarms raised by France, the deliberations in NATO's political councils did not confirm France's charges, although there was some uneasiness expressed in the presses of most of the allies about the direction American policy was taking in Vietnam, particularly as the American presence in Vietnam increased exponentially after 1964. There was still a consensus in mid-decade that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, either as partners or rivals, continued to be a threat to the West. Although there were occasional signs of concern about America devoting its energies in an area far removed from Europe, most member

states continued to be aware that Communism was a global menace and that NATO should recognize its many dimensions.

If the United States was mentioned at all in the council's consideration of South Vietnam's struggle, it was in positive terms. As late as 1963 NATO's Expert Working Group on Southeast Asia credited American aid for the apparent improvement in the military situation. Secretary of State Dean Rusk spoke periodically of the progress, modest as it was, in U.S. efforts not only to help the Republic of Vietnam's army but also to develop a program of economic aid to the country's rural population. Such was the "strategic hamlet" concept that created fortified communities designed to remove the influence of Viet Cong forces and permit U.S. specialists to work with Vietnamese counterparts in supporting village-level health and public-works programs as well as in providing agricultural loans and honest administrators. Civic action could be more effective than military aid in winning over the peasantry to the side of the government. Not even the crisis at the end of the year, when a military coup left President Diem dead and the country in chaos, undermined their belief that the new leadership would reverse the damage done.

This optimism dissipated in mid-1964 as the Viet Cong grew in strength and a succession of Vietnamese generals proved incapable of maintaining a stable government capable of coping with the enemy. In May 1964, Secretary of State Rusk sounded an alarm, blaming both North Vietnam and China for the vigor of the Viet Cong insurgency. He wanted to ensure that the NATO allies recognized that Hanoi was specifically directing the operations in the south. France's Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville used this occasion to express qualified sympathy for American difficulties in Vietnam and for Britain's in Malaysia, but he reminded his allies that France had endured these burdens in Indochina and Algeria for a longer period in the past. He implied that his country did not receive the understanding that the United States was now seeking.

The Americans did receive support for their efforts in Southeast Asia from NATO's Expert Working Group, which was composed of both larger nations such as Germany and France and smaller allies such as Belgium and

the Netherlands. These observers were dispassionate in their estimates of the chances of South Vietnam to cope with internal unrest and external pressure. At the same time, they looked with approval on American military and economic assistance for its beneficial effects on the tactical situation. They represented majority opinion in the alliance that U.S. support of Vietnam served a NATO interest. The containment of Communist expansion and the suppression of Communist subversion was a leitmotif of the alliance's views on Southeast Asia, at least until the summer of 1964.

THE AFTERMATH OF TONKIN GULF

The Tonkin Gulf crisis in August 1964 marked a turning point in attitudes toward U.S. involvement in Vietnam. When North Vietnamese torpedoes attacked one and arguably two American warships in August 1964, the United States responded with a Senate resolution empowering President Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel aggression. The way was opened for more than just a massive increase in military aid to South Vietnam. The resolution led to the United States taking over the conduct of the war from the incompetent South Vietnam government. In this context the apparent consensus over American action dissolved. Rusk pleaded with the allies to express their support not with words but with troops or supplies. At the very least those allies that had diplomatic relations with China should chastise Beijing for its role in the war. Later in the decade Rusk was reduced to pleading with the NATO allies to stop their shipping to North Vietnamese ports. There was increasing American irritation over the lack of European backing of the United States as it expended its forces and resources in a war the allies should support.

European leaders were initially sensitive to U.S. dissatisfaction with their behavior. In October 1965, Secretary-General Manlio Brosio warned a NATO Parliamentary Conference that a setback of the United States in Southeast Asia would be a defeat for NATO. An American retreat or humiliating compromise in Vietnam could have a domino effect on other areas in Asia and elsewhere. This was a sentiment that appealed to

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Other allies recalled that the United States was bearing the bulk of the military burden that might have been shared by European members.

Although Europe seemed to be distancing itself from the conflict, two NATO allies-Britain and the Netherlands-had reasons to be more empathic than their colleagues. Both nations had experience with Communist-backed aggression in their former colonies, Britain in Malaysia and the Netherlands in Indonesia. British Defense Minister Denis Healey observed in December 1965 that the United States-and Britain-carried a disproportionate share in the defense of the free world outside Europe, and that the United States would soon have as many troops in Vietnam as in western Europe.

Rather than responding sympathetically to this reality, many of the allies saw it in a negative light, as a zero-sum situation in that more troops for Asia meant fewer troops for Europe. Beneath the language of politesse (France excepted), a sense of uneasiness pervaded NATO meetings and NATO publics in western Europe, propelled initially by vocal opposition among the Scandinavians in the summer of 1965. Their concern was over the American emphasis on military means to cope with the Viet Cong adversaries and their North Vietnamese patrons. They worried about the conflict escalating and expanding to encompass Europe and the Soviet Union. This concern spread to America's conduct in Vietnam that led to widespread suffering by innocent civilians. The Scandinavian allies in particular urged unconditional negotiations with the enemy given the assumption that there was no military solution. At the same time, they were skeptical about America's good faith, and doubted the sincerity of its professed intentions. The delegates reflected public opinion at home.

What triggered doubts in December 1965 were charges in the American press that the Viet Cong had put out peace feelers that the government had ignored in the middle of the nation's presidential campaign. This putative approach from the Communists apparently took place at a time when the United States was advertising its willingness to enter negotiations unconditionally. The criticism was made all the more significant in that it came at a time when the American forces in Vietnam were being rapidly

expanded and when the air campaign against North Vietnam was striking a country that was not at war with the United States. Europeans as well as American antiwar critics recalled that one of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in the year before may have been provoked by the U.S. naval intrusion into North Vietnam waters and the other may not have occurred at all.

If there was ambiguity about America's war in Southeast Asia on the part of Scandinavian members, there was none with respect to France's attitude. It was clear and hostile. The French representative at the NATO Parliamentarians' meeting in May 1965 condemned the United States for its systematic, large-scale military action north of the seventeenth parallel, observing that its unilateral steps were taken without allied consultation. The United States consequently damaged the alliance in the eyes of the nonaligned states and weakened the moral standing of the free world. British diplomats were particularly sensitive to the issue of consultation, and saw future trouble in precipitate action that was out of proportion to the provocations. As friends and defenders of the United States, they concurred with the French warning that Asians and Africans could regard NATO as a club for rich, white countries.

When some of the allies expressed reservations about France's open rejection of America's behavior in Vietnam, French officials were contemptuous of their colleagues in NATO for their passive support of the United States. Did the United States hesitate to voice its disapproval of French and British actions in the Suez crisis when they acted without informing Washington of their plans? The other members were hypocritical in silently opposing American involvement in Vietnam while France was frank in its criticism.

European silence certainly did not extend beyond 1965. And when they spoke out it was not because of collateral damage inflicted on the civilian population or because of any sympathy for the Viet Cong cause. Partly they were upset over the Johnson administration's inability to see the quagmire it was falling into. Europeans were primarily concerned that the United States was diverting energies and resources that should have been spent in Europe. The Americans claimed that its commitment to the South Vietnam

government showed its fidelity to its obligations, which Europeans should appreciate. If the United States failed to support its allies in Southeast Asia, faith in American commitments to other parts of the would be undermined, emboldening Communists to throw up more challenges to the West. This argument was not convincing to most Europeans. They did not perceive fighting for Vietnam and fighting for Europe as comparable.

Before the major buildup of American troop strength in Vietnam, it was the Federal Republic, the most vulnerable of the European allies, that appeared the most understanding of American motives. German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder feared that withdrawal or defeat of the United States in Vietnam would have an effect on the situation in Europe, comparable to the test of strength over Cuba in 1962 on the situation in Berlin. Recognition of Soviet intentions made it imperative for Germany to support a policy on Vietnam that would protect NATO allies against Communist efforts to extort concessions from the West in Southeast Asia through application of pressure in Europe.

German empathy with the American war in Vietnam, however, could not survive the realization that more American troops in Asia meant fewer American troops in Europe. In fact, the role of American troops in Europe had roots independent of the Vietnam War. From the beginning of his tenure as secretary of defense, McNamara was seeking ways of using the latest advances in technology to increase the efficiency of the American military contribution to Europe. He believed he found it in the "Exercise Big Lift," the dispatch of troops by air from the United States to American bases in Germany. It involved the airlifting of some 16,000 tank troops of the 2nd Armored Division to West Germany in more than 200 Air Force transport planes. Not only would the United States be able to provide rapid reinforcements in Europe when needed, but these divisions in reserve in the United States would also save expenditures that American forces in Europe imposed on the balance of payments.

But this program raised questions in Europe-particularly in Germanywhether the resulting U.S. flexibility would affect its forces in Europe. What could be sent quickly could be recalled just as quickly. It

required assurances from McNamara that the exercise did not signify U.S. intentions to reduce the number of combat troops in Europe, and the U.S. member of the Military Committee in NATO tried to minimize the impact by noting that the Defense Department had been conducting this sort of exercise for many years. The allies, nonetheless, were not fully reassured. German General Adolf Heusinger, the Military Committee's chairman, responded that the capability of airlifting entire units across the Atlantic did not replace the need for combat-ready troops on the ground to oppose an attack from the outset.

If the troops issue was sensitive in 1963, it was all the more so two years later when questions were raised over the toll the redeployment of troops from Europe to Asia was taking on the status of Europe's defense. European journals expressed the widespread fear that President Johnson would have to call up specialists drawn from the European theater to supply forces in Vietnam. In the event they were replaced at all, the new units would lack the skills of those withdrawn. As for the growing transport capacity of U.S. forces, they suspected that no airlift could offer full equivalence to forces on the ground. However mobile the mobile strategic reserve may be, it would not have the same effect as uniforms on the streets of Europe.

It was this kind of speculation that inspired Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts to proclaim in October 1965 that the war in Vietnam had not affected the strength of American forces in Europe. McNamara offered the same assurances at Senate hearings two months later when asked about plans to take troops out of Europe. He saw no reason for doing so on the grounds that such moves might send the wrong signals to the Soviet adversary. The stark realities of the war in Vietnam, however, compromised the credibility of this statement. United States forces grew from 59,000 on 30 June 1965 to 267, 500 a year later, an investment of manpower that had to affect American commitments to NATO.

The personnel were as specialized as the European press feared. The Army had to draw down highly skilled personnel from aviation maintenance, construction, and signal services; the Air Force had to yield four tactical reconnaissance and six tactical fighter squadrons totaling 7,000

men; and the Navy offered a Marine Corps battalion landing team from the Sixth Fleet. And this was only the beginning. By mid-1966, a substantial portion-up to two-thirds of the U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft-would be removed from NATO assignments, along with 30,000 servicemen with critical skills.

The British delegation to NATO worried that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, even if only temporarily, would give the French military spokesman opportunity to make as much political capital as he could from these redeployment plans. For the Germans who had put a brave face in supporting American actions in Vietnam in the early 1960s, the implementation of plans to redeploy American troops from Germany to Vietnam was frightening. The most immediate fear was the danger to a population on the front line facing Warsaw Pact forces. The consequence was not only weakening NATO's defenses against a powerful enemy but the psychological damage to the German people if they conflated these reductions of U.S. forces with reduction of American concern for the survival of the Federal Republic.

Secretary McNamara was not impressed with Europe's negative reactions. He was able to rationalize the redeployment much in the way he approached France's withdrawal from the military structure. It would serve rather than harm the alliance by permitting a reorganization of supply and support units to offset the decrease in the numbers of troops in Germany. The reason behind his complacency rested once again in the greater efficiency of the forces in place, combined with a greater capability to deploy men quickly from the continental United States. There was little respect in the secretary's analysis of the defense of Europe for the sensibilities of the allies.

The issue became more acute in the later years of the decade. It required considerable effort on the part of McNamara's Pentagon to mask the effects of some 200,000 additional troops in Vietnam by March 1967 on the status of U.S. troops in Europe. The reduction of forces announced to the NATO allies in April 1967 involved 30,000 Army and 6,000 Air Force personnel. As a result of this drain, the Joint Chiefs of Staff increasingly voiced

reservations about the ability of the military services to prosecute the war in Vietnam and at the same time maintain the American presence in Europe without calling up the reserves. The secretary and his civilian staff advisers felt this was unnecessary. Instead, individuals with critical military skills would continue to be withdrawn to Vietnam. The result was an inability of the United States to meet its NATO commitments. At the end of 1967, only one and one-third of the airborne divisions, instead of three reinforcing divisions, were available to NATO by M-day (mobilization day) plus 30.

The Vietnam War intensified divisions within the alliance without reaching the point of dissolution. A combination of factors limited the damage. The Soviets themselves provided some help unwittingly by their brutal destruction of the Czech reform government in 1968. At the same time, the Brezhnev Doctrine, justifying the suppression of any defection from the Soviet bloc, had only a temporary impact on NATO, even when it reminded the European partners of Soviet power. Many of the allies interpreted it as a sign that the Communist world had turned away from aggressive designs against the West, and confined their military action to their own allies. Moreover, by 1968 President Johnson appeared to be deescalating the war in Vietnam as he moved toward peace negotiations with the North Vietnamese.

U.S. GRIEVANCES AGAINST EUROPE

Just as European resentment against the United States escalated over Vietnam, so did American anger at the lack of appreciation for the enormous burden Americans had assumed on behalf of the free world. The key to the American attitude lay in the concept of burden sharing. Why should the United States continue to shoulder the costs of defending Europe when most of the allies not only had recovered from the devastation of World War II but had achieved a level of prosperity that should have made it possible for them to lift some of the burden from the back of the transatlantic partner. Yet, on the one hand, they balked at increasing their conventional forces, preferring to rely on American troops to fill the gap.

And, on the other hand, they persisted in opposing America's war against Communism in Southeast Asia. This stance struck U.S. senators as provocative ingratitude.

Vietnam was a breaking point for many American critics of NATO. It was the culmination of a long series of European offenses against the spirit-and the costs-of the common defense of the West. The nub of the issue was the imbalance of payments resulting from American expenditures of dollars in Europe, particularly in Germany. This grievance was manifest early in the Kennedy administration. A State Department aide-memoire in February 1961 intended as a guide for American negotiations made it clear that "the deficit of the United States arises wholly from the common defense of the free world. Without these freely assumed obligations, the United States would now be running a heavy surplus in its commitments and actions in balance of payments." The United States was prepared to lean heavily on its allies to redress the balance of payments.

Germany was at the heart of the problem because of the relationship between the Deutsche mark and the dollar. With the U.S. military spending contributing almost $400 million annually to Bonn's foreign reserves, the time had come for reciprocity. This would include Germany's increasing its share of foreign aid to undeveloped parts of the world as well as to easing the defense burden in Europe. The proposed remedies involved greater purchases by Germany of U.S. military equipment and larger payments for maintaining U.S. facilities in Europe to offset U.S. expenditures.

The Berlin crisis of 1961, soon after Kennedy took office, aggravated the balance of payments. The rapid buildup of U.S. troop strength in Germany in the shadow of the Berlin Wall sharpened the differences between two allies. The Federal Republic could not resist American demands at a time when the United States had sent 40,000 additional troops to bolster NATO defenses in Germany. The simple fact of the United States expending its resources and manpower on behalf of a frightened Germany made efforts to lessen the financial burden all the more imperative.

The Germans had to concede, but not before they raised as many objections as they could. The economics minister was anxious that the Americans not exaggerate his country's wealth. The press was filled with articles, encouraged by the government, to blame the United States for the dollar crisis. They pointed to the sharp rise in the outflow of dollars through U.S. private investments abroad and implied that the source of the problem lay in tax privileges granted to Americanowned multinational corporations such as General Motors and Firestone. Hence, they argued, it would be unfair for Germans to pay for U.S. corporate profits.

This reasoning failed to relieve Germans of American pressure. To soften the often blunt tones in the negotiations, the United States was willing to accept German purchases of U.S. equipment in place of specific dollar outlays. Direct sale of U.S. tanks or airplanes would offer the least objectionable way of achieving results without offending German dignity. In October 1961 the Germans agreed to purchases ranging from armored troop carriers to rockets at a cost of $230 million. Coupled with earlier purchases, the figure in 1961 would reach approximately $500 million, increasing to $700 million in 1962. The successful offset agreement with Germany accelerated negotiations with other allies on whose territory the United States had installations that drained dollars.

Even as the secretary of defense displayed some satisfaction with the downward trend in the balance-of-payments deficit, he kept pressing the allies for more. In July 1962 he stated that he would seek $900 million more between 1963 and 1966 to liquidate the imbalance. McNamara had the enthusiastic backing of Congress. There never was a time when congressmen or the secretary of defense felt that the allies were contributing their fair share of the defense burden. When a new agreement was made with Germany for 1965 and 1966, the funds were not enough; the $1.350 billion was $30 million less than the Pentagon had estimated its costs in Germany would be in this period. As long as an imbalance of payments remained, there were threats emanating both from the administration and the Congress that if a more equitable sharing of costs were not forthcoming, America's contribution to Europe's defense would be in jeopardy.

The offset quarrels were essentially background noises, rumblings of discontent, but not loud enough to fray the transatlantic ties. The American military presence in Europe between 1961 and 1965 remained stable, aside from spikes in a moment of crisis; and the European partners did make efforts to accommodate the American demands. The situation changed dramatically in 1965 when the offset conflict with Germany meshed with the expansion of the Vietnam War.

Unhappy with Germany's unwillingness to meet full offset payments, McNamara threatened in June 1965 to reduce U.S. forces to match lower offset goals. He claimed that 30 percent of the increase in defense expenditures could be traced to the burden of the Vietnam War. When the State Department warned against unilateral action, he asserted that the Germans had brought this situation on themselves by refusing to change their position on the offset problem. The secretary of defense was not simply expressing a personal judgment. The Johnson administration, aside from the State Department, shared McNamara's impatience. Two senior administration officials had advised the president in November 1965 to dramatize the balance-of-payments problems as a means of raising Europe's consciousness of American sacrifices in Vietnam. If they would not contribute to the cause, at least the allies could minimize America's burden in Europe.

By mid-1966 the financial distress of the United States and the United Kingdom over the upkeep of their troops in Germany had reached a point at which the Americans and British claimed that they would keep their forces intact only if new arrangements were made. The Defense Department threatened a major increase in troop withdrawals from Europe unless Europe responded to American needs. The conflict was temporarily resolved through the establishment of a Trilateral Commission in 1967. State Department officials, always more attuned to European sensibilities than their counterparts in Defense, wanted to limit withdrawals to two or three brigades of only one army division, but McNamara wanted four brigades from two divisions.

The result was a compromise whereby the German Bundesbank would purchase $500 million in medium-term U.S. government bonds during fiscal year 1968 and promise not to convert their dollars into gold. The United States in turn scaled down its redeployment plans and pledged that security and not financial considerations would be the primary factor in determining U.S. force levels in Europe. The allies agreed to accept the principle-and expansion-of dual basing that had begun with the Big Lift in 1963. The agreement in April 1967 relieved tensions at the diplomatic level, but did not satisfy a growing public demand, fueled by the failing military campaign in Vietnam, for more equitable burden sharing from the allies. The reaction of the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, to the trilateral compromise itself reflected continued dissatisfaction with the conduct of the allies. Senator Mansfield scorned the arrangement allowing Germans to purchase special U.S. government securities, claiming that Germany would be winning new profits from their loans that would make a mockery of the compromise.

The truce over the offset issue did not, in fact, affect the larger American complaint, namely, the anomaly of the United States maintaining over 300,000 troops in defense of a Europe that could do more to defend itself while sending as many-and more-personnel to wage a war in Vietnam without European support. Inevitably, there would be outcries in the press and in the Congress to redress this imbalance. Secretary of Defense McNamara's selective redeployments were not sufficient for many senators. In August 1963 Mansfield gathered 43 sponsors to introduce the first of many subsequent resolutions calling for substantial reductions of the U.S. presence in Europe unless the allies increased their defense expenditures. Mansfield obviously was not a lonely voice, although his objections extended back to the early 1960s. The senators' concerns, however, were not identical. For some, the main issue was the money drain; for others it was the persistent complaint about unfair burdens; and for still others, it was the lack of European understanding of the stakes in the Vietnam War.

Mansfield's resolutions were just that: an expression of discontent without expecting to alter America's role in Europe. In the next year, however, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, introduced an amendment

to the annual defense procurement bill that would have prohibited the use of funds to support more than 50,000 U.S. troops in Europe. Unless successfully vetoed, this amendment would have the force of law and would have affected the viability of NATO's defenses in Europe. Symington's action was intended to show the growing impatience of Congress with European behavior. But like Mansfield's resolutions, it was basically a warning, not a prelude to America's departure from Europe. Symington withdrew his amendment on the same day. Neither Mansfield nor Symington had any wish to weaken NATO in the face of the Soviet adversary.

In one respect the Mansfield and Symington maneuvers reflected the ongoing importance of NATO to American leaders. They wanted to get their message across without damage to the defense capabilities of the alliance. The Warsaw bloc's suppression of Czechoslovakia's attempts to liberalize its system in 1968 was a sobering reminder-more to the United States than to its allies-that defense preparations were still necessary.

Nonetheless, the accumulation of grievances on both sides of the Atlantic could have had more damaging effects on the survival of the alliance than was inflicted by America's diversion of men and materiel from Europe to Vietnam. If NATO surmounted these challenges it was largely because neither Europeans nor Americans wished for a divorce. Nor did they want to use the provision in the North Atlantic Treaty-Article 13-that would allow any member to depart legally after 20 years. Although there was recognition-more on the European than on the American side-that the Soviet menace was not what it had been at the beginning of the decade, there was also recognition that the detente sought by the Harmel report was not yet achieved.

The Czech crisis of 1968 had a centripetal effect in reminding the allies of their raison d'etre. It reduced American pressure for further reductions of their troop level in Europe but did not eradicate frustration with the behavior of the European partners. A Senate report in October 1968 admitted that the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw bloc armies were profoundly disturbing. Given the unsettled conditions in

Europe following the invasion, the report concluded that the time was not propitious for substantial reductions of U.S. forces. But it also quoted McNamara's statement at the North Atlantic Council's December meeting in which he agreed that although there should be no major diminution of U.S. strength in Europe, the Europeans bore a responsibility to meet the balanceof-payments deficit created by America's contributions to Europe's defense.

The issues that divided the allies throughout the 1960s-the balance of payments that so disturbed Americans, European suspicions that the American war in Vietnam was diluting its commitments to NATO, and America's conviction that Europe lacked empathy for its sacrifices in Southeast Asia-persisted. But despite all the transatlantic alarums, the United States remained in Europe in substantial numbers at the end of the decade. In 1961 U.S. military personnel totaled 373,000; in 1969 the figure was still well over 300,000-316,000 after the years of McNamara's efforts to redeploy troops not only to satisfy pressing needs in Vietnam but also to further his hopes to reorganize the military structure of the alliance. By early 1968 he had left office, with the U.S. NATO military in Europe largely intact. If there were substantial changes since 1961, they were caused less by the secretary of defense's policies than by the actions of the president of France.

There were both similarities and differences between the transatlantic tensions at the beginning of the decade and those at the end of the decade. In both periods Europeans had doubts about their American partner. In 1961 they centered on the aftermath of Sputnik with concomitant fears that the new vulnerability of the United States to Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles would jeopardize the American pledge to its partners under Article 5 of the treaty. Soviet power never seemed more formidable. At the end of the decade, Europeans still had doubts about their main ally, but on different grounds. After the Vietnam debacle, doubts centered on the shortcomings of American leadership. The Soviet adversary was no longer the behemoth it had been in the past; its blinking over Berlin and Cuba had reduced its menace and convinced most Europeans that the East and West could coexist in relative peace. This was the message of the Harmel agreement, and the

Czech crisis, shocking as it was at the time, was indeed a momentary scare. The Soviets had taken care to assure the West that their actions were directed internally not externally. Detente was derailed only temporarily.

What was superficially surprising was that the United States appeared prepared to accept detente in 1968. The explanation lies in the troubles in Vietnam. Unlike the Korean War, Vietnam did not transform NATO. Nor did it destroy the organization. It induced the United States to follow the European path of detente with the Warsaw bloc less because of a new belief that the Soviet threat had dissipated than because of a need to disentangle itself from Southeast Asia. Detente with the Soviet Union was a means of securing this objective although, unlike its allies, the United States had fewer illusions about Communism's ultimate objective.

4

DETENTE AND ITS LIMITATIONS: 1968-1980

Detente was the driving force in the first half of the 1970s not only in the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact but also in the more complicated ties between the United States and its European allies. The term itself was neutral; it meant simply relaxation of tensions. But when applied to international politics at the end of the 1960s, it was fraught with ideological content. For the United States it meant an opportunity to extricate itself from the quagmire of Vietnam without equating detente with an abandonment of Soviet ambitions for a Communist world order. At the same time, it was an implicit recognition of equality in the military power of both superpowers, a fact of international life that the United States would have to live with. For the Europeans, detente was far more expansive and implied far more optimism than the American version. There was a sense of normality in their outlook on the Warsaw bloc; the Eastern Europeans seemingly were no different in their wish for coexistence than the Western Europeans. In investing different meanings to detente, the transatlantic allies almost guaranteed the generation of friction.

Detente on one level symbolized the equality of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In recognizing the power of the Soviet bloc, reinforced by its decisive action against Czechoslovakia in 1968, Europeans gave it a respectability it had not enjoyed in the first 15 years of its existence. NATO communiques in the 1970s, unlike those of the 1960s, routinely discussed relations with the Warsaw Pact. An annex to the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council gave lip service to the "defense" aspect of the Harmel report but emphasized the role of detente in the broader context of the alliance's basic

purposes. The communique looked forward to detente's success in negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The language of this annex connoted another meaning of detente: the decline of American authority in NATO circles. It was not that the United States was now dispensable as the senior ally. It was that the combination of a more reasonable Soviet adversary and a perception of American weakness in the Vietnam War encouraged an independence among the Europeans that had not been possible in the first two decades of NATO's history. This new sense of European empowerment was reflected in the actions, sponsored primarily by the smaller partners, to flesh out the promise of the Harmel initiative. In effect, "defense" was to be submerged under "detente"

It produced immediate results. The Eurogroup formed in 1968 was an entity in which smaller powers would be heard, a forum for harmonizing European views on major political or strategic questions. Its purpose, outlined in the "Reykjavik signal" at the North Atlantic Council's meeting in Iceland in 1968, was to set in motion confidence-building measures with the Warsaw Pact by a Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

The United States was not a major player in these proceedings. Yet, it collaborated in every phase of the changing posture of NATO even as American leaders differed with their European colleagues over the meaning of detente. There was little faith in the State Department or in the Pentagon that the Soviets regarded detente in the way the European allies did. The major explanation then for America's relative quiescence in 1968 was the impact of the Vietnam War. The conflict had absorbed the nation's energies and more of its troops than were stationed in Europe; it had led McNamara to leave office in 1967, belatedly recognizing that the war could not be won; and rising opposition at home destroyed President Johnson's hopes for a second term in the White House in 1968. Europe's role as America's primary ally appeared to diminish as Asian concerns predominated. When NATO did intrude into the nation's consciousness, it was usually as an irritant both because of the allies' opposition to the U.S. war and because they continued to demand more money and manpower than the alliance

seemed to merit in that year. The Soviets exacerbated America's annoyance with its allies by its conscious efforts to avoid confrontation with NATO during the Czech crisis.

DETENTE'S MANIFESTATIONS

Britain and the EEC

From 1968 to the middle of the 1970s, the Harmel spirit seemed to dominate the alliance. Accommodation was in the wind once the Czech crisis had been put aside. It took a number of forms. After its heavy-handed advocacy of Britain's membership in the European Common Market, the United States stood back as Britain successfully negotiated its entry into the economic community in 1973. De Gaulle had died in 1970 and the successor government, while Gaullist, was less strident in its anti-American stance and more open to a British association. The Conservative British government under Prime Minister Edward Heath in turn appeared more anxious in this period to cultivate ties with the Continent than with its transatlantic partner. In fact, Henry Kissinger, national security advisor to President Richard Nixon, regarded him as the most indifferent of all British leaders to the American connection. He showed no sign of any interest in promoting the special relationship. Heath remembered with resentment the Suez debacle and admired many aspects of the Gaullist vision of Europe. Unlike his predecessors, the prime minister made no effort to meet with Nixon after his defeat of Harold Wilson in 1970. The distance the British prime minister placed between himself and the president did not signify a major breach; there were close connections at lower levels of government. But it did reflect the Zeitgeist of the time when Europe was seeking via detente to impress its own views on NATO.

There was little resistance to this British drift on the part of the United States. Although not irrelevant, Britain was no more important politically than Germany to American leaders at the end of the decade. It had failed to

give sufficient support on Vietnam, and the devaluation of the pound in 1967 suggested that Britain had failed as well to sustain itself as a major player on the global scene. Not least among the obstacles to promotion of a closer relationship was American irritation over British moralizing about Vietnam. When the My Lai massacre was uncovered, the House of Commons expressed its shock on discovering the depth of American brutality.

Ostpolitik

Similarly, the United States was an uncomfortable but passive witness to Chancellor Willy Brandt's new policies toward East Germany. Ever since the Federal Republic had been established there was fierce resistance, supported by the United States, to recognition of the German Democratic Republic. This position was the basis of the Hallstein Doctrine, which pledged to break diplomatic relations with any government that recognized the Communist government of East Germany. The Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961, when the Soviets threatened to make a separate peace treaty with its client regime, signified the dangers that the hostile East German government posed to the West.

But in the changing environment of East-West relations at the end of the 1960s, a new chancellor, Social Democratic leader Willy Brandt, initiated Ostpolitik in a major break with the German past. It was also a species of detente, in keeping with the mood of the European allies. By opening ties with East Germany, he was tacitly accepting a reality that Adenauer and his successors had denied: the apparent permanence of a divided Germany. He was also responding to the reality that Germany's allies were giving only lip service to the concept of German unification. Europe's-and America's-acceptance of the Berlin Wall drove Brandt to try a new approach to German foreign policy.

Ironically, the coolest response to economic political connections with the Warsaw bloc came from East Germany. Its leaders suffered from an inferiority complex toward their more powerful western kin and felt that their role as the most advanced of the Communist allies would be lessened

if West German connections with the Soviet world flourished. The Soviets, on the other hand, welcomed Brandt's approach as an opportunity to win an agreement that would keep West Berlin outside the Federal Republic. Even more important to the Soviets was West Germany's willingness to respect the Yalta boundaries that incorporated parts of prewar Germany into Poland and to acknowledge the permanence of the Oder- Niesse line. These concessions became treaties in 1970 and 1971. A four-power accord on Berlin was signed in September 1971 followed by agreements between East and West Germany. In May 1972 the Federal Republic signed treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union.

The American reaction to the transformation of German foreign policy was mixed. On one level the new foreign policy team of Nixon and Kissinger admired Brandt's courage in finding a way for the Federal Republic to live with a partitioned Germany, and even to profit from the division. They recognized that unification was impossible-outside an unlikely and suicidal war with the Warsaw bloc. In the context of the rising spirit of detente, West Germany could be a magnet for Communist Europe. An improved standard of living for East Germans, increase of trade with the Soviet Union and its satellites, and the freer flow of travel and exchanges between East and West could blur the dividing lines between the blocs. In the long run, then, the Brandt policy was intended to achieve German unity rather than perpetuate division, with Germany as the kind of European leader that de Gaulle's France had aspired to become.

These were worthy goals from the American perspective, up to a point. On the other hand, the Nixon administration nourished some doubts about Brandt'sand particularly his close confidant, Egon Bahr's-adherence to the Atlantic alliance. Brandt had made no secret of his disillusionment about the allies' hesitations over the Berlin Wall and, consequently, over the future of West Berlin itself. Would a flourishing new relationship with the Warsaw bloc loosen or even destroy the Federal Republic's relationship with the West? But the outcome might not be an assertion of a potentially dangerous German nationalism manifested in a withdrawal from NATO; the ties were too strong for such a break. A more likely result could be a neutralist Germany, long sought by the Soviet Union, by which West Germany's

entanglement with the Warsaw bloc would become so intimate that Brandt or his successors could not be counted on to support the United States in a future crisis between NATO and the Soviet Union. And could this depen dence sway other European members to separate themselves from the United States at critical moments?

These nightmares did not prevent the United States from suppressing its misgivings and supporting Ostpolitik. There really was very little choice. Detente with the Soviets was too strong a sentiment to frustrate even if Nixon and Kissinger genuinely wanted to kill Brandt's rapprochement with the East. They could take satisfaction in the agreements to safeguard the integrity of West Berlin. They were also appreciative of a consequence that would remove once and for all the kinds of tensions growing out of a promise of German unification. Moreover, detente between Germany and the East cleared the way for new arrangements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger were determined to profit as best they could from the discomfiting fact that American weakness permitted allies to make their own agreements with the Communist world. The United States itself would have to make concessions to the Soviet Union in recognition both of its military strength and of pressures from allies, but these concessions would also involve Soviet concessions as well.

The Nixon Doctrine

The dilemma facing American policymakers in the Nixon administration was how to counter Europe's seeming rush to accommodation with the Warsaw bloc and at the same time use detente as a means of both renewing ties with Europe and deriving advantages from a new relationship with the Soviet Union. The Nixon Doctrine on the surface was a means of extricating the United States from the Vietnam War by turning over its conduct to the Vietnamese themselves, although with the blessings and material support of the United States. The doctrine was purposely entwined with the Vietnamization of the war, as Henry Kissinger presented it in the journal Foreign Affairs before entering government service as presidential adviser in 1969. The president restated this theme in his visit to Guam in the spring of that year.

The role of the NATO allies was a major element in the doctrine. Kissinger himself had a long record of engagement with European issues, from his doctoral dissertation at Harvard on the Congress of Vienna to his perceptive analysis of NATO in The Troubled Partnership, published in 1965. In this study he considered a genuine transatlantic partnership with Europe to be vital to the success of the alliance. He emphasized the importance of European unity as a prerequisite to NATO's coherence in the future, and urged the United States to promote its connections for the sake of its own national interest.

Although the Kennedy-Johnson years had witnessed some softening of the rigidities of John Foster Dulles's stewardship in the Eisenhower administration, NATO's military structure remained intact, and the strident tones of anti-Communist rhetoric rang more loudly under Kennedy than they had under his predecessor. During the Johnson administration NATO seemed to have been consigned, at least in Nixon's judgment, to a form of limbo attended to after the Vietnam War ended. Because the war did not end during Johnson's administration, Nixon and Kissinger believed that inattention to NATO's concerns and consequent European resentment damaged the transatlantic relationship.

The Nixon Doctrine was to signal both the end of the Vietnam War and the end of America's diversion of its energies and resources away from the European arena. The identification of NATO as the first priority in American foreign relations should have won a warm reception from the European allies. The alliance should have been reinvigorated by America's response to European concerns. Indeed, as presidential candidate, Nixon had lashed out at the Johnson administration for dismissing NATO, for not even mentioning it in his State of the Union Address in 1968. It was time, he declared, to pay more attention to the European partners, to lecture them less and listen to them more.

As president, he made a point of visiting Europe a month after this inauguration to dramatize his desire for greater consultation. Beyond this spirit of cooperation he promised to present a plan to move from crisis management to crisis prevention to an era of cooperation. This commitment

applied not only to relations within the alliance but also to relations with the Soviet bloc.

Mutual Balanced Force Reductions Program and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Mutual Balanced Force Reductions Program (MBFR), introduced in the same year as the Nixon Doctrine, was a product of the confluence of America's interest in accommodating Europe's drive toward terminating the Cold War and the nation's need for its own accommodation to Soviet power. If there was a balance of terror achieved through the parity of NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's military machines, this should be an occasion to give meaning to detente by reducing the numbers of troops on the front lines of Europe. The allies pushed for rapid action in East-West negotiations for troop reductions and for inhibiting development of mutually destructive weaponry. The Harmel report itself made these objectives clear with its plans for "studying disarmament and practical arms control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions." Three years later, at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome, NATO placed emphasis on adequate verification and controls to ensure agreements made under MBFR.

The United States did not lag behind its European colleagues in celebrating the virtues of MBFR. Senators such as Mike Mansfield praised the effort for its potential effect in reducing American manpower in Europe as well as for alleviating the always-emotional balance-of-payments issue. The reason the Nixon administration embraced the program had little to do with the potential end of the Cold War and much to do with diminishing the Soviet superiority in ground forces, hence the emphasis on "balanced" force reductions. The Warsaw Pact organization would be required to reduce far more troops than would the Western allies.

It was the Soviets who resisted the MBFR, ignoring the North Atlantic Council's approaches as long as they could without alienating the Europeans. The Soviets were ready enough to have NATO forces reduced. This was a long-standing Communist goal. By "NATO forces" they meant removal of American forces altogether from Europe. Ideally, the Soviets

wished to deal only with the Europeans not as a part of a NATO bloc but as individual nations sharing the European continent with them. By finally consenting to meet with NATO representatives in Vienna in 1973, they temporarily gave up their intention to exclude the United States from the negotiations or to exclude NATO as a bargaining agent.

The MBFR talks opened in Vienna in 1972 and proceeded at a snail's pace through the 1970s. A basic problem with these negotiations was the virtual impossibility of genuine parity. The United States hoped for an asymmetrical reduction of forces with the larger Warsaw Pact armies making proportionately larger reductions. The problem of parity was further complicated by the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union to central Europe compared with the distance of American forces from their home base. Inevitably, the Soviet conception of parity was a reduction of an equal number of troops from both sides, whereas the United States recommended less than half be withdrawn from the West.

Neither proposal had any chance of satisfying either party, and this stalemate suited Soviet objectives. Its interest was in the convening of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that opened in Vienna in 1973 and ultimately produced the Helsinki Agreement two years later. This agreement presumably allowed the kind of freedoms for the peoples of the Warsaw bloc that were taken for granted in the West. They turned out to be empty concessions. More important to the Soviet Union was the aura of legitimacy the Helsinki Agreement gave to the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. Just as Ostpolitik led to German acceptance of the Yalta decisions, the CSCE was the path to NATO and U.S. recognition of a seemingly permanent division of Europe. This was a direction detente was taking the NATO alliance.

In the many negotiations in the early 1970s, the United States was uncomfortable with the eagerness of its European partners to embrace these manifestations of detente. Senate leaders in particular were worried about the subordination of defense to detente in the translation of the Harmel report into reality. The ongoing MBFR talks increasingly sensitized Congress to the realities of Soviet military power in conventional weaponry

and, conversely, NATO's weaknesses in troops and armaments. Rather than endorsing the expectations of Senators Mansfield and Symington, the prospect of successful talks could undermine NATO's military position in Europe. A cut of 100,000 U.S. troops, even if balanced against a much larger reduction in Warsaw Pact forces, could destabilize the political as well as military posture of the organization. There would be nothing "mutual" or "balanced" in an American rush to achieve force reductions while burdened with the war in Vietnam.

Despite reservations about Europe's enthusiasm for MBFR and CSCE, the Nixon administration repeatedly gave evidence of its concern for NATO in ways that should have been unmistakable to Europeans. The revival of the Mansfield resolutions in the U.S. Senate after the shock of the Warsaw bloc intervention in Czechoslovakia had worn off put the issue of American troop withdrawal from Europe in focus once again, even more seriously than in the Johnson years. It was not surprising that the American public's increasing disillusionment with the Vietnam War would spill over into the NATO arena. Nixon's carefully crafted plans to turn over the conduct of the war in Vietnam to the Vietnamese did not bring a quick end to American involvement. On the contrary, the expansion of the war into Cambodia in 1970 intensified American anger with the Nixon administration. Europe's seeming insensitivity to America's agony over Vietnam made Europe one of the targets of this mood. While the dollar was weakening as a consequence of the war, the economies of the Western allies were flourishing and currencies were strengthening at America's expense.

The Nixon administration held firm against the rising demands for sharp troop reductions in Europe, asserting that the United States would not reduce its forces unless there was reciprocal action through the MBFR on the part of the Soviet adversary. Any unilateral action, it feared, would create a military imbalance that might induce the Warsaw bloc to risk provocations it would otherwise avoid. It would also generate doubts among allies once again about the steadfastness of American commitments to NATO.

This was not simply a rhetorical gesture in support of the alliance. The Nixon position was tested in 1971 when Senator Mansfield mounted a more powerful challenge than he had made in the 1960s. Unlike the resolutions in the past, which were simply signals of dissatisfaction, he attached an amendment to a bill extending the Selective Service Act requiring that U.S. forces in Europe be halved to 150,000 troops. If successful, this would become law and not just the sense of the Senate. To counter the popularity of this amendment, the administration mobilized former NATO supreme allied commanders Alfred M. Gruenther, Lauris Norstad, and Lyman L. Lemnitzer, along with such veteran Democrats as Dean Acheson and George Ball, to express their opposition to the Mansfield amendment. Nixon also won the endorsement of former President Johnson who agreed that drastic reduction of troop strength would be dangerous to the mission of the alliance. The amendment was defeated in the Senate by a substantial majority, 61 to 36, but the administration's attention to the danger was a measure of its determination to give primacy to Europe in America's foreign relations.

At the same time that it was staving off the Mansfield threat, the Nixon administration was helping Europe by maintaining a low profile on matters that in the past would have provoked American objections, privately if not publicly. The acute French pundit, Raymond Aron, observed the "ostentatious silence" of Americans on Britain's latest attempt in 1972 to enter the Common Market. It was in striking contrast to the heavy-handed advocacy that damaged rather than served the British cause during the de Gaulle years. Similarly, as noted, the United States chose not to speak out against the Ostpolitik of Chancellor Brandt despite serious reservations about the terms the Soviets might demand in return for improved relations with the Federal Republic. The United States confined its public interest in the accords to those facets that directly related to its own position in Berlin. This discreet behavior appeared to confirm the Nixon Doctrine's resolution to support Europeans' management of their own affairs in ways they regarded appropriate without American interference.

DISILLUSIONMENT WITH DETENTE

U.S. "Unilateralism"

The result should have been a more harmonious transatlantic relationship in the 1970s than in the 1960s. Such was not the case. In retrospect, Nixon and Kissinger received little credit from the European allies for their low profile on internal European affairs or even for their firm championship of the American military presence in Europe in the face of vocal domestic opposition. A primary factor in European reservations about the Nixon policies was suspicion of hidden agendas within the Nixon Doctrine. Was the doctrine a mask concealing American weakness? Vietnamization of the war was seen as the real reason for America's interest in detente. It provided an exit from an unwinnable situation. Given this perception, it was likely that America's reduction of commitments abroad would touch Europe as well, no matter what priority the Nixon Doctrine assigned its NATO relations. The drive for a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union could be an admission of inferiority in the competition with the Soviet Union, in which European interests might be sacrificed. If partial disengagement from one part of the world was a reaction not only to failure in Vietnam but a concession to domestic opposition to costs in Europe as well as in Asia, the administration would have to walk a fine line to maintain its credibility with the allies.

That this credibility was in doubt was raised by the obvious linkage between American economic and foreign policy manifested in new measures in 1971 to shore up the weakened dollar. The issue of financial implications of the cost of American military investments abroad had always been a major theme in the demands for Europe to share the burdens more equitably. Nixon may have stopped the latest Mansfield amendment but he sanctioned suspension of the convertibility of the dollar in August 1971. A 10 percent surcharge imposed on all imports shocked the European members, partly by its unilateral application and partly because of the confession of weakness it demonstrated in what had been a bastion of stability for a generation.

The American justification for its defense of the dollar was not surprising; the dollar gap of the 1960s continued to worsen under the burden of massive military expenses in Europe and the unresolved conflict in Southeast Asia. The outcome was the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and, with it, the apparent end of the policy of trade liberalization as protectionist sentiment burgeoned in the United States. The impact of a cheaper dollar on European producers was sharp and immediate. The European Economic Community, an object of American benevolence in its formative years, was no help in mediating with the United States. Indeed, a major source of Secretary of the Treasury John Connally's animus against Europe was the preferential trade agreements, especially in agricultural products, that discriminated against American competitors. Europe's potential as an economic rival of the United States was a dimension in the relationship that American leaders had neglected to observe in the 1960s.

The Connally initiative was short-lived. An agreement signed at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington before the end of 1971 established a floating exchange rate system that helped restore, temporarily at least, equilibrium to the international system. There was a return to the status quo in that the surcharge was lifted and the troop levels of Europeans and Americans in Europe remained in place. But psychological damage to the Nixon Doctrine could not be undone. The Treasury Department's action contradicted the new spirit of cooperation that the administration was nourishing. Bringing the dollar gap to the fore through devaluation reminded the partners that America's domination of much of Europe's market from automobiles to soft drinks siphoned a constant stream of dollars back to the home bases of the American multinational companies.

Annoying as the economic gauntlet was that the United States laid down to Europeans, a more disturbing element in the transatlantic relationship in the 1970s was a new spike in their doubts about the strengths of America's commitment to Europe's security. Granted that the thrust of detente signified a diminished fear of Soviet aggression, Europeans still lived next to a superpower equipped with large conventional forces as well as an impressive nuclear capability. In this context the American presence on the front lines remained a vital counterweight. But from the inception of the

Nixon Doctrine there was a suspicion abroad that the U.S. drive for detente with the Soviet Union was a confession of weakness in Europe as well as in Vietnam. If "Vietnamization" of the hot war in Asia was a euphemism for abandonment of an Asian ally, then a unilateral approach to the Warsaw bloc might lead to the "Europeanization" of NATO's defense in the Cold War. Reducing America's global commitments undertaken in the old Truman Doctrine might be accomplished by sacrificing the interests of the European allies.

The American embrace of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) fed anxieties about the fraudulence of the Nixon Doctrine's putative elevation of NATO Europe as the first priority in America's foreign relations. The doctrine in this light was a sinister way of making a virtue out of weakness by retaining the presumption of leadership while reducing obligations to its allies. Even more distressing was the entrance of the United States into a bilateral relationship with the Soviet adversary outside the NATO framework. Superficially, negotiations with the enemy, as evidenced in Ostpolitik and in MBFR, should have been a positive sign of a more stable life in Europe. Such was the objective of those initiatives. And it should be noted that Ostpolitik was as much a unilateral action by West Germany as SALT was by the United States.

In many ways the time was right for a mutual effort to reduce strategic nuclear weaponry on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Soviets had achieved essential parity with the United States in nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and had an interest in inhibiting another offensive-weapons cycle. For the United States, the ending of its nuclear superiority made the Nixon administration all the more sensitive to the perils of mutual destruction if the nuclear arms race were not reversed.

There were two other factors in play from an American standpoint. One was the rising opposition in Congress to a further arms buildup, fueled by disillusionment over the Vietnam War. A second was the opportunity, in a new bilateral relationship with the Soviets, according to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (as of 1973), to link SALT and other arrangements to

Soviet concessions to American interests, not least of which would be Soviet backing for American policies in Southeast Asia.

The upshot of these mutual considerations was an agreement between the two nations in 1972 to limit permanently their deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs) to no more than two sites, 1,300 kilometers apart and to no more than 200 missiles. For the first time in history, as Kissinger observed with some exaggeration, two great powers built their future security on the vulnerability of their defenses. But what attracted Europe's attention was its exclusion from the proceedings.

The allies foresaw danger in the SALT agreements of 1972 from the differing interpretations of just what were strategic weapons. Although the substance of the talks devolved on the limitations on strategic weapons that could hit either the Soviet Union or the United States, the definition of which weapons were strategic affected the European allies directly. Although the United States insisted that only intercontinental missiles should be classified as strategic, this was not the Soviet position. Any weapon that could strike the Soviet homeland was its definition of a strategic weapon. This meant that such nuclear IRBMs deployed in Europe would be considered "strategic" and subject to regulation under the SALT agreement. Because Soviet IRBMs aimed against European targets would be "tactical" and hence excluded from SALT, the resulting asymmetry became an understandable concern for the partners.

The lack of a strong American protest confirmed Europe's perception that SALT served the Soviets and signified American insensitivity to its security. If this were the product of bilateral negotiations without European collaboration, the Nixon Doctrine would be more than a fraud; it would be a betrayal of the alliance. Europe's uneasiness was compounded by the continuing American pressure to build up NATO's ground forces on the familiar assumption, dating back to the McNamara era, that nuclear weapons could not provide the deterrence it had provided in the 1950s. From the allied perspective, the product of such a buildup not only would be unreasonably costly but could never match the array of conventional forces the Warsaw bloc could muster. The American argument that in reality

the better equipped NATO forces were more than a match for their Communist counterparts was no more persuasive in the 1970s than it had been when McNamara had presented it in the I960s.

The efforts of American officials to calm these fears did not dispel the ongoing uneasiness in Europe about the direction the United States was following under Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger. Their doctrine seemed to have been wholly discredited at the very time that the president's second term in office was about to be terminated by the Watergate scandal.

"The Year of Europe" and the Yom Kippur War

It was obvious to Kissinger that there was greater need to repair linkages within NATO than there was to establish new ones with the Soviet Union-not that Europeans disagreed with the key platform of the Nixon Doctrine. They felt they deserved the equality the United States had professed to give them. A uniting Europe under the aegis of the European Economic Community seemed to promise a new transatlantic relationship. The population of the EEC was 260 million in 1973, as opposed to 210 million in the United States, and 249 million in the Soviet Union. The community's gross national product was almost twice that of the Soviet Union and only 20 percent less than that of the senior partner. The impulse toward detente was essentially a European project, and it implied a normality in international relations that portended a lessening of the importance of the American connection to Europe's future.

But with all the gains accumulated by a more confident Europe, there still was no United States of Europe ready to assume the military responsibilities the United States of America had borne over the first quarter-century of NATO's history, and there was little prospect of such an entity coming into being in the foreseeable future. The EEC had no means of raising its own armies or of exacting taxes to pay for them. And despite a modest nuclear capability in its British and French components, there was no movement toward developing a credible nuclear force of its own. The role of the NATO superpower was still indispensable in dealing with the Warsaw bloc controlled by the Soviet Union. As long as European defense

rested on the flexible-response doctrine the allies had reluctantly accepted in 1967, they would remain dependent on the American presence in Europe.

European frustration over this continuing inferiority, joined with doubts about the reliability of the American ally, induced Kissinger to proclaim 1973 as the "Year of Europe" in a speech at the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York on 25 April of that year. The speech highlighted America's intention to reinvigorate the Atlantic alliance. A new Atlantic Charter dedicated to a transatlantic collaboration would deal with defense, trade, and energy issues. In essence, the Year of Europe would perform what the Nixon Doctrine failed to resolve, proof of America's devotion to its European allies.

The attempt was doomed to failure. Europe's reaction was cynical. Kissinger's speech was delivered just as Watergate was beginning to shake the foundations of the Nixon administration. Shortly after Kissinger made his grand gesture, the president was forced to dismiss his key aides to calm the rising storm over the rifling of Democratic Party records at the Watergate complex and the subsequent efforts to cover up the administration's involvement. The scandal that forced Nixon out office left Kissinger with more power than he had enjoyed in the first administration. It was understandable, then, that European observers would wonder if the proposed Atlantic Charter was just an attempt to divert attention from the ongoing Watergate troubles. They might even speculate that the ambitious Kissinger may have envisioned himself as a latter-day Roosevelt or Churchill.

But it was more than Watergate that derailed the Year of Europe. The proposal was awkwardly presented without sufficient consultation at home or abroad. Kissinger's overtures contained many of the elements that had contributed to Europe's suspicions from the beginning of the Nixon years. Few judgments could have angered Europeans more in his message than the observation that "[t]he United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests." The arrogant tone and language grated on European sensibilities and served to accentuate rather than narrow the gap separating America from Europe.

Not all the difficulties arising from the speech derived from Kissinger's lordly manner or from his assumptions about Europe's role in the world. Some of them were the product of the allies' own pretensions. The disarray in the Nixon administration encouraged them to deprecate American leadership in the alliance even as they refused to accept any diminution of America's military contribution to Europe's defense. The mood in the United States was resentful. Although the Vietnam War was winding down in 1973, the Senate and public at large were reminded of the lack of support western Europe had given to the war against the common Communist adversary. Although the Mansfield resolutions were no longer on the table, congressional cutbacks of military aid, along with Watergate-inspired restrictions on the president's power to conduct war, inevitably would bring on new versions of the old resolutions.

Grievances on both sides of the Atlantic burst open in an out-of-area issue, the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. As was the case in 1956-the Middle East, an external conflict triggered a destructive centrifugal movement that threatened to destroy the alliance. Former Assistant Secretary of State Eugene V. Rostow believed that the crisis the war created in NATO was more serious than earlier flashpoints in Korea, Cuba, or Berlin. Whether the Soviets intended to use the war to drive the United States out of the eastern Mediterranean is arguable. What is beyond question was the depth of American anger at Europe's distancing itself from its major ally. The allies quickly embraced the Arab cause, including Egypt's assault against Israeli forces in the Sinai. When American military aid to Israel was rushed to the scene, the NATO partners denied the use of their territories and air space. Portugal was the reluctant exception. Although there was no NATO obligation to provide staging areas for transshipment of supplies, as Portugal did in the Azores, Europe's hostility to America's role in this crisis contained political and economic undertones that were more significant than a pro-Arab bias.

The latter was certainly a factor as NATO members carefully nurtured their special relations with Arab powers, France with Algeria, Italy with Libya, Greece with Egypt. Support for the Egyptian assault was a cheap price to pay for the economic benefits Arab connections provided. Their

economies were more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than was America's, a situation they felt Americans did not appreciate sufficiently. Given the American presence on the North Atlantic Council, they could not express this sentiment clearly in this setting. The EEC, however, in which the United States was not represented, issued a communique in the midst of the war endorsing the Arab interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 requiring Israeli evacuation of all territory captured in the 1967 war. In effect, the Europeans gave their blessing to the concerted Egyptian-Syrian attack against Israel.

A political factor was also in play. Europeans saw America's support of Israel in the conflict as a typical example of its disregard for European interests. Convinced that pandering to the Jewish lobby was at the heart of the American response, they blamed domestic politics for policies pursued at their expense. Confronting the United States over a Middle East issue was an opportunity to express discontent with a host of other American policies. Secretary of State Kissinger concluded that the Yom Kippur War released the allies from restraints that had prevented them earlier from fully venting their displeasure with their inferior position in the alliance.

This attitude received no sympathy from American public opinion. The war, after all, pushed the United States to the brink of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, Egypt's principal arms supplier. When the reinforced Israeli forces crossed the west bank of the Suez Canal, the Soviets threatened to inter vene on behalf of the besieged Egyptian Third Army. They could not afford another humiliating defeat of a fractious client that would leave their reputation in tatters in the Arab world. At the same time that Kissinger's shrewd diplomacy marginalized Soviet influence in the area, he placed limits on the extent of the Israeli victory. The United States was the paramount power in the Middle East by the end of the decade.

As these events unfolded, Europe's behavior was more than just an annoyance to the Nixon administration. To the Congress and public at large, it was nothing less than outrageous. The Europeans not only had deserted their senior ally in the crisis but also profited from an oil embargo that the Arab producers mounted against the United States for its support of Israel.

Congress had already made its resentment felt by means of the Jackson-Nunn amendment, a rider to a vital military appropriations bill. The bill became a law that required the president to reduce U.S. forces in Europe by the same percentage that Europeans failed to offset American costs in the balance of payments. This was not an unfamiliar congressional response to European offenses, but even before the outbreak of the war, emotions had been raised to the point of giving teeth to what had been warning resolutions. The president underscored the nation's feelings when he asserted in March 1974 that the allies "cannot have it both ways. They cannot have United States cooperation on the security front and proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political fronts."

Small wonder, then, as the twenty-fifth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty approached, predictions of an early demise of the alliance surfaced again. A Gallup poll disclosed that internationalist views in 1974 had dropped to the lowest figure since 1945. Only 48 percent of those polled approved the use of force to help western Europe in a crisis. Another measure of the alliance's distress was the equality that the NATO Review reluctantly gave to the "Downs" in an essay on "Twenty-Five Years of Ups and Downs" Nevertheless, the editor remembered that NATO was always in one state of disarray or another, and if it had survived the rancor of the Suez crisis in 1956, the shock of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the high tensions following de Gaulle's expulsion order in 1966, it would also outlive the bitterness on both sides of the Atlantic in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. Detente had not yet run its course, even if the Year of Europe had such a brief shelf life. The NATO allies continued to keep detente alive in the mid-1970s.

Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish Imbroglio, 1974

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the treaty was also the occasion of an explosion of violence between two NATO allies. Conflict between Greece and Turkey had historic roots in the Ottoman empire, and its manifestation over the newly independent island of Cyprus was hardly a surprise. More surprising was their anger against the United States, the nation that had been a patron of both countries since the announcement of

the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Each ally asserted that America had used its powerful influence to favor its rival's cause.

Hostility between Greeks and Turks, always deeper among the weaker Greeks, lay beneath the surface of the fragile spirit of cooperation that developed in the 1930s because both countries wanted to avoid entanglements with the great powers that had hindered their national ambitions in the past. World War II temporarily shattered this cooperation when the belligerents exploited Greece and Turkey in that war. But fear of Communism brought them together again when Greece fought a civil war against domestic Communists and Turkey endured enormous pressure from its Soviet neighbor for both maritime and territorial concessions. The United States was their patron in their successful resistance because Americans fulfilled the promise of the Truman Doctrine with funds and arms. As a result of this experience, Greece and Turkey were joint suitors for membership in the Atlantic alliance in 1949. That neither nation was anywhere near the Atlantic did not matter; Italy, after all, was a signatory. Both countries felt that its confrontation with Communist aggression deserved recognition, and feared that without the embrace of NATO the Communist menace might rise again.

Their arguments had not been persuasive in 1949. Only after the outbreak of the Korean War and the militarization of the alliance under SHAPE was their application revisited. The perceived need for NATO to secure its southeastern flank against a potential Soviet attack and the prospect of acquiring troops, particularly from Turkish divisions, changed their status. Against the better judgments of the northern allies, the United States led the way to bring Greece and Turkey into NATO at the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council in February 1952. For a brief time there was even a Balkan Pact that embraced Communist Yugoslavia, as well as Greece and Turkey, out of a common fear of Soviet aggression. This pact dissolved in the mid-1950s when the Soviets appeared ready for a rapprochement with Yugoslavia while the Greek and Turkish members revived their mutual suspicions, particularly over Cyprus, even as they remained in NATO.

Centuries of antagonism made Turkey, not the Soviet Union, the primary threat to the Greeks; Russia in the nineteenth century had been considered the protector of Greeks and the enemy of Turks. Although Turkey was more conscious of the Soviet danger, it nourished grievances against Greek influence in the United States and Greek claims over the air and sea space around the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. It was the island of Cyprus, with a population 80 percent Greek and about 20 percent Turkish that was the scene of a serious crisis in the mid-1970s. As long as Britain had remained sovereign over the island, an uneasy coexistence prevailed. But Greek Cypriot pressure for enosis with the mother country and Turkish Cypriot agitation for protection from Turkey had accelerated Britain's willingness to give up the control that it had exercised since 1978. As in India and Palestine over a decade before, the widespread terrorism between the two communities created more problems than the Cypriots could handle.

Given that Greece and Turkey were both NATO members, Secretary-General Lord Ismay attempted to mediate in the late 1950s. His successor, Paul-Henri Spaak, proposed a federal arrangement with separate Greek and Turkish legislatures advising a British governor. It, too, failed, and Cyprus became independent in 1960. Under the terms of independence, Greece, Turkey, and Britain were to have special rights in Cyprus. The British would retain two bases and the two Balkan powers would keep a small force on the island-950 personnel for Greece, and 650 for Turkey. Essentially, the Spaak plan allowed the majority Greek Cypriots to control the government under President Archbishop Makarios, but with special protections for the Turkish minority intended to promote internal harmony and eliminate obstacles to NATO's objectives. These elaborate precautions failed. Archbishop Makarios chafed under unwieldy regulations that guaranteed the Turkish Cypriots a larger share of governance than the size of its population warranted. He made plans to curb the minority's role in government. The result was violence between the two communities.

Until 1964, the United States had kept a relatively low profile in Cyprus. But it was always conscious of the dangers a Greek-Turkish conflict could inflict on NATO's defense structure in the eastern Mediterranean. Makarios

was instinctively anti-American, identifying himself with the Third World and susceptible to Soviet effort to pose as the champion of anticolonialism. He was also a believer in a unitary state, with minimal liberties for the Turkish minority. Although he did not support union with Greece, his attitude toward Britain and the United States meshed with Greece's feelings about its victimization by the great powers.

Turkey, neighbor to the Soviet Union and concerned about Soviet aggressive intentions, normally enjoyed warmer relations with the United States, but events in the 1960s and 1970s loosened these ties. There was a sense of betrayal in Turkey when the United States removed its medium-range missiles from its emplacements, without consultation, as part of the Soviet-American resolution of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Two years later President Lyndon B. Johnson used harsh language in warning Turkey that if its intervention in Cyprus with U.S.- supplied military weapons brought on a Soviet attack, NATO would reconsider its military obligation to respond to an attack against Turkey under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. These actions raised doubts about the reliability of the American commitment and made the Turks as susceptible as Greeks to Soviet efforts to weaken their ties to NATO.

This was the background of the major crisis in 1974 when Makarios was overthrown by supporters of the dictatorial Greek junta in Athens and replaced by an unscrupulous agent of the new ruling colonels intent on securing Cyprus's enosis with the mother country. Ironically, Turkish Cypriots preferred the authoritarian Makarios to the outlaw regime that ousted him as an opponent to union with Greece. Fearful of the fate of Turkish Cypriots in this new situation, Turkey ignored the warnings of 1964 and invaded the island. Three days after the Turkish invasion, the Greek junta fell and was replaced by a civilian government that was powerless to repel the Turkish assault.

What Athens could do was vent its frustrations on NATO and the United States. The Konstantine Karamanlis government that succeeded the dictatorship could withdraw from the NATO military structure, in the manner of France's departure in 1966, because it could not take on the

Turkish military. Secretary of State Kissinger personified in Greek eyes a conspiracy that had been behind the coup in Cyprus and behind the bellicose Turkish response. An articulate and influential Greek lobby in Washington worked to focus American attention on the betrayal of its Greek ally. That Greek public opinion turned against the United States was hardly surprising; the American ally had been a prime supporter of the colonels' dictatorship. All Greek factions could agree that once again Greece suffered for its dependency on friends willing to sacrifice Greek national interests in a crisis.

There was some merit in this charge. Although American public opinion traditionally and sentimentally had been pro-Greek since the time of the Greek war of independence, the U.S. military placed a higher value on the military strength and the seemingly consistent anti-Soviet cast of Turkey. It was Turkey's military potential and strategic location straddling the Dardanelles that made the Turkish partnership more valuable than its Greek rival. A consequence of this gap between the two countries was the apportioning of military aid on a de facto 7 to 10 ratio: for every $7 granted to Greece prior to the invasion of Cyprus, Turkey was to receive $10.

Yet Kissinger fared little better over Cyprus with the presumably favored Turks than he did with the Greeks. Under congressional pressure, the United States placed an embargo on transfers of military equipment to Turkey in February 1975. The threat uttered by President Johnson in 1964 materialized 10 years later. Turkey was as mystified as it was angered by the American punitive action. Turkey's purpose in intervening in Cyprus was to protect the Turkish minority from persecution by the more numerous Greek Cypriots, and its American ally either did not understand the motives or was excessively influenced by pro-Greek public sentiment in the United States. As a result, Turkey suspended U.S. operations at Turkish military bases in 1975.

The Cyprus crisis that left 40 percent of the island under Turkish control precipitated the departure of one ally from the military structure of the alliance and the equivalent action on the part of the other ally in NATO. The United States was blamed for withholding its blessing from either side, and

so earned the enmity of both. This clash between two NATO allies left the carefully constructed defense arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean in shambles. It was the continuing presence of the powerful American Sixth Fleet that provided NATO's shield in the last half of the 1970s. The Soviets were the beneficiaries as both Turks and Greeks warmed their relations with the putative Communist enemy, and there was little NATO or the United States could do to solve the Greek-Turkish imbroglio.

Still, there was no permanent break in the alliance or in U.S. relations with either power. The onset of a Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 made Turkey more appreciative of the American ally, and willing to come to some compromises with the Greeks. Greece agreed to reintegrate into NATO's military structure in 1980, less because of any revived fears of Soviet aggression and more out of concern that Turkey would benefit from America's renewed military aid at its expense as long as it stayed outside SHAPE's command. Fairly or not, the United States was the scapegoat for Greece's and Turkey's frustrations. But as with Iceland in 1956 and with France (de facto), the two countries felt they had no choice but to remain under the aegis of the transatlantic partner.

THE END OF DETENTE?: 1974-1976

The lure of detente dominated both sides of the Atlantic in the 1970s. Although the motives may have been different, the goal was the same: de-escalation of tensions that permitted the United States to extricate itself from Vietnam and that permitted the European allies to believe that the Cold War was ending. No such expectation animated Kissinger's foreign policy. Given the fall of the Nixon administration in 1974, the secretary of state became the dominant figure in fashioning American foreign policy, and he saw in detente an opportunity to restrain the aggressive impulses of the Soviet Union by pursuing "linkage" in place of confrontation. Europeans distrusted Kissinger's motives in seeking detente, even as the NATO partners pressed in concert for the MBFR process. Alistair Buchan, an authoritative British analyst of NATO affairs, suspected that the MBFR

program would become a mask for the administration's appeasement of Senator Mansfield and a cover for dangerous unilateral reductions of American troop strength in Europe.

Although this strain of anti-American sentiment persisted among the allies, its virulence decreased as the Vietnam War ended and as American troops remained in place during the Ford administration. Yet an uneasy sense of stagnation pervaded the alliance, stimulated perhaps by the absence of the kind of crises that roiled NATO in the 1960s. The MBFR negotiations made little progress in Vienna. Even if the Soviets were seriously interested in a "balanced" reduction of conventional forces, the problem of achieving a balance seemed insoluble when the Warsaw Pact armies were at NATO's doorstep while the American ally's main forces were across the Atlantic-its European outreach was relatively small and more tenuously perched. The MBFR negotiations stretched out with one unproductive round of talks following another.

The allies' disillusionment was compounded by the rapid progress of the CSCE. Those negotiations, begun at the same time as the MBFR's, yielded the successful Helsinki agreements in 1975, meeting the goals of the Warsaw bloc by legitimizing the Yalta boundaries of 1945. So anxious were the Soviets to convene the CSCE that their agreement to talk about force reductions in Vienna appears in retrospect to have been lip service in return for the genuine service the allies rendered in Helsinki.

Less than a year after the Helsinki accords had been signed, the idea of detente became an albatross around Kissinger's neck. The word itself disappeared from official papers when President Gerald R. Ford decided that its French origin was too imprecise in English to transmit its proper meaning. Detente's disappearance in 1976 symbolized how far Kissinger had fallen from the public esteem he had enjoyed in 1974. For a time-in the last months before Nixon fled Washington in disgrace, one step ahead of impeachment-the secretary of state was the most important figure in the U.S. government. This was the period when his shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East extracted as much of a victory for American influence abroad as could be expected under the existing adverse circumstances. His

successful projection of American power obscured his failure to prevent the demise of South Vietnam in 1975.

President Ford, a lackluster Michigan congressman, earnest and honest, had been catapulted into the vice presidency and then the presidency in 1974 without benefit of electoral provenance. Untutored in the intricacies of foreign affairs, he initially placed the management of foreign relations entirely in the hands of his secretary of state, who continued to serve as adviser for national security. But Kissinger was unable to win the triumphs he had achieved under Nixon. His descent from Olympus was rapid. It was also probably inevitable. The Vietnam experience damaged him as it had damaged every leader connected with that debacle. His Nobel Peace Prize notwithstanding, he was blamed not only for widening that war by the invasion of Cambodia but also for the deceptions that accompanied it and for the ultimate collapse of South Vietnam itself. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus was laid at his door, as was the support the United States had given to the Greek dictatorship in the past. Turkey was only slightly less upset with American policy in the Ford years, and American policy meant Kissinger's. When Greeks and Turks could not reach each other, they struck out at NATO and at its leader. Kissinger's reputation suffered.

From the other end of the Mediterranean, NATO faced a new worry. Just three months before the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, a military coup in Portugal ended the Antonio de Oliveira Salazar dictatorship that had been solidly proNATO and anti-Communist. Even though the new government pledged loyalty to the alliance, it took a sharp turn to the left. Communist influence seemed to predominate just at a time when "Euro-Communism" in France and Italy sought to present a new and moderate Communist system willing to live with the West, even with NATO. Kissinger and Ford feared for the future of the southern flank of the alliance if a Communist government should be elected. Even those European leaders disposed to criticize the United States at every opportunity were taken aback by this possibility.

There was some recognition that Soviet behavior, and not just Kissinger's Machiavellian diplomacy, helped to undo detente. Most of the

allies tried to put the best face possible on obvious Soviet efforts to manipulate the process to their own advantage, whether by stalling on the MBFR negotiations or by exploiting one "basket" of the Helsinki agreement and ignoring another on human rights. Nevertheless, the weight of blame fell more heavily on the secretary of state.

The reaction against President Nixon's abuse of power in the Vietnam War was itself a factor in limiting Kissinger's freedom of action. Bowing to the antimilitary mood of Congress, the Nixon and Ford administrations presided over annual cuts in defense requests from 1969 to 1976 on the average of $6.7 billion a year and a decrease in the defense-spending percentage of the gross government expenditures from 40.8 percent in fiscal year 1970 to 24.3 percent in fiscal year 1977.

The reduction in U.S. defense spending was not a problem as such for the European allies; they had set their hopes on detente facilitating reductions in their military budgets. What was disturbing was their recognition that arms control agreements promoted by the United States were not simply satisfying by-products of detente but a confession of military weakness on the part of the United States. The agreements not only recognized Soviet nuclear parity but also the impossibility of winning over a post-Watergate Congress to reverse this course if it became necessary. The allies' ambivalence on this subject was intensified by the obstacles uncovered in the evolution of detente.

American liberals joined with their European counterparts in deploring the amorality of the Kissinger policies in Greece, Vietnam, and southwest Africa. They were not as ready as former Undersecretary of State George Ball to lump the CSCE agreements into the same category. Ball damned the Helsinki accords as submission to the logic of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had been the Soviet justification for the overthrow of the Prague government in 1968. The West had legitimized Communist control of eastern Europe. The American right wing took up this theme and made it part of Governor Ronald Reagan's campaign for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976. Reagan failed in that year, but he pushed the Ford campaign to distance itself from Kissinger's authority by having the

National Security Council removed from his jurisdiction. It was at this point that the president also distanced himself from detente.

Kissinger's approach had failed. "Linkage" was not working. Detente in the Soviet lexicon did not encompass activities in the Third World. The Ford administration looked with dismay but without influence on Cuban surrogates in southwest Africa spreading Communism in the former Portuguese territory of Angola. Nor did any mutual understanding between the superpowers inhibit massive Soviet intervention in northeast Africa when Somalia fell into the Soviet camp.

The outlawing of detente from American foreign policy did not lead to an immediate revival of the Cold War in Europe. Both the American and NATO moods required continued searching for modes of coexistence with the Warsaw bloc. Even though Kissinger had set himself up for a fall by overselling the American version of detente, it still had an appeal for Europeans, and under a different label for Americans, too, in 1976 and beyond. Although the European allies were suspicious of superpower deals in SALT negotiations and were worried about Communist tactics in Portugal, France, and Italy, they had no wish to see the Cold War reinvigorated. Europeans felt that normalization of economic and cultural relations with eastern Europe depended in the long run on the survival of detente between East and West.

EUROPE AND THE CARTER INITIATIVES

The successful presidential candidacy of Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia offered a welcome change for the NATO allies. As with every president, Carter entered office determined to distinguish himself from his predecessors, and immediately did so. An outsider to the Democratic Party, President Carter had won a reputation for honesty and efficiency as governor of Georgia. A born-again Christian, he intended to apply moral principles to foreign relations in a manner that would contrast sharply with Nixon's or Kissinger's. Equally important was his conception of a seamless

world in which every issue was interconnected. By this example, the United States would exhibit to the world that moral power could serve mankind. There would be none of the manipulation of power that had characterized American policy in the recent past.

A successful peanut farmer and an engineer educated at the U.S. Naval Academy, he fitted into no clear mold beyond a vague idealism tinged with populism. It is unlikely that he would have made his way to the White House if the Vietnam War had not turned the nation against the Washington establishment. Hardworking and intelligent, he was also obsessive to a fault about detail. Whether these qualities were sufficient guarantees for success in the management of foreign relations was quickly tested.

His troubles grew out of a lack of experience in foreign affairs that was reflected in his choices of secretary of state and national security advisor. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, a veteran of the McNamara Pentagon, embraced the president's wish to change the nature of America's foreign policy objectives. Rather than dwell on the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet bloc or even on the slow and uncertain steps toward detente, Carter intended to reorient the direction of American foreign policy from East-West to North-South problems. Following his moral compass, the president saw the source of future instability in the world arising from the inequality of wealth and resources between the First World and the Third World. In this reformulation of policy, the conflict with the Second World should be quickly liquidated as an impediment to the more pressing issues facing Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia. Nuclear weaponry in this context should be removed from the relationship with the Warsaw bloc as soon as possible. The rule of law should govern international relations.

Carter's inexperience in foreign affairs accounted for allowing his grand design to be translated into action by two able but conflicting personalities. His national security advisor was Zbigniew Brzezinski. A Harvard-educated professor of government at Columbia University, Brzezinski was knowledgeable and articulate about the problems of a multipolar world. With his European background and slight but impressive Polish accent he could not help but be compared with Henry Kissinger. Although he

professed to share Carter's abhorrence of the former secretary's method of diplomacy, his deep suspicions of the Soviet role in eastern Europe colored his advice to the president and tended to keep East-West relations at the top of the administration's agenda.

Brzezinski's approach conflicted with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's and led to divisions within the administration's foreign-policy establishment that were never bridged. Where Vance promoted a program based on the centrality of arms reduction and cooperation with the Soviets in easing tensions in the Third World, Brzezinski saw a Soviet arms buildup and the need to counter Communist initiatives through traditional power relationships. Although rivalry between the secretary of state and the national security advisor was hardly a new phenomenon in Washington, former presidents usually resolved it by clearly designating the preeminent spokesman for foreign affairs. In Carter's case, his disposition to be involved in all aspects of government, combined with an inability to make firm decisions in favor of one or another of his advisers, made for confusion about America's position on NATO interests among the European allies.

Given their discontent with Kissinger's manipulative behavior toward Europe, there should have been widespread rejoicing over the arrival of an American leader who spoke of normality in relations with the Soviet Union even if he did not use the term detente. His genuine devotion to North-South problems and to moral solutions in international relations seemed to evoke the finest of American traditions, particularly in their contrast with the putative realism of the Nixon years. Perhaps in another time and in other circumstances this would have been the case. But Carter was burdened by European partners such as Premier Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany, who saw not the ideals but the inconsistent positions of Carter's advisers and the distance between the pronouncements from the White House and the threatening Soviet military buildup in Europe.

If Nixon and Kissinger had been too overbearing in their dealings with the allies, Carter and Vance by contrast were too casual in their relationship. Confident in the rightness of their approach, they simply assumed that

Europeans would follow the American lead. Free from the inordinate fear of Communism and the Soviet Union, as the president noted in a speech at Notre Dame University, NATO should no longer adopt the erroneous practices of its adversary at the expense of the West's own values and principles. And on the assumption that the Soviets would share the new approach the United States was advocating, Carter plunged ahead with proposals two months after his inauguration for deep cuts in the still incomplete SALT II accords on further limiting deployment of strategic weapons. A public and humiliating rejection of this initiative did not deter the administration from canceling the production of the costly B-1 strategic bomber on the grounds that the existing B-52s could perform the same functions at much lower cost.

These actions in the early months of the Carter administration unsettled the allies. They were well aware that although there were relatively few increases in the number of NATO forces, the number of Warsaw Pact forces rose dramatically. In the years 1971 to 1976, a period of declining NATO defense budgets, Soviet military spending increased by 4 to 5 percent annually. This was the situation at a time when the new administration pledged to cut U.S. military spending by $5 to $7 billion four days after taking office. Rather than seeing in the Carter actions a more principled as well as a more rapid approach to detente, the allies feared that a naive American president was engaging in unilateral disarmament, ultimately at Europe's expense. By contrast, the Kissinger policy of hard-nosed linkage in dealing with the Soviet Union, flawed though it was, seemed in retrospect more appealing to the allies.

The United States did make an effort to respond to Europe's concerns by asking each NATO partner to accept a 3 percent increase for national defense budgets. Because this was at least a specific response to a growing crisis that the Carter administration had not previously recognized, the North Atlantic Council responded positively to this challenge, particularly when it addressed IRBMs, but Europeans wanted more, realizing that even a 3 percent solution would not produce results that would match the formidable Soviet military machine in this period. The continued presence

of more than 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe provided significant but insufficient reassurance to nervous allies.

THE NEUTRON BOMB FIASCO

Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was Carter's most articulate challenger. He was suspicious of the soft human rights approach of Secretary Vance, which he regarded as a diversion from the appropriate agendas of the alliance. And he was personally hostile to National Security Advisor Brzezinski, whose aggressive antiSoviet stance may have contained anti-German components. But it was the open conflict over the development of an enhanced-radiation weapon (ERW), popularly known as the neutron bomb, that raised the differences with the Carter administration to almost crisis proportions. Enhanced-radiation warheads had been under development for almost two decades and had been on the NATO agenda since 1973. Its achievement was an ability to destroy enemy concentrations without the kind of damage to the environment that existing battlefield nuclear weapons would inflict. The warhead, mounted on a short-range missile such as the Lance, would produce radiation sufficient to kill enemy tanks and troops without the blast and heat caused by other nuclear weapons emitting an equivalent amount of radiation.

The neutron bomb was ready for deployment in 1977. Chancellor Schmidt recognized its value in deterring aggression but he wanted the United States to assume the burden of responsibility. He had domestic opposition to a weapon that would be used exclusively on German soil even if the buildings in the area of the killing fields would be spared radiation contamination. Carter let him down. Although the president saw in the neutron bomb a means of redressing the imbalance in ground forces between NATO and the Warsaw bloc at a reasonable cost to all the allies, he had to face a storm of criticism from a variety of domestic groups-from those who felt that its use would revive the possibility of winning a nuclear war to those who called it "the ultimate capitalist weapon," designed to kill people but spare property. This cry was echoed and expanded on by Soviet

propaganda. It left Carter in a quandary that he solved in 1978 by deferring production of the bomb.

Although Carter's conscience may have been relieved by the decision, Schmidt was outraged. He regarded the president's waffling as a betrayal of faith. But Schmidt's own caution may have inhibited Carter. He and other allied leaders had sent confusing signals to the United States. They wanted the bomb as a bargaining chip in dealing with the Soviet Union, but they refused to offer their territories as sites for the bomb's deployment. Blame for the failure of the ERW deserved to be shared, although it was Carter's image as leader of the alliance that was damaged. The allies were all too eager to find in the administration's diplomacy weakness that the Soviets would exploit, such as negotiations in SALT II that could result in banning the American use of cruise missiles.

SS-20s VERSUS CRUISE MISSILES

In the wake of the neutron debacle, the issue of the cruise missile assumed greater significance for Europeans than it might have had otherwise. Once again the issue was trust in America's commitment, and the medium-range missile was a test case. They knew that the Soviets regarded (or pretended to regard) any missile that could reach their territory as a strategic weapon open to removal in SALT negotiations. What exacerbated the allies' fears was the Soviet deployment, beginning in 1977, of SS-20 missiles targeted on western Europe. The weapon contained a triple warhead, was mobile, and was capable of being launched in a few minutes. The Carter administration knew of its lethal potential, but instead of seeking to ban its use by the Soviets, it made sure in SALT talks that it would not be converted into an intercontinental missile aimed at the United States. This success on the part of American negotiators did nothing to soothe European feelings. Was America turning its back on its allies? Europe's cities remained vulnerable to the SS-20.

Chancellor Schmidt raised the European alarm. At a highly visible forum, London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, he spoke sharply against the path American foreign policy was taking. While the United States preached the virtues of increasing defense expenditures on the European allies to build up conventional forces, it downplayed the possibilities inherent in a major weapon that, unlike infantry, could deal with the SS-20 threat. Moreover, it appeared willing to entertain the Soviet proposal to block transfer of strategic weapons to other states. This proposal was embedded in SALT II, signed in 1979 but never ratified. From a European perspective the cruise missile, although not mentioned in the address, would be removed from the American arsenal, and NATO Europe would be left defenseless against the Soviet adversary. The speech in effect was a stinging rebuke of American policy and behavior, calling into question the whole issue of U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee.

The alarm raised by the German chancellor was shared throughout Europe. There was no question that the United States had to renew its assurances to the allies, and the surest route would be a decision to deploy the new ground-launched cruise missile equipped with the ability to navigate at treetop level and to strike its targets with little margin for error. It was relatively cheap to produce. Unlike the ballistic missile, it was slow, taking hours rather than minutes to reach its objectives, but its small size and mobility, particularly its capacity for evasion, compensated for its lack of speed. In 1978 the modernized Pershing II missile was included in NATO plans, replacing the Pershing IA missiles in Germany with a weapon capable of reaching Soviet targets, and with a flight time of only 6 to 12 minutes The allies seized on both missiles as NATO's antidote to the SS-20, and the Carter administration had no choice but to go along with their allies, if only to redeem its credibility as leader of the alliance.

In fact, the American establishment-military and civilian alike-never saw the SS-20 as a threat to the strategic balance between NATO and the Warsaw bloc. The cruise and Pershing missiles, if employed, would be a segment of the broad American deterrent that encompassed land-based and sea-based intercontinental nuclear ballistic missiles. The Minuteman ballistic-missile silos in the American Midwest and the submarines armed

with Polaris missiles made intermediate-range cruise missiles located in Europe unnecessary. But given the level of anxiety exhibited by the allies, the American partner had to show its empathy, and to do so by taking the SS-20 threat as seriously as its European allies did. Secretary Vance successfully convinced them that nothing in the SALT II negotiations would inhibit the deployment of missiles to counter the SS-20s.

Driven by the need for action, NATO leaders agreed to a plan that would couple the deployment of IRBMs in Europe with negotiations for mutual limits on long-range-theater nuclear systems. At a special meeting of foreign and defense ministers in December 1979, the High Level Group, formed in 1977 under the Nuclear Planning Group, proposed the deployment of 464 ground-launched missiles-160 in Britain, 112 in Italy, 96 in Germany, and 48 each in the Low Countries. In addition, 108 Pershing missiles would be included, replacing the older Pershing missiles already in Germany. The fact that the SS-20s were being installed at a rate of one a week by 1979 intensified the urgency of counteractions. This distribution of weaponry had political as well as military implications. Vital to the success of deployment were the requirements that NATO powers share responsibility for deploying weapons on their own soil.

There was sufficient precedent for this dual-track initiative. After all, missiles had been placed in Europe since the 1960s and were due for replacement, and the hope for de-escalation of the nuclear arms race was a continuing inspiration for the ongoing SALT negotiations. At a special meeting in Brussels in December 1979, NATO's foreign and defense ministers emphasized that the dual-track approach would further the course of arms control and detente in the 1980s. As in the Harmel report, detente would be facilitated by the deployment of the new missiles. The carrot of detente would accompany the stick of missile deployments.

The dual-track initiative should have been a turning point in Carter's relations with the European allies. It seemed to respond to most of the irritants in the transatlantic relationship. It reaffirmed America's commitment to the defense of Europe by identifying once again America's stake in Europe's security; it alleviated Europe's dread of the Soviet nuclear

weapon by a counterweapon that could strike deep into Warsaw Pact territory; and it underscored the relevance of the Harmel spirit by its embrace of arms control. These accomplishments should have fashioned a legacy that elevated Carter's reputation above those of his two most recent predecessors. He had come to grips with the rising Soviet power in a way that satisfied the European partners without relinquishing his support of detente. Unlike his predecessors, the allies recognized a genuine, if naive, commitment to arms control.

IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN

The dual-track approach was certainly a milestone in NATO's history. It influenced the events of the 1980s but failed to change Carter's image as an indecisive bumbler in foreign affairs. Two external events diminished what should have been an impressive record of accomplishment in his dealings with allies. Both occurred in 1979, the year of the dual initiative, and cast the planned deployments into the background. The Iranian revolution against the Shah and against America's role in his regime broke out three weeks before the dual-track decision. Student militants aroused by religious leaders took 53 Americans hostage, most of whom were not released until Reagan took office in 1981. It was a humiliating experience for the nation, made all the worse by bungled attempts to free the prisoners. The Shah's Iran, a keystone in Nixon's and Kissinger's Middle East policy, became a millstone for Carter's. It revived Europe's perception of an inept leader.

The second crisis was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Unlike the Iran debacle, the United States acted vigorously and with some success to check the Communist overthrow of an insufficiently pliant Communist regime in Kabul. Washington was alarmed, fearing that the true Soviet objective was not Afghanistan but the Persian Gulf's oil resources. Brzezinski identified "an arc of crisis" from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to the Persian Gulf, which required immediate allied attention. The United States led the way with the Carter Doctrine, calling for a joint task force-the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)-in March 1980 to reinforce

the claim that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be considered an attack against America's vital interests. NATO responded with the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) urging allied coordination of out-of-area deployment of forces. Scenarios envisaging Iranian conquest of the Middle East and the overthrow of moderate Arab regimes by Moslem extremists were not confined to American planners.

But this show of American resolve did little to restore Carter's credibility as a strong leader of the alliance. His reactions were too spasmodic, and too often overshot their mark. Trade sanctions against the Soviet Union or the American boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow suggested to Europeans that the Americans took the invasion more seriously than they did, once the initial shock was over and the limits of Soviet intentions made clearer. From a European perspective, the United States paid too much attention to an out-of-area issue and too little attention to other concerns of its allies. The Afghanistan invasion should not be an occasion, according to Chancellor Schmidt, to jeopardize the delicate negotiations between NATO Europe and the Soviet Union for a multibillion-dollar plan to build a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to the West. Although Americans were hostile to this rapprochement with the Soviets, Europeans rationalized that Afghanistan had long been a Soviet preserve, and the regime that precipitated the invasion was itself Communist. Carter was conducting his foreign policy without considering its impact on the allies. Only the new Conservative British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, gave full backing to his hard line against the Soviet Union.

Carter lost the presidency in the election of 1980, but it was unlikely that NATO relations were at the heart of his difficulties. His handling of the Iranian hostage situation occupied a larger space among the American electorate. Nor was his seemingly impulsive veering from moral suasion in foreign relations to an aggressive stance against the Soviets the source of his domestic troubles; his critics felt he had not gone far enough in either direction. But was Europe's rhetoric excessive? It was America's revived awareness of a Soviet threat that relieved the allies' fears sufficiently for them to relax the timetable for deploying cruise missiles and to pursue new

economic relations with the Warsaw bloc. His indecisiveness may have subjected him to the contempt of his allies, but the Carter presidency's support of NATO, appreciated or not, was a factor in the continuing relevance of the transatlantic relationship.

5

ENDING THE COLD WAR: 1980-1990

REAGAN AND THE "EVIL EMPIRE"

The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 offers a study in contrast with his predecessor. Carter entered the White House with a vision of a world free from the Cold War competition between the East and West, in which the North would use its energies and resources to lift the economies and polities of the South. Reagan had a simpler vision of a world divided between good and evil, and identified himself and his nation as standing without reservations against the Soviet evil empire. Carter was a master of details, but with a plodding rhetorical style that reflected a pessimistic nature. Reagan was the supreme communicator with an affable manner and simple solutions to problems of government-foreign or domestic. Carter immersed himself in the minutiae of government and vacillated over decisions; Reagan left details to his aides; in fact, most of the major issues of his administration were left to his staff. But he had no hesitation about making firm decisions, whether or not he understood their implications.

Europeans might have appreciated the positions Reagan was ready to show the world. He agreed that America had suffered from some reverses, as in Vietnam and Iran. But it suffered most from lack of firm leadership of the free world, leaving a gap that he proposed to fill. His administration would stand up to the Soviet Union and revive an unambiguous primacy in the alliance that had been absent under his predecessor. It was a strong

message delivered with the verve and polish of the Hollywood actor that he once was. Given the malaise associated with Carter's presidency, there was a sense in Europe that any change would be a change for the better. But, in the Aesopian image, European allies soon wondered if they had exchanged King Log for King Stork as leader of the alliance.

Conflict with European goals inevitably followed from the American perception, strengthened under Reagan, that detente was truly dead, and that the Soviets could be dealt with only from a position of strength. Without giving appropriate recognition to the infrastructure the Carter administration had established for the modernization of America's defenses, this president gave his blessing to a massive buildup, raising the level the United States spent on defense from approximately 5.5 percent of its gross national product in 1980 to more than 7 percent four years later. There was little faith in the arms control promise that won over Europeans in 1979.

The rhetoric was hyperbolic in the view of the allies, but parts of the message resonated well in western Europe. Given the scare the Soviets had inspired with the SS-20 missiles, the clear promise of a firm nuclear guarantee was heartening. Carter was never convincing in this regard. The Reagan administration was equally staunch about the continuing presence of American troops in Europe. The allies not only appreciated the commitment, backed up with stronger reinforcement capabilities, but also the lack of pressure on them to increase their own contributions of conventional forces. The Europeans were not even willing to honor the 3 percent increase in their defense budgets that was mandated in the Carter administration.

This appreciation, however, had distinct limits. Just nine days after his inauguration, the new president frightened his European allies with charges that Soviet leaders reserved "the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, to achieve their immoral ends." This bloodcurdling language was hard to overlook when officials in the Reagan administration seemed to believe in winning a nuclear war as well as in surviving one. A deputy undersecretary of defense for strategic nuclear forces envisioned a scenario in which citizens would "dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors, and then throw

three feet of dirt on top. With a sufficient supply of shovels, everyone's going to make it." This was not the kind of advice the European allies wanted to hear. No matter how disturbing the SS-20s were to their sense of security, and no matter how much they deplored Soviet actions in Afghanistan in 1979 or in Poland in 1981, they had to share a continent with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Detente could not be permanently scrapped.

A major element in the survival of detente for Europeans was potential economic benefits from trade relations. Europeans had never shared the American conviction, going back to the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 that would cancel military aid to those allies who did not comply with the U.S. embargo on strategic items to the Soviet Union. This act assumed that trade restrictions against the Soviet bloc could defeat the Communists in the long run. Carter's cancellation of American participation in the Olympic Games in Moscow and the imposition of a grain embargo on the Soviet Union in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion in 1979 were not welcome events in Europe. When Reagan discontinued the grain embargo on assuming office, transatlantic critics saw only appeasement of American farmers deprived of a large market. Their suspicions were confirmed when martial law was imposed in Poland in 1981. The administration's response then was to apply sanctions not only against Poland, but also against its patron, the Soviet Union, on the assumption that economic retaliation might bring down Communism as well as benefit U.S. business interests.

Although there certainly was sympathy for Poland's resistance, just as there was revulsion against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the more prevalent sentiment was that the United States was overreacting in both instances, and again at the expense of Europeans. This sense of grievance intensified when the Reagan administration suspended oil and gas technology sales to the Soviet Union to put teeth into sanctions. This action prohibited the export of technology manufactured by subsidiaries of American companies in Europe. The Reagan decision affected a planned pipeline from the Soviet Union to western Europe designed to carry natural gas to the West. This apparently thoughtless, automatic response to Soviet behavior did not sit well with the allies. Regulating European companies

because of their American connections smacked of extraterritoriality, or at least an infringement on European sovereignty. The Europeans refused to abide by the American regulations, and prevailed after five months of wrangling with the United States.

THE UNITED STATES, NATO, AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, 1982

The hard-nosed anti-Soviet rhetoric-and policy that implemented it-led to new conflicts between Europeans and Americans. If Carter's perceived waffling over Soviet challenges distressed European leaders, Reagan's firmness itself created problems of perception. Allies who had begged America to respond to the SS20s now wondered whether the response was too harsh and would generate a dangerous backlash from the Soviets. Such was the reaction of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the leading European opponent of Carter's policies.

But on balance, the Reagan position won more appreciation than his predecessor's principled efforts to balance an arms buildup with renewed efforts at accommodation with the Warsaw bloc. This was partly due to the arrival of new leadership in Britain and Germany. In both countries strong conservative governments under Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, in Britain and Germany respectively, displaced socialist administrations with records of hostility to the United States. The new leaders welcomed the firm positions and the forceful language that President Reagan offered and viewed American leadership more benignly than their predecessors had. In both cases, but particularly with respect to Thatcher, Reagan established bonds that had not been seen in NATO since Eisenhower and Macmillan, or Dulles and Adenauer, were in office 20 years earlier. Thatcher and Kohl shared with Reagan concerns over Soviet behavior, whether in Afghanistan or in Europe, where Soviet missiles menaced western European targets.

A crisis in the South Atlantic arose in 1982 that cemented relations between Reagan and Thatcher and resuscitated the special relationship that

had lapsed under the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath and the Labour leader James Callaghan. It was all the more intense because the clash between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands was also a clash between America's old attachment to the Monroe Doctrine, which expressed opposition to European influence or control in the Western Hemisphere, and its new loyalty to the North Atlantic Treaty. In April 1982, the Argentine dictatorship attempted to occupy the Falklands, islands that the British had colonized in 1832. Both nations claimed the territory, which Argentina called the Malvinas. Its seizure of the islands was a demonstration of nationalist sentiment on the part of the country's dictatorship, which expected that this outpost, with its handful of occupants, would not be contested. Argentina, after all, had what some Americans considered a defensible case. In 1965 it had brought the Falklands issue to the United Nations, which sponsored what turned out to be unproductive negotiations between the two parties. Using the 150th anniversary of Britain's control of the islands as an occasion to demand its cession, the ruling junta took military action after Britain rejected its ultimatum.

When Britain responded with warships and an expeditionary force to aid the handful of shepherds and farmers, the United States faced a dilemma. If it did not support Argentina's actions, it risked antagonizing Latin American friends as well as arousing Americans around the banner of the Monroe Doctrine. On the other hand, if it turned its back on the British ally, the Atlantic alliance could be in jeopardy. Here was a clear-cut case of a new tradition confronting an old one.

Ultimately, the British ties prevailed, but not without considerable turmoil in Washington. The crisis over the Falklands was one of the factors that cost Secretary of State Alexander Haig his post. A strong supporter of London, Haig argued vigorously against Argentina's invasion of islands inhabited by British citizens. They were few in number, but the principle involved was important enough to inspire Britain to strike back at the aggressor. Secretary Haig recognized the "spirit of the Blitz" in Britain's dispatch of a task force of 100 ships and 28,000 men to retake the Falklands. He preferred to cast himself in the role of an honest broker, but when a choice had to be made, it was clearly with Britain. This brought

Haig into conflict with Jeanne Kirkpatrick, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who feared the loss of solidarity with Latin America if the United States sided with Britain. A reawakening of Latin American nationalism as a consequence of the British action could damage American interests. Her choice would be to back Argentina.

An undercurrent in the dispute between Haig and Kirkpatrick was an Anglophobia reminiscent of American sentiment in the nineteenth century, during which Britain represented all that was wrong with the Old World. One influential senator, Jesse Helms, a North Carolina Republican, supported Kirkpatrick's position, asserting that there was ample evidence that U.S. munitions were being shipped to Britain to kill Argentine soldiers. He was correct; the United States did provide military assistance to Britain in the name of alliance solidarity as well as in opposition to aggression. It is worth noting that of the 80 senators voting, Helms was the lone dissenter against a Senate resolution supporting Britain.

The Falklands were located in the South Atlantic, outside the boundaries of NATO's responsibilities, but the European allies joined the United States in expressing their unity on behalf of their British partner. It was a fragile unity, however, although the fragility was not the responsibility of the United States. If the war had not been concluded with a quick British victory, Italy might have wavered in its loyalty, given the large Italian population of Argentina. Additionally, the Socialist governments of France and Germany, although understanding the validity of the British action, worried about their constituencies' perception of an anticolonialist war in the Third World. The European allies might have complained-but did not-that NATO resources in the form of British naval forces were being diverted from their mission to serve one member's national interest. The upshot of the Falklands crisis was an affirmation of the solidity of the Atlantic alliance. It was also an opportunity for an expression of a transatlantic unity that was too frequently conspicuous by its absence.

TROUBLES OVER NUCLEAR ARMS, 1982-1983

Transatlantic comity inevitably was a transient phenomenon. There were too many competing forces separating Reagan's America from Europe for it to last. Yet the Anglo-American cooperation in the Falklands war consolidated a personal alliance between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan that ameliorated tensions throughout the 1980s. The arrival of Helmut Kohl to power in 1972, replacing Socialist Helmut Schmidt, was another source of comfort to American policymakers. He shared with the Socialist president Francois Mitterand a skepticism about Soviet policies toward the West, as evidenced by the support France gave to Germany's decision to deploy the American cruise missiles in 1983. The commitment, as has been noted, was made in the dual-track decision of 1979, but the activation of the policy took four years to complete. The delay gave an opportunity for protests to develop, but there was no alternative; the missiles were not ready for deployment in 1979. Thatcher's Britain along with Kohl's Germany stood firmly behind the decision, and put the lives of their governments at risk in their nations' respective elections in 1983.

Although Thatcher and Kohl retained their offices, and the deployment of the cruise and Pershing II missiles proceeded as planned, these successes were accompanied by a wave of protest in Europe against the perceived American manipulation of the alliance. Reagan's entourage was part of the problem. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig, former supreme allied commander in Europe, was forced out of office, the administration seemingly dismissed the one American leader Europeans felt they could count on. His successor, George Shultz, a respected economist and former secretary of labor under Nixon, was inexperienced in foreign affairs and left room for more hawkish figures to direct the administration's foreign policy.

Reagan's anti-Communist rhetoric was translated by the European Left into a prelude to war against the Warsaw bloc. The formerly centrist Socialist parties of Britain and Germany had been radicalized in the 1980s, moving not merely toward opposition to the Atlantic alliance but to identifying the United States rather than the Soviet Union as the enemy of Europe. They found evidence of American imperialism in all parts of the world. In Africa, the United States supported the reactionary rebels in Angola against the pro-Communists who liberated the country from

Portuguese colonialism; American money in Latin America backed the corrupt remnants of Anastasio Somoza's dictatorship against the Sandinistas seeking liberation from American domination. Only in Asia were there European objections to Soviet actions in Afghanistan, and even here the emotions expended against American imperialism in Latin America and Africa were deeper than those directed against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Critics concentrated on American rather than Soviet misbehavior.

Hostility to mighty America imposing its power on lesser nations was never confined to the radical left or to pacifists. The governments of the major European nations, allies of the United States, made their feelings heard in the UN Security Council in concert with the Soviet Union. The United States invaded tiny Grenada in 1983 to overthrow a Communist-controlled government charged with spreading Castro's doctrine in Central America. This military action evoked a UN Security Council resolution "deeply deploring" the intervention as a "flagrant violation of international law." The vote to condemn the United States won 11 votes in favor of the resolution, and among them were the NATO allies France and the Netherlands. Britain abstained. Only an American veto prevented adoption of the resolution.

The most powerful demonstration of opposition to the United States-and by extension, NATO itself-was over the ultimate deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Germany and Britain in 1983. Mass protests in both countries preceded the elections, and they included pacifist and religious groups as well as Communist and pro-Communist elements. Many, but not all, of the demonstrations were orchestrated by Moscow. Communist arguments turned on the provocative nature of the missiles, with their ability to strike at the Soviet homeland. Peace demonstrators dwelled on the possibilities of a nuclear holocaust resulting from missile deployment. Few opponents were willing to look at the Soviet role in raising the level of fear in Europe.

Socialist newspapers in Belgium were convinced that even if the British and Germans accepted the American weapons, their country and the

Netherlands would reject them. Shortly after the elections ratifying deployment of the American missiles in Germany and Britain, the Low Countries accepted them on their soil. Soviet intimidation that accompanied protests united rather than divided the alliance over this issue. The success of the Conservative governments at the polls in Britain and Germany affirmed NATO solidarity both over the extent of the Soviet threat embodied in the SS-20s and over the need for cruise and Pershing missiles to counter them.

If the deployment of missiles signaled a centripetal force in transatlantic relations, the lack of progress in arms control-the other half of the dual-track decision of 1979-was a centrifugal element that had preceded and followed the NATO decisions on deployment. There was gratitude among the allies for the steadfast opposition of the Reagan administration to Soviet pressure in Europe and at the same time dismay at America's disinterest, bordering on cynicism, in working toward arms reduction, nuclear or conventional, with the Soviet adversary. Whereas Europeans valued the American presence in Europe and appreciated its willingness to confront Moscow with cruise missiles, they were uncomfortable with the belligerence that accompanied its stance on arms negotiations.

There was reason enough for doubting the good faith of the Soviets. The stalling over a rational and balanced conventional force reduction had gone on for almost a decade before Reagan came to Washington. And the CSCE's success in the Helsinki agreements in 1975 only accentuated the selective application of its "baskets" to the advantage of the Soviet Union. It is hardly surprising that hardliners in the new administration, such as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense for international affairs, dominated the scene. They were devoted advocates of a massive new military buildup and did their best to separate arms control from rearmament.

Their way of managing both was to place the burden of intransigency on the Soviets. Among the many efforts to manipulate suspicious Europeans was a semantic device to reassure allies while hewing to a strong line. The Theater Nuclear Force (TNF), which seemed to dissociate Europe's nuclear

defense from America's, was replaced with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) as a more acceptable rubric for American missiles in Europe. The term theater could be construed as dissociating America from Europe.

Another approach to calming European tensions was the introduction in 1982 of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) to replace the moribund SALT. The latter dealt only with "limitations" on nuclear arms, whereas President Reagan seemingly took a bolder step in asking for talks on "reduction" of nuclear arms. Rather than seeking an agreement that would do no more than codify and marginally influence the growth of strategic forces, the United States would make a proposal for substantial and verifiable reductions.

Instead of demonstrating solidarity with Europe's aspirations, the American offers appeared cosmetic and insincere. The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was an ardent opponent of both arms control and disarmament. Kenneth Adelman and his colleagues were convinced that U.S. security would be best guaranteed through unilateral action on strategic nuclear matters. START was consequently translated into a mock quid pro quo with the Soviets under the name of "zero option." If the Soviets would dismantle all their intermediate-range missiles, the United States would not deploy its 572 cruise and Pershing missiles. Superficially, this was as equitable and advantageous as any European ally would want. But in reality it was irrational to expect the Soviets, who already had their weapons in position, to give up their SS-20s in return for Americans giving up missiles that had not yet been deployed.

The immediate reaction abroad to the START proposals was not hostile. There was hope that this was a negotiating ploy, a first step in a compromise that would serve all parties. This was not the intention of the hawkish circle around the president, and not even the efforts of Paul Nitze, a former hawk himself, could make progress on START either through public diplomacy or through back-channel arrangements. Europeans were increasingly worried about American, not Soviet, inflexibility, and these worries even affected such champions of the American partnership as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and West German Chancellor

Helmut Kohl. They recognized the impossibility of securing a zero option in intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, and hoped for a less ambitious agenda.

Paul Nitze, the chief American negotiator in Geneva, essentially agreed with the European critics, but his was almost a lone voice on this issue in the Reagan administration. But even if there had been a moderate response, the Soviets had no intention of moving toward a compromise. When the NATO allies finally accepted deployment of the cruise and Pershing missiles, the Soviets carried out their threat to walk away from the negotiating table in Geneva.

East-West relations had descended to levels not seen since the Cuban and Berlin crises of the 1960s. And West-West relations suffered as well, as European fears of American insensitivity to their vulnerabilities surfaced once again.

EUROPE AND "STAR WARS," 1983-1984

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will never shake the sobriquet of "Star Wars" because of its association with President Reagan. This former Hollywood actor and a devoted film watcher had been enchanted by the pyrotechnics in the film of that name, in which intergalactic warfare was conducted by what looked like space-based laser weapons. These appealed not only to his sense of drama but also to an ideal of a world made safe from nuclear war. But to European allies, the juxtaposition of this apparent streak of idealism with a fiery speech denouncing the Soviet Union as "the evil empire" in early March 1983, just two weeks before his Star Wars proposal, was confusing. It cast a shadow on the claim that by providing a perfect safety shield against an enemy attack, it would end the nuclear arms race as well as eliminate American vulnerability to intercontinental ballistic missiles. How serious was the president? What implication did his new enthusiasm have for the defense of the alliance?

This was ostensibly a plan to make nuclear war obsolete. The nuclear arms competition was "a sad commentary on the human condition." It would be far better, Reagan asserted in a speech on 23 March 1983, "to save lives than to avenge them." The president did talk with advisers, but his inspiration for this new direction in military policy came from the distinguished physicist Edward Teller who convinced him of the feasibility as well as the desirability of the new strategic initiative. Reagan was intrigued by the image of 50-foot-long bolts of high-energy electrons destroying any ICBM at nearly the speed of light-ultimate impregnability of America's defense system was the objective, to be achieved within the foreseeable future. But this was never the sole function of the SDI. Rather, the hope it opened in the future was a world free from nuclear nightmares.

Questions about the SDI immediately arose. Some skeptics recognized that it would require years, even decades, before the technology necessary to produce the miracle weapon would be available. Other skeptics with a hard-line, anti-Communist agenda saw in Star Wars a means of destroying the Soviet empire. It was not just that no Soviet missile could ever strike at the American continent, and so return Soviet power to the pre-Sputnik era; the advanced technology that the SDI would require would be too costly for the Soviets to develop, with consequent damage to their economy if they would make the attempt.

That the Warsaw bloc would not appreciate the benefits of the SDI was hardly surprising. But the transatlantic allies were no more welcoming than NATO's adversaries. There were three major concerns in the reactions of European allies. First, they worried that American technology would be advanced at Europe's expense, exacerbating the growing divide between the United States and Europe over their respective military capabilities. New consortiums of European defense industries had difficulty competing with their American counterparts. Even if the fruits of the SDI would not materialize until the distant future, there would be economic by-products of the research that would leave Europeans at a disadvantage in world markets. The Reagan administration did offer subcontracts that would engage allies in the enterprise, but it would be obvious that these entrepreneurs would not be the prime beneficiaries of the SDI's

development. Second, Europeans wondered what effect the new venture would have on the Soviets. It was possible that it would only stimulate them to come up with new means to cope with America's future impregnable defense system. Even if the future was distant, energy in the present would be expended to expand their offensive capabilities. It was likely that the Soviet Union could always build new missiles that would overcome any defensive shield. Instead of enhancing the security of the West, SDI could make the East-West competition more dangerous than it had been since the crises of the early 1960s.

Disturbing as these scenarios were, a third element was the most serious issue between the United States and its partners. SDI could undermine the credibility of NATO's nuclear strategy that had been in place for over a decade. It was built on the principle of mutual assured destruction, a concept that McNamara had promoted in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. It assumed that no defense was possible against a nuclear attack without an unacceptable loss of lives on both sides. Mutual vulnerability would be a deterrent against a strike. Such was the philosophy behind the ABM agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. Although it applied essentially to intercontinental missiles, the ABM Treaty was a major milestone in the expansion of detente. It symbolized stability between the superpowers that the allies valued even as they demanded other assurances with respect to IRBMs. Embarking on the Star Wars project intended to shield America-and presumably those allies willing to join-against a nuclear attack would make the ABM Treaty meaningless.

There was still another caveat about the SDI. It occurred inevitably to Europeans that a successful SDI would make NATO itself meaningless and useless to the American partners. If the United States had a perfect defense against a nuclear attack, it would not need a European involvement. Once again the cry of America decoupling itself from Europe was heard in the West. Would it lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe and the abandonment of Article 5, leaving westem Europe prey to the ambitions of its Soviet neighbor? The suspension of IRBM arms control talks in 1983 contributed to the insecurity that the SDI inspired.

Continuing American dissatisfaction with Europe's reluctance to share more of the burden in conventional arms also played a role in raising tensions in the alliance as the SDI was preoccupying the Reagan administration. This was a familiar charge, but when it surfaced again in 1984 under the name of the Nunn-Roth amendment to the fiscal-year 1985 Defense Department budget, it struck a particularly harsh chord among the allies. Its main author, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, was known to be one of the nation's strongest NATO supporters, and his putative jump into what had been the Mansfield camp of the 1960s appeared to be a powerful signal of widespread American discontent with the allies. He proposed to mandate troop reductions in Europe by almost one-third unless the European members met the target commitment of 3 percent per annum real increase in defense expenditures. There was no countering the fact that while the United States since 1980 was more than doubling the minimum requirement approved by the North Atlantic Council, most European nations were failing to meet it.

The Nunn initiative shocked Europeans. German Foreign Minister HansDietrich Genscher acted for his European colleagues by rushing to Washington to repair the damage. He need not have troubled. The amendment was a one-day phenomenon in the United States, intended only as a sign of American displeasure with Europe's role in NATO's defense. On the next day, the Senate replaced the amendment with a toothless resolution urging greater troop contribution that carried no specific threat. The Nunn action did not create a substantive change in European contributions, but it did jolt the allies into remembering that the American troop presence in the alliance was still a necessary and very visible entity on European soil.

The allies' reaction to the Nunn amendment reflected a sense of malaise that afflicted NATO in these years. A delegation from NATO headquarters made a point of asking at a conference on the Mediterranean theater in Italy in the spring of 1993 if the Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies at Kent State University would serve as host for a team of NATO speakers. They feared an anti-NATO backlash from students prepared to abandon Europe and the alliance. The NATO team did not gather sufficient funds to make its tour in 1983. If it had done so, it might have been disappointed as well as

relieved by their findings. The reasons for relief would have derived from the absence of any groundswell of revulsion against Europe on American campuses over the deployment of American missiles. At the same time, they might have been disappointed over the relative disinterest in European affairs and the lack of knowledge about the alliance. But if there was apathy in the universities, it seemed to signify a relationship with the outside world in the same way that abstention from European affairs had been the norm before World War II. NATO was accepted as a given in American foreign relations; apathy was not to be equated with antipathy.

TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IN THE MID-1980s

Instead of heightening transatlantic tensions, the outcome of the Nunn amendment was a reassuring signal of the continuing American commitment to Europe, whatever the status of SDI might be. When a group of distinguished American diplomats, including George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, issued a widely publicized call for "no first use" of nuclear weapons in 1982, the Reagan administration rejected it outright on the grounds that acceptance would deprive NATO of a vital deterrent. Despite the clamor for arms control, the allies welcomed the American action. Deterrence remained dependent on the potential of a nuclear response to Soviet aggression, as NATO's ultimate solidarity vis-a-vis the SS-20s attested.

SHAPE planners made a special point at this time of noting, as SACEUR Bernard Rogers did in 1984, that emerging technologies were being incorporated into NATO's defense structure. These would enhance the effectiveness of conventional forces, which in turn adopted new tactics to deter or defeat an assailant. Such measures as "follow-on forces attack"-striking at the Warsaw Pact forces behind front lines in the event of war-was a means of raising the nuclear threshold as well as giving heart to Europe's faith in the deterrent power of ground troops. The European allies may have been reluctant to increase their contribution of conventional forces, but they recognized and fitfully appreciated the efforts their senior partner was doing

in their stead. And they had a right to remind the United States that despite the disappointing level of defense spending, the allies provided approximately 75 percent of NATO's readily available ground forces in Europe, 75 percent of the tanks, 65 percent of the air forces, and 60 percent of the naval vessels. The percentages were obviously higher when French forces were added to the list. The United States occasionally recognized these services, but never to the extent the allies felt they deserved.

Where successful transatlantic collaboration did take place in the mid-1980s was, ironically, in the Third World, largely on an informal basis. It was ironic because the most visible transatlantic conflicts had been out of area, in such places as Cuba, where the allies failed to follow America's lead in shunning Castro, and in Vietnam, where the United States appeared to divert its resources and attention away from NATO. Yet in the world outside NATO, member nations acting individually served the common interest in situations in which the United States could not intervene. The approach was usually through an informal distribution of responsibilities-witness French activity in Francophone Africa to defeat Soviet initiatives generally and specifically to repel Libyan aggression against Chad. Arguably, the most impressive service was performed by Italy, which took the leadership in helping liberate Malta from its Libyan-influenced leader Dom Mintoff in 1984. Neither the United States nor Britain would have been an acceptable partner to protect this important Mediterranean island from hostile powers. Lesser powers such as Italy and uncertain allies such as France found opportunities to move Third World nations out of the Soviet orbit more effectively than a show of NATO solidarity or American power might have managed.

THE GORBACHEV FACTOR, 1985-

The fast-changing leadership in the Soviet Union generated new fears of the adversary's intentions. Within a period of 16 months, three septuagenarian Soviet leaders led the nation, each molded by the attitudes of the Cold War and none prepared to change the status quo. Leonid

Brezhnev had controlled the Politburo for over 18 years when he died on 10 November 1982. His successor, Yuri Andropov, a veteran of the KGB, was said to lean toward some reforms in the Soviet system before his death in February 1984. But it was under his leadership that the Soviet delegation walked out of the Geneva negotiations. Konstantin Chernenko was in no better health than Andropov; he barely survived a year in office, and had no more to offer than his predecessor to resumption of serious talks with the West. These old men were beset by problems with coping with the U.S. missile deployment and with the implications of the SDI. But their health and idees fixes about relations with the United States assured only the continuation of stasis. There were no actions on the part of either superpower to give comfort to the European NATO allies in this period.

The accession to power of the 55-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 11 March 1985 might have portended an extension of the negative approach of the three men who preceded him. As a protege of Andropov, he fitted the image of a younger version of his mentor. But the image would have been misleading. Conceivably, the reforms that the ailing Andropov wished to impose on the Soviet system were the inspiration for the opening and reconstruction (glasnost and perestroika) that marked the Gorbachev years in office. Whether this was their source or not, they became the leitmotifs of Gorbachev's policies from 1985 to the end of the Cold War. What he wanted in domestic policy was never fully clear, it centered on de-emphasizing funds for military ends and redirecting them to other uses in the Soviet economy. It was clear enough, however, that his intentions were not to overturn the system and adopt Western capitalism, but to strengthen it to cope better with the economic power of the West. In foreign policy his means seemed to have been as candid as his objectives, namely, to end the Cold War that was so costly to the nation's wellbeing, and to reintegrate the Soviet Union into what he called "a common European home"

These objectives were just what the European allies had been seeking ever since detente had been on their agenda. That the United States may be left out of this "home" was a problem because it would raise questions about the future of NATO itself. Nor was it axiomatic that the Gorbachev

opening guaranteed an end to the Cold War. Could the Soviets now be trusted as new partners?

Inevitably, this question agitated the hawkish members of the Reagan team. Weinberger's Pentagon remained skeptical of a sudden Soviet conversion, and was uncomfortable with the Soviet leader's proposal of a Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva that would take place in November 1985. But unlike their role in Reagan's first term in office, they were less influential in the second; Shultz's more accommodating State Department had taken their place, with Paul Nitze in the lead. The president was impressed with Gorbachev's return of Soviet delegates to Geneva to discuss new arms control negotiations that encompassed space systems, strategic nuclear forces, and INF issues. Reagan's rhetoric and attitude toward Communism had softened. A year before Gorbachev arrived on the scene, the president had addressed the 34-nation Stockholm Conference on Confidenceand-Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), at which he spoke of a new dialogue with the Soviet Union, and in February 1985, just a month before the formal announcement of succession in Moscow, the NATO Review, the alliance's official organ, featured a photograph of a broadly smiling Secretary of State George Shultz shaking hands with a more constrained Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, a veteran spokesman of the Soviet Cold War against the West. The caption above the photograph read that new negotiations were to begin. The photo opportunity would not have been possible without the support of the president.

THE REYKJAVIK GAMBIT, 1986

Gorbachev showed by the end of 1985 that he was more than willing to respond to Reagan's initiatives and, indeed, to assume leadership himself in reducing the levels of nuclear weaponry. The Geneva Summit meeting between the two leaders in November 1985 was the occasion for him to assert his interest in a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arms. Fascinated European observers were not wholly relieved by this aspiration. There was

no specific common understanding about whether this reduction would apply to strategic arms, to intermediate-range weapons, or to space systems. Nor was there any sign of advances in the longstanding negotiations on MBFR negotiations in Vienna toward a verifiable agreement for Warsaw Pact-NATO reduction of ground forces. The allies had a right to wonder how a generalized, 50 percent cut in nuclear forces would affect their security, particularly if it would be a bilateral Soviet-American arrangement produced without their involvement.

Yet the momentum that had been building toward constructive relations in 1985 accelerated in 1986. It was embodied in the agreement of the two leaders to visit each other's respective countries in the near future as well as in the conclusions of the Stockholm conference. The CDE required mandatory notification and observation of military activities throughout Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. These measures would apply to all of Soviet Europe, and not just the 250kilometer-wide strip along the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) western border (as under the Helsinki Final Agreement of 1975). There would be no right of refusal of on-the-spot verification inspections.

These events provided the psychological infrastructure for the meeting of Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986. There the subtexts of Gorbachev's policies became apparent, to the consternation of the European allies. His immediate goal was to undercut the American commitment to the SDI, an objective that Europeans for their own reasons did not find objectionable. Recognizing that it was unlikely there would be any breakthrough along conventional diplomatic lines, Gorbachev went directly to the president himself, presumably to sign an interim agreement on the INF that would leave some missiles in Europe. The SDI was not part of the agenda. At the last minute, he offered instead a grand compromise on both offensive and defensive weapons to an unwary Reagan. The Soviet premier's proposal was to have both sides get rid of all nuclear weapons rather than dicker over piecemeal arrangements. This was a "classic bait-and-switch operation," as Time journalist Strobe Talbott called it, a way of eliminating the troublesome SDI without admitting this purpose. The SDI, after all, was a nuclear instrument. If removing the SDI would be the end

result of the Reykjavik meeting, the European allies would have been relieved. But the removal of all nuclear weapons was another matter; this would include both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles that would strip Europe of protection from the Soviet ICBMS and force NATO to rely on conventional forces alone against the Warsaw bloc.

The president initially saw none of these implications. He had enjoyed his encounter with Gorbachev in Geneva, and was pleased to continue the colloquy in Reykjavik, approximately halfway between Moscow and Washington. Confident in his powers of persuasion, he felt he could bring the Soviet leader around to recognizing that the SDI would be of benefit to both countries. His advisers were less sanguine about these prospects. The week before the meeting, Rozanne Ridgway, assistant secretary of state in charge of European affairs, tried to discourage excessive expectations when she informed Congress that this was essentially a preparatory meeting, an opportunity for private and informal talks, in anticipation of Gorbachev's visit to the United States.

The State Department was justified in its uneasiness over the meeting in Iceland. American diplomats feared that an aging president, never educated in the arcane arts of diplomacy, would be maneuvered by the younger man into making arrangements that would damage the nation's security and throw relations with the European allies into turmoil. The initiative behind closed doors appeared to have been Gorbachev's when he pressed Reagan to respect the ABM Treaty of 1972 and to accept an interpretation of that treaty that would prohibit development of the SDI outside of laboratory research. Fortunately, from the perspective of its partisans, the president would not yield to the Soviet views on the SDI.

What disturbed Europeans was less the president's intransigence over the SDI than his apparently impulsive counterproposal to eliminate, within 10 years, not just intermediate-range nuclear missiles but all missiles and, as Senator Sam Nunn observed, "everything else, including bombs" It was as if the Soviets had finally taken up the zero option proposal of 1982 and carried it to an extreme, which, if implemented, would have removed U.S. nuclear presence from Europe. Richard Perle and other hawkish American

critics thought at the time that the 1982 proposal was so skewed against Soviet interests that it would never be accepted. In fact, the zerozero option was what Gorbachev specifically endorsed, with Reagan, for the moment at least, joining in enthusiastically. Only the SDI stood in the president's way of achieving the zero-zero option. The prospect of removing all nuclear weapons from the NATO arsenal while keeping alive only the SDI would accelerate the pace of America's decoupling itself from Europe.

Reagan's State Department was almost as shocked as the allies at the cavalier way in which the president was ready to cast off nuclear defenses. Although the White House quickly rephrased Reagan's statements to take the sting out of its implications, Europeans were not wholly calmed by the communique applauding the meeting's effort on behalf of balanced reduction of conventional forces without addressing their concerns.

EUROPE AND THE INF AGREEMENT OF 1987

Despite the apparent standoff at Reykjavik over Star Wars, the Soviets continued their campaign to reduce both strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons, and found an increasingly receptive partner in Washington. The Reykjavik meeting brought to the surface an issue that would be picked up later: a 50 percent reduction of strategic missiles over a 10-year period. The meeting also opened the way for an INF treaty signed in Washington on 8 December 1987. This agreement would remove 470 of the Soviet INF missiles (SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS- 5s) and 429 of the American cruise and Pershing Il missiles. For the first time, there would be machinery in place to enforce compliance. A key element was the establishment of a force of 200 inspectors, 200 monitors, and 200 aircrew members from each side to verify the phased reductions over a 13-year period. The signing of this treaty seemed to testify to the success of NATO's linkage of defense preparations with a peaceful detente.

On another level, however, the INF Treaty raised a host of questions about the future of the alliance that could have led to its dissolution if its

members failed to respond to the new challenges. Former SACEUR General Bernard Rogers feared that western Europe was "on the slippery slope of denuclearization," a prospect that alarmed many of the European allies. The 1987 INF Treaty seemed to give credence to concerns about the United States turning away from its allies. Like the abortive Reykjavik discussions the year before, the two superpowers could be on the verge of working out their own detente at the expense of the NATO allies. These possibilities poisoned the atmosphere despite the genuine success the treaty had achieved in minimizing the SS-20 threat that had hung over the European allies. This outcome would lose its luster if the end product of these efforts toward de-escalating East-West tensions should be the removal of American troops as well as American missiles from Europe.

A species of schizophrenia characterized the European reaction to the changing environment in the Soviet Union. On the one hand there was some disbelief in the sincerity and durability of the Gorbachev reforms, but if they were credible, what effect would they have on relations with the transatlantic ally? If NATO, empowered by the American presence in Europe, should dissolve, would this be in the interest of the European allies? No matter how much friction there had been between America and Europe, Europeans recognized that their freedom to oppose American leadership derived from a knowledge that the United States remained a firm ally. After 40 years of dependency, standing alone could present troublesome scenarios.

At the same time, there was a sense of triumph in the West. This emotion was hardly surprising as the allies watched Gorbachev's policies tearing down the barriers that had been built up between East and West for more than a generation. Not only was there unilateral Soviet reduction in conventional forces to match reductions in nuclear weaponry, there was also the loosening of controls over the Warsaw Pact allies. When the first multicandidate elections in an open contest in March 1989 rebuffed official Communist Party candidates for the Congress of Peoples' Deputies in the Soviet Union, the floodgates were opened in Poland and Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Romania. Glasnost had reached the Warsaw bloc, leading to the overthrow of its Communist regimes in each of these nations.

Gorbachev unwittingly and unwillingly had opened a Pandora's box to let out the repressed passions of nationalism and anti-Communism.

In this new world, Europeans could be excused if they believed that America was less necessary to their lives than in the past. A presentiment of European unity was in the air, propelled by the growing power of the European Economic Community. For half a generation, since the Wirtschaftswunder of the 1960s, Europe had the potential of equaling, if not surpassing, both the United States and the Soviet Union in economic power. Its population was larger than both superpowers, and two of its members had nuclear capabilities that could serve a potential United States of Europe. There was reason to anticipate the flowering of a genuine third force in the Western Union in the 1990s.

As events rapidly unfolded in the wake of the INF Treaty of 1987, NATO itself was confined to the sidelines by Gorbachev's initiatives, and remained a step or more behind the Soviets, without a clear sense of the changes that were convulsing the Warsaw bloc. Its leaders were concerned that the European public might be lulled into complacency by Gorbachev's style. Although reductions in conventional armaments were welcome, particularly if they were asymmetrical, the European partners continued to worry about the nuclear dimension. They saw no evidence of arms reductions in the Soviet modernization program even as large cuts in nuclear warheads were projected for the near future.

To cope with a potential danger that a new generation of Soviet nuclear weaponry might inflict, SACEUR General John Galvin advocated the deployment of an improved short-range nuclear missile. But instead of welcoming NATO's plans to modernize the reduced tactical nuclear weaponry in Europe, Germans balked at the prospect. Whereas the Lance missile might be more efficient as a battlefield weapon, it would strike only forces in Europe, most notably in Germany, if it were deployed. At another time, when the Soviet words and actions were more threatening, these misgivings would have been muted. But proposing more advanced weaponry at a time when Gorbachev was delivering on his promise to forge a new relationship with the West seemed needlessly provocative. The

increasing German opposition to the acquisition of new short-range missiles was part of a more general complaint against NATO maneuvers-tanks that chewed up arable land and planes that generated unbearable noise pollution. Sacrifices that would be bearable in times of peril now were unacceptable. Understandably, Chancellor Kohl urged postponement of a decision until after the next German elections.

Here was the dilemma. Although NATO recognized the importance of maintaining and even strengthening the organization's defense posture, there remained a residue of distrust of Soviet intentions. General Galvin noted in May 1989 that since March 1985, when Gorbachev took power, the Soviets continued to expand production of tanks and artillery. Such reductions in conventional forces that Gorbachev announced at the United Nations in December 1988 would make at best only a modest dent on their offensive capabilities. Uneasiness about Soviet objectives was shared by the leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. Were the Soviets just offering a variation of the old plans to lull Europe into inaction and to drive the United States out of Europe?

Yet public opinion in the member nations necessitated a response to the adversary's deepening of detente. An American counterpart to the Soviet peace offensive took forms that disturbed Europeans. From the right wing came the charge that the lack of support given by the allies to the common cause should induce the United States to leave the alliance and encourage Europeans to make their own security arrangements. Two familiar themes that seemed receptive to many Americans were the unfair sharing of the defense burden, and the potential but still untapped strength of an almost-but-not-united-enough Europe. Voices of pundits from the left wing in the United States were equally loud in urging withdrawal. The United States, in their view, should use its good offices to demilitarize the Continent because the Soviet threat was no longer valid. They agreed with the Green Party in Germany and the radical wing of the Labour Party in Britain that the United States military presence in Europe was an obstacle to peace. It was apparent as NATO celebrated its fortieth anniversary that the alliance could be in greater danger from Soviet benevolence than the malevolence displayed in the past.

THE CHALLENGE OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION, 1989-1990

As the Cold War lurched into its final phase, the transatlantic problems within the alliance assumed new forms. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991 should have terminated most of the conflicts in the organization. It did not; in fact, for a variety of reasons, the end of the East-West rivalry served to intensify West-West differences. But before the final collapse of the Communist empire, the reunification of Germany opened a new schism in the West, along less-familiar but not altogether new lines. The unification of Germany in the wake of the loosening of Soviet controls over its allies, symbolized by the razing of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, brought the United States and Germany together in opposition-often sotto voce-to Britain and France.

It would not be the first time that the United States took stances with respect to Germany that created intra-European conflict. It was American pressure for a German contribution to the alliance in the wake of the Korean War that produced France's defensive Pleven Plan. And when the resulting EDC failed in 1954, the United States threatened to make a bilateral treaty with Germany at the expense of France. As noted earlier, these were examples of transatlantic conflict but they were also symptoms of division within Europe itself. In 1989 the issue was even more volatile because the possibility of reunification was so unexpected. Its reality forced the allies to come to grips with an outcome that none had anticipatedthat the Soviet Union would actually release East Germany from its grip and permit Germans the freedom to choose their own government. This, after all, was what NATO presumably had been seeking since the 1950s and had been the reason for Chancellor Adenauer to throw West Germany into the arms of NATO.

Whether the rapid breakdown of authority in the Warsaw bloc was a result of the Soviets' inability to match America's expensive military expansion or a result of a Gorbachev plan that got out of hand is a debatable

question. What is not at issue is that Gorbachev's tacit approval of political reforms in Poland in April 1989 led to the election of a non-Communist government in Poland by August. The urge to oust the Communist regimes in the Warsaw bloc now seemed to be irresistible as well as contagious. Between September and December, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania had removed their Communist leaders, by free elections in Czechoslovakia, by violence in Romania.

But it was East Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the most important member of the Soviet bloc, that quickened the end of the Communist empire. A domino effect was in process when Hungary opened its western border in September, permitting thousands of East Germans to cross freely to the West. When Gorbachev urged reforms a month later, popular demonstrations forced the replacement of Erich Honecker, a symbol of the Brezhnev era, and two months later were responsible for tearing down the Berlin Wall, a symbol of the Khrushchev era. The road to German unification was cleared of its major obstacles. The dismantling of the Wall was the most striking signal that the end was approaching. What was apparent to so much of Europe-in the West as well as in the Easttook longer to reach American leaders: that the Cold War was indeed in the final throes of dissolution and that the Wall's destruction was the end product of changes taking place throughout the Warsaw bloc.

But a vital by-product of the changed environment was incorporation of East Germany into the Federal Republic in 1990, less than a year after the Wall had fallen. Although this was a logical position of the last falling domino, it still elicited surprise and shock among both NATO allies and the Soviet adversary. The rhetoric of unification notwithstanding, few outside Germany believed that it was possible in their lifetime. A revealing moment occurred in September 1989, at a meeting in Brussels of future leaders of NATO, under the auspices of the NATO Information Directorate. At one session, a young British member of Parliament asked a German general from SHAPE what kind of thinking were he and his colleagues doing about German reunification. Recognizing that this was a mischievous question, he gave a supercilious reply, saying with a wide grin that they were doing as little thinking as possible. The possibility was too far-fetched. This meeting

took place just six weeks before the Wall was dismantled, to the surprise of the NATO establishment. At the Brussels conference, the expectation was that the modernization of the Lance missile would be the most pressing NATO issue in the year ahead.

There was always a question about the desirability as well as the possibility of a single Germany. Doubters included German leaders as well as those from their allies. Adenauer's devotion to the principle had been suspect. His more enduring goal was incorporation of the Federal Republic into the West as a means of burying an ugly past. As a Catholic Rhinelander, he identified East Germany with Prussia and Protestantism, which were outside his vision of the future, despite his political rhetoric. Nor was Brandt's accommodation with the Warsaw bloc a support for unification. Ostpolitik accepted the reality of two German states. These German sentiments were seconded by many in the West, particularly in France, who were worried about the direction a strong, populous, ambitious Germany would take. The carefully crafted relationship with Adenauer's Germany was intended to maintain France's seniority in the partnership. Uniting the Germanies threatened to reverse the roles and revive fears that had been repressed for a generation. Britain may have lacked the memories and defeat that afflicted France, but Britain had its own long memory of opposing the dominance of any single Continental power.

The idea of two separate Germanies appealed as well to the Soviet Union. Like France, it had vivid memories of two world wars involving a powerful, united Germany. Not only would the Communist German Democratic Republic be a bulwark of the Warsaw bloc, but it would inhibit the ambitions of the Federal Republic. The disassembling of the Wall and the wild celebrations that event inspired among Germans jolted all their neighbors into a recognition that they were more comfortable with the status quo than with the prospect of a unified German state. As historian Frank Ninkovich observed, "after the bacchanal in the streets of Berlin came sober morning-after thoughts in Western capitals."

There was no cheering in Paris and London, and there was some puzzlement in Washington. Although events went too fast for President

George H. W. Bush, American leaders shared none of the visceral dread that afflicted their European allies. The American role in the rapid envelopment of East Germany into the West within a year of the fall of the Wall attested to a significant difference between America and Europe. Bush was certainly willing to join the British and French as well as the Soviets in trying to slow the momentum of reunification, but he lacked the emotional baggage carried by European victims of German occupation. It was this relative objectivity on the part of the United States that facilitated Chancellor Helmut Kohl's rejection of a confederation of East and West Germany in favor of absorption of the Communist state into a greater Germany.

Anglo-French resistance to immediate incorporation of East Germany into an enlarged Federal Republic was more than matched by open Soviet opposition. Gorbachev undoubtedly underestimated the momentum the removal of the Wall would have on German aspirations. Soviet leaders became concerned a bit belatedly about the ramifications of Kohl's plans for "federation" that would emerge from his proposal of binational commissions to arrange the process. The Soviets recognized that settled boundaries could be scrambled, including commitments under the Helsinki agreements. Their allies in the Warsaw bloc would be affected psychologically as well as politically, and their assets in East Germany, including the enclave of Kaliningrad, might come under review. Not least among Soviet worries was the question of East Germany becoming a part of NATO after unification. Gorbachev turned against the unifying process in the months following the opening of the Wall, and he had quiet support from Germany's NATO neighbors.

If British and French reservations were not blatant, they were not invisible. President Francois Mitterand of France, miffed that Kohl had not consulted him before announcing his plans, visited East Germany and the Soviet Union, presumably to check their sentiments. The French president spoke of deepening rather than widening the European Community, a not-too-subtle objection to impending change. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wondered about an excessively powerful new Germany and its impact on Europe. Only in the United States were both public opinion and the administration supportive of rapid reintegration, although with

recognition that it should be accompanied by assurances of a united Germany's attachment to NATO and the West.

What forced the hand of all the interested parties was the disintegration of the German Democratic Republic. Where East Germany would go was a vital question. A neutral, united Germany outside NATO was not a prospect its western neighbors, or even some of the Warsaw bloc associates, would welcome. The answer was to anchor Germany inside NATO, in the manner of the Federal Republic in 1955, with promises to the Soviets that NATO forces would not move into East Germany. Additionally, generous financial arrangements would be made to facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany. To advance the process, Secretary of State James A. Baker proposed what was called the "2+4" approach. The "2" referred to the two Germanies that would settle internal issues between themselves; the "4" were the most interested and most influential nations-the former occupying powers that would determine the new Germany's place in Europe.

Again, the demands of East Germans for immediate incorporation undid the timetable that NATO and the Soviets would have preferred. The waiting period via a confederation of the two German states fell by the wayside. Gorbachev tried to stem the tide with a proposal in June of a five-year transition period in which the two Germanies would retain their alliance obligations. He failed. The momentum for reunification was too strong to resist-by the West as well as by the East. Neither the "2" nor the "4" could prevent Chancellor Kohl from winning his objective; the most that Gorbachev's plan could achieve was to ratify the termination of the remnants of the Four-Power occupation rights in Germany. A united Germany would stay in NATO and Soviet forces would leave gradually over a four-year period, after which German troops under NATO auspices would be stationed in the East. As compensation to the Soviets, Germany would bear the costs of their military withdrawal. Limits would be placed on German forces in the form of reduced size of the Bundeswehr and a pledge that neither non-German NATO troops nor nuclear weapons would be located in the former East Germany. After the East German legislature voted to join the West in August, a formal treaty of unification was signed in August 1990. Behind the scenes, the United States support heartened

Chancellor Kohl's drive for reunification. His success seemed to validate NATO's mission to contain (and ultimately overturn) the Communist East and to integrate a unified Germany into the democratic West.

The Cold War ended in NATO's forty-first year. For a brief moment the allies could savor the sense that they had prevailed over the Soviet adversary while maintaining its own coherence. Granted that the unity was precarious, and that examples of friction were more numerous than those of harmony, they were able to keep their differences within the NATO family. Whether the alliance could survive after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact remained open to question. But unlike the Warsaw Pact, it had a future in the last decade of the twentieth century. Would the end of the Cold War destroy NATO's raison d'etre? Was it only the existence of a common adversary in the Soviet Communist regime that maintained allied cohesion despite the many challenges over almost two generations? If so, the future of NATO in the post-Cold War era would be in doubt.

6

SEEKING NEW MISSIONS: 1990-2000

TOWARD A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The domino effect that Gorbachev set in motion in 1985 finally came to rest in 1991, and in that interval Germany was reunited, the Warsaw bloc was disbanded, and the Soviet Union itself imploded. The Baltic republics regained the independence they had lost in 1940, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) replaced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The difference between the two entities was that the USSR was controlled from its center in Moscow, while Russia in the CIS was just one of several loosely associated independent nations. These dramatic changes left the United States as the sole superpower.

But where did they leave NATO? And what implication did these changes have for the United States and its European allies in NATO? For a brief moment, celebrated by the euphoric predictions of U.S. State Department official Francis Fukuyama, the world appeared to be witnessing not just the end of the Cold War but the end of history itself. The success of the West in the long contest with Communism would mean the universal acceptance of Western democracy as the final form of government for all nations. This putative cancellation of the Hegelian dialectic encountered too many obstacles to be credible, but even if it was never more than a passing aspiration, it called attention to the future of NATO. Without the Soviet menace to serve as a unifying glue, there seemed ample reason to recommend its dissolution.

This was not idle speculation. At a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London in June 1990, pro forma recognition was given to the military capabilities the Soviet Union possessed even as the council's communique proclaimed the substantial decrease in military risks. But more attention was paid to the Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as "a central element in the construction of a new Europe." Given a membership that embraced both the United States and the Soviet Union as well as 34 European and Asian countries, it is understandable if some thought was given to the CSCE as a "framework for farreaching reforms and stability" in Europe. If NATO remained essentially an entity dedicated to the defeat of Communism and the containment of Soviet expansionism, it could be replaced by an organization more suited to the changing international environment.

The CSCE was not the only vehicle considered in place of an obsolescent NATO. A reinvigorated United Nations to which the framers of the alliance had paid lip service might also make NATO unnecessary. Because the reformed Soviet Union was no longer the source of automatic vetoes in the Security Council, it was possible for the United Nations to revive its charter's Article 47, which established a Military Staff Committee to assist the Security Council's military requirements. Unlike the doomed League of Nations, the United Nations would have military contingents to give teeth to its resolutions. But as long as the Cold War was in process, there was no prospect of this committee serving as an agent for collective security of the member nations. With the end of the Cold War in sight in 1990, the Soviets might be inclined to take on a more positive role in the Security Council.

NATO AND THE GULF WAR

The moribund Soviet Union reluctantly acquiesced in the Security Council to the Gulf War that ignited in the winter of 1991 after an aggressive Iraq occupied neighboring Kuwait. But the United Nations was in no position to use the Military Staff Committee even if the United States

had supported it. Only one organization could manage a successful military action against a country that threatened the oil resources of the Middle East and, in particular, the survival of Saudi Arabia. Only NATO with its forces centered in Europe and with its own stake in a stable Middle East could do this. In December 1990, both the North Atlantic Council's Defense Planning Committee and its foreign ministers, meeting in a ministerial session in Brussels, praised UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal from Kuwait and for all NATO members to "further support this continuing effort, in line with evolving requirements."

It is noteworthy that the recommendations for each member to provide support did not signify that the American-led war against Iraq in 1991 was a NATO effort any more than it was a UN operation. The UN resolutions were a useful diplomatic screen for U.S. defense of its own interests, and putatively of NATO's as well. But beyond this aid, the idea of giving meaning to Article 47 of the UN charter was never seriously considered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would have objected to subordinating U.S. contingents to a UN command in 1991 no matter how the composition of the Security Council had changed.

But a NATO command could have been a different matter. Although Article 5 would not have been applicable, the allies might have converted the coalition into a NATO operation under the rubric of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which authorized consultation "together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened" NATO intervention in the Persian Gulf would have required a broad construction of that article, but "security" involved protection of oil resources and the potential spread of Iraqi aggression to the neighboring nation, Turkey. The "out-of-area"-beyond the specific territorial limits of Article 6-was an arena in which NATO might have acted under a formula the allies had accepted in 1982 at a Bonn summit meeting at which they agreed not only to consult on out-of-area deployment but also to compensate the United States for the costs it would incur. But while the allies sought justification for its survival in the post-Cold War era and found a common cause in their opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, they could not bring themselves to embrace common

action in a specifically NATO context. Articles 4 and 6 lacked the credibility of Article 5.

The Persian Gulf War in the winter of 1991 then was an American war conducted from Washington, not from Brussels. Yet it was also a coalition of the willing (most of them members of the alliance) blessed by the UN Security Council. Twelve of the 16 NATO allies provided forces to the coalition. The United States was able to draw on the military infrastructure NATO had created over the years. Britain and France dispatched troops to the Gulf while other allies facilitated the transit of U.S. aircraft through their logistical support. In the course of the buildup and the subsequent rapid victory over Iraq, the kinds of transatlantic tensions that had been visible during much of the Cold War were in abeyance. France may not have returned to the SHAPE military fold but its ground troops were present in the assault against Iraq.

The one openly dissenting voice in this crisis was Germany's, and it was expressed over the possible invocation of Article 5 if Iraq attacked neighboring Turkey. Its initial reaction was to assert that the nation would not be bound by its treaty obligations if Turkey were attacked. Germany's justification for its stance on the application of Article 5 was that U.S. use of Turkish bases to strike Iraq could be construed as a provocation that relieved that government from having to aid Turkey if Iraq retaliated. An unstated reason for German reluctance to join the allies stemmed from concern that the Soviets might back away from ratifying the treaty unifying East and West Germany if they were offended by Bonn's joining its allies in an operation the Soviets had accepted so reluctantly. But before the war ended, a German air squadron was dispatched to Turkey as part of NATO's support of their Turkish ally.

The triumph of the coalition over Saddam Hussein's forces had a centripetal effect on allied unity. Frictions between America and Europe seemed a relic of the past as the allies were energized by their victory. The Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, meeting in Brussels in May 1991, not only welcomed the success of the coalition forces in the Gulf War but gave credit to the alliance for the air and naval

forces deployed to the Persian Gulf to deter a potential attack on its members. This celebratory note did not change the reality of a war in which NATO allies functioned outside the control of the alliance's military structure. But NATO's virtual representation in the Gulf War reinvigorated the alliance and pointed to roles it might occupy in the future. In other words, a case may be made for the war serving as a life preserver for the alliance.

RAPID REACTION FORCE VERSUS EUROCORPS

Two immediate changes flowed directly from the experience in the Persian Gulf, and both posed problems for transatlantic comity. One of them arose in May 1991 when NATO defense ministers unveiled a plan for managing future military crises with smaller forces. The allies would establish a multinational rapid-reaction corps composed of four divisions based in Germany under British command. Although personnel would be drawn from Germany, the Low Countries, Italy, Greece, Spain, and possibly Turkey, its core rested on Anglo-American collaboration. The United States would provide tactical airlift and sealift transportation for the corps and two of the four divisions would be British. The other two would consist of an Italian division supplemented by Greek and Turkish support, and a mixed division with Dutch, Belgian, German, and British elements. In the initial stage of a crisis, a mobile unit of 5,000 troops would respond within 72 hours. The corps' rapid mobility was expected to compensate for reduced numbers of troops. These forces would be augmented by contributions from all willing members and would include U.S. Reserve and National Guard units that could be dispatched over a period of weeks. The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) would be under British command and headquartered in London. The implications in these deliberations involved out-of-area operations that sought to anticipate and forestall crises of the order that Iraq had created in that year.

Although these plans not only reflected the crisis of 1991, they were by extension identifying a mission the alliance might follow in the post-Cold

War era. But a major obstacle stood in their way-the obvious dominance of the AngloSaxon members in the Rapid Reaction Force. Other allies were given a minor place in the force, and France in particular was left out entirely. This omission was not inadvertent. The concept of an RRF was a product of NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), two bodies in which France was not represented. Inevitably, the combination of an unequal distribution of power in the new force with the exclusion of France revived some of the transatlantic tensions that had been lessened by the impending implosion of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

These activities sparked France's initiative in establishing a Franco-German counter to the British-led force. Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl was almost as uncomfortable with the prospect of serving under a British command as President Francois Mitterand was. Their response was to create a "Eurocorps," building on the Franco-German brigade that had been in progress since 1987. This brigade symbolized the Franco-German rapprochement that had been solemnized in the Elysee Treaty of 1963, fashioned by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. Ultimately this force would consist of 35,000 personnel when it gathered contributions from other Western European Union (WEU) powers.

The multinational model that France would not accept under NATO auspices advanced in October 1991 under the rubric of the WEU. Given France's ambiguous position in NATO over the past generation, it was hardly surprising that it would support a rival program to effect the same objective of managing smallscale, out-of-area problems affecting European security, but under French leadership. Unstated but nevertheless a factor in the French initiative was that country's felt need to be assured that the German military would be more securely anchored in a French-dominated corps than in the more loosely knit NATO context. Less understandable was the German rationale for membership in both forces, one inside NATO, the other outside. Germany rationalized the apparent contradiction by claiming that the Eurocorps was necessary to justify maintaining a French military presence in Germany. Not least among the reasons for its identification with the French approach was the major role Germany would play in the

Eurocorps, as opposed to the lesser assignment in the RRF. A subtext for American consumption was Germany's potential service as the middle man between NATO and the WEU, using its influence to bring France closer to NATO.

NATO'S ROME SUMMIT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S MAASTRICHT SUMMIT

French leadership was evident in the transformation of the European Community into the European Union (EU) at a summit meeting of European powers in Maastricht in December 1991, two months after the formation of the Eurocorps. Out of this gathering emerged the promise of a common foreign and security policy, using the WEU as its instrument. Although the path to the objective of a European defense identity was not clear, the idea of the WEU as an arm of the EU was a signal of European independence of the United States, and perhaps of NATO itself.

Divorce from NATO was not the stated purpose of the Maastricht summit's plans; the defense capabilities of an independent Europe were still too far in the future. On the surface, the new European treaty noted that the EU's policy "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain member states and shall respect the obligations of certain member states under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established under that framework" Such was the labored language that papered over a major rift between America and Europe, a separation that had precedents in the Cold War.

The caution that the Maastricht meeting displayed may be traced to the work of the major NATO summit meeting following the end of the Cold War in Rome in November 1991, at which the allies implemented the agreement made in London in July 1990 to "transform the alliance to reflect the new, more promising era in Europe" It was here that the allies determined that potential dangers lurking in the wreckage of the Soviet

empire-ethnic strife in the new republics, a counterrevolutionary coup in the Russian Federation, territorial disputes between former members of the Warsaw Pact-meant that NATO would have a different function from its role in the Cold War. The organization would be the crisis manager in the event of new threats that could emanate not from "calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the consequences of instabilities." The scope of NATO's concerns extended, as the text of the communique made clear, to the "Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East"

How to translate the new strategic concept into reality was a question that was asked by NATO supporters as well as by its foes. Could it presage new American pressures for disengagement from Europe? This was not just casual speculation. Without intending this objective, a successful evolution of the new European Union into a genuine United States of Europe, as envisioned by its leaders in Brussels, would threaten NATO at its most elemental level. There would be no need for an Atlantic alliance, with or without the Americans, if Europe developed defense capabilities sufficient to take care of its own security. The political expectations were as exciting as the economic prospects when the European Union at Maastricht pressed for the removal of the WEU headquarters from London to Brussels to strengthen the links between the two institutions. Implicit in all the activities relating to the EU in the 1990s was the lowering of NATO's profile in Europe's future.

The apparent success of a unifying Europe under Franco-German auspices resonated across the Atlantic in a number of ways. Least surprising was the reduction of the size of U.S. forces in Europe. The Bush administration fought a losing battle with Congress to keep the number of troops in Europe at 250,000. The reduction bottomed out at 100,000 by the middle of the decade. At that figure, the Congressional Research Service report estimated that the United States could barely manage to field a medium-sized army corps, and below 50,000 the Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated that the military could make noncombat contributions through peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, but not much more.

Why not leave Europe to the Europeans, given the limited functions drastically reduced American forces would have in these circumstances? This question became critical in February 1962 when Canada announced that it would close all its bases and pull its combat forces out of Europe by the end of 1994. Europeans recognized that Canada's decision might well foreshadow an American departure, and both actions could be done without consultations with their partners beforehand. If no military threat was visible in Europe's future, it was understandable if the United States should depart from Europe-and from NATO.

The European allies in the EU had decidedly mixed feelings about an American abandonment of Europe. There were lively suspicions at the time of the Maastricht meeting that the United States was conspiring to undercut the development of a separate European defense force. Attention was paid at the WEU assembly in the winter of 1992 to a Pentagon paper, subsequently modified, that asserted America's intention to ensure that no rival superpower be allowed to challenge the preeminence of the United States in the post-Cold War era. A potentially powerful Europe could become that superpower rival. Europe's resentment of American hegemony might have gone to the extreme of preempting America's disengagement by disengaging itself from the United States-and from NATO.

Despite the renewal of transatlantic tensions, the new strategic concept crafted in the Rome meeting of the North Atlantic Council pointed the way to a detente between Europe and America. The new emphasis on crisis management provided room for Europe to make its own special contribution in a Franco-German-led corps within the NATO context. Europe was not ready to divest itself of American power, and the United States was not ready to turn its back on the role it had occupied for almost two generations. Americans were too hasty in dismissing the Eurocorps as a convenient means of removing Europe from American domination. And Europeans exaggerated the sense that Americans assumed a sovereign right to maintain the same controls they had held in Europe since the darkest days of the Cold War. NATO and the WEU, America and Europe, needed each other if there was to be stability in Europe.

There was no guarantee of security against the threat of crises that might arise in the years ahead. The unstable status of the successor nations to the defunct Soviet Union was sufficient of itself to make both NATO and the United States remain vital partners in Europe. A North Atlantic Coordinating Council (NACC) was established in 1991 to foster cooperation with the former members of the Soviet empire, creating an "interlocking network" to deal with all aspects of defense issues as well as with managing conversion of defense production to civilian purposes. Promotion of a close relationship with Russia reflected the NATO partners' concerns about the nuclear power remaining in the East and the dangers they might pose in the hands of dissidents in the new Russia. An abortive coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 that led to the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in the following month gave credence to the worry about instability in the region and, by the same token, increased reliance on the United States as the comforting arm of NATO.

THE BOSNIAN CHALLENGE

The breakdown of the Yugoslav Federation in July 1991 should have been an occasion for the Eurocorps or a revitalized WEU to display its ability to manage crises beyond NATO's borders. The Balkan civil war was also an opportunity for NATO to give meaning to its crisis management intentions. Yugoslavia's instability could directly affect the security of the European allies under Article 4 if its war spread north to Hungary or east to Turkey, or led to a flood of refugees into western Europe.

The Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic precipitated the crisis by refusing to recognize the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia after Slovenia's declaration of independence. He then engaged in a limited war on the pretext of protecting the Serbian minority in Croatia. Conflict spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina where a mixed population of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims provided a setting for warring Croats and Serbs to seek annexation of their nationals at the expense of the Muslim population. The resulting bloodshed accompanied by ethnic cleansing aroused cries for international

intervention, particularly as the horrors of war were displayed on television screens.

Arguably, the distinctions between aggressor and victim in Croatia were sufficiently blurred to make NATO's hesitation to intervene understandable. This was not the case in Bosnia in 1992, where a strong Serbian minority, armed and supported by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army, seized all the territory it could manage from a country with a Muslim plurality. Milosevic's aim was to create a Greater Serbia in territory formerly occupied by Muslims. The Croats too were victims of Yugoslav aggression as they tried to stem the attacking Serb forces, presumably in collaboration with the Muslims. But the Croatian role in the war was suspect. It had plans for annexing territory from Bosnia-Herzogovina.

Although the Milosevic campaign was just the kind of challenge the Rome meeting had identified for NATO, it was even more appropriate that Europeans should take the initiative in meeting it. The war was in their own backyard, with more at stake, it seemed, for EU members than for the distant United States. It was all the more appropriate because it was German pressure that induced the EU to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. Germany's objective was to encourage a Western orientation on the part of those two former Yugoslav republics, and to reap economic advantages from its relations in an area that had once been in the German orbit.

From the U.S. perspective, the troubles emanating from Serbia's military efforts to subjugate Croatia, if not Slovenia, were European, not American, problems. This was the message Secretary of State James A. Baker delivered to the European allies in 1992 when he observed that "We don't have a dog in this fight." Unlike the Persian Gulf, there were no natural resources on which the West was dependent; the national interest of the United States did not seem to hang on the outcome of the Balkan war. Conditions for a surgical strike that could win a victory at minimal cost were not present, as they had been in the Persian Gulf the year before. The heavily armed Yugoslav army fighting in mountainous terrain could wreak havoc on an invader, just as Tito's Partisans were able to inflict on the Nazis

in World War II. To the Bush administration the Bosnian war was an opportunity for Europeans to demonstrate their ability to act independently of the United States, in the spirit of the Maastricht summit.

The allies failed to respond in an effective manner. The carnage in Bosnia escalated in 1992. Germany applied strict construction to the constitutional bars against military action outside the boundaries of NATO. The British and French preferred to regard the Bosnian conflict as a civil war in which neither side was blameless. Although recognizing the aggressive designs of the Serbian leaders, the European partners saw their primary role as helping the United Nations maintain a neutral presence, supporting innocent civilians to cope with damages inflicted by the warring parties. The Security Council denounced Serbian aggression and the UN secretary-general dispatched peacekeeping teams. The NATO allies hoped that the good offices of UN representative Cyrus Vance, joined by the EU representative, David Owen, could bring the belligerents to the peace table. The United Nations itself was not prepared in 1992 to conduct a war against the Serbs to enforce its resolutions.

Gradually and unwillingly the United States found itself drawn into the Balkan conflict. There was anger against Europeans who encouraged the breakup of Yugoslavia and then stood passively by as Milosevic's well-armed forces committed atrocities against the relatively defenseless Bosnian Muslims. These were reported in gory detail by the international press, and the hapless victims were visible on every television screen. The European approach through a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) proved powerless to protect civilians; its humanitarian objectives dwindled to an effort to protect just its humanitarian convoys.

As the war raged on, the new administration of President Bill Clinton, which had made a more active support of the Muslims a campaign pledge in the presidential race, looked for ways to increase American involvement without placing American lives at risk. The initial response was to employ U.S. planes under NATO auspices flying at high altitudes to drop food and supplies to starving Muslims. These air drops, however, were not only too

modest and too frequently wide of the mark, but they also sent the wrong signal to the Serbs. The actions suggested timidity rather than boldness.

When the United Nations in 1993 requested that NATO draw up a detailed plan for implementing a no-fly zone barring Serb aircraft over Bosnia, the United States believed it had a solution to stop Serb aggression without embroiling the nation in ground warfare. A collaboration between NATO and the United Nations would give the international organization the benefits of the infrastructure NATO had built over the decades and at the same time legitimize the new NATO mission of maintaining stability in Europe.

But would this synergy be realized? And if it were, would it be in time to preserve Bosnia from being absorbed into a Greater Serbia? In mid-1993, as NATO entered its forty-fifth year, there was no clear answer. France was uncomfortable with being part of a NATO force unless it was indisputably under UN command. Britain's lightly armed peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia was vulnerable to Serb retaliation. Outside the Security Council, Germany paid more attention to its growing internal problems than to the ongoing crisis it helped ignite. As long as there was uncertainty about German military forces participating in a conflict beyond NATO's borders, NATO capabilities would be severely strained. As for the senior NATO partner, the United States remained fearful of being pulled into a quagmire. If it had to contribute to a NATO force, it would only be after all the parties had agreed to a peaceful resolution of their differences.

It seemed that Europeans and Americans had not been so divided since the Suez debacle of 1956. Although Americans pointed to Europe's unwillingness to take charge of a matter in its own neighborhood, Europeans refused to accept lectures from a country that would not provide troops for the UN mission. At most, American pilots would patrol skies high above the fighting on the ground where vulnerable Europeans, not Americans, would suffer casualties. Reluctantly, the allies accepted in principle the use of airpower to enforce UN safe zones, but then did little to make the threat of armed intervention credible to the Serbs. The principle of consensus in NATO, that seemed workable if Article 5 of the North Atlantic

Treaty were involved, did not work as American authority dwindled and Europe failed to take up the leadership that the United States seemed to abdicate. Article 4 was too vague to bring cohesion to the alliance. Neither the Franco-led Eurocorps nor the British-led Rapid Reaction Force (both paper entities) was prepared to take action to stop the carnage in the Balkans.

Superficially, the problem in 1993 lay with the role of the United Nations, which the allies wished to use as a cover for their own inaction. The reason may be traced to the Gulf War, when the United Nations gave its sanction to the war against Saddam Hussein. The United Nations served NATO by blunting potential criticism with its blessing. Although the Gulf War was not a NATO operation, there were enough NATO allies engaged to offer that impression to the world at large.

But what worked in Iraq was a dismal failure in the Balkans. The allies' inability to act in harmony undermined NATO's self-proclaimed mission to preserve stability in Europe by managing its crises, although the United Nations once again provided a fig leaf for NATO action. The televised scenes of ethnic cleansing gnawed at the consciences of NATO allies and inspired UN Security Council Resolution 781 in December 1992 that banned all flights over Bosnia not approved by the United Nations. Although the allies vetoed U.S. recommendations to shoot down violators of the resolution, they did accept U.S. AWACS aircraft as monitors and did provide peacekeepers under UN auspices "for the first time" in NATO's history, as the NATO communique of December 1992 observed. There was no better example of the message from the Rome meeting in 1991 than the plight of Bosnia where the threat arose not from "calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities." NATO instead made a travesty of its mission by failing to implement its no-fly zones. The confused lines of communication between the United Nations and NATO inhibited decisive actions and encouraged Serbian aggression. The British and French were unwilling to jeopardize their peacekeeping forces in Bosnia by provoking Milosevic's forces. They appeared ambivalent as well about supporting the territorial integrity of Bosnia.

As the war intensified in 1993, the position of the new Clinton administration was in sharp contrast to that of the European partners. If they could have activated one or more of the European security organizations that had been projected in 1991 and 1992, it would have fitted the Clinton agenda in which domestic issues were its first priority. The allies not only resisted American pressures but articulated their own grievances against the senior partner for its unwillingness to station its own troops as part of the UN peacekeeping force. The most that the United States could extract from its allies was an agreement in March 1994 on a pact to create a Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia and, a month later, to establish a "Contact Group" that included the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Italy.

Actually, NATO had used U.S. airpower against Serb positions in Bosnia with apparent effect in February 1994 when international outrage over deaths from Serb artillery in a crowded Sarajevo marketplace temporarily united the allies. This strike was intentionally only a warning, and it succeeded in suspending Serb attacks for the moment. But when the Serb leadership recognized the extent of the disarray between the United Nations and NATO and between America and Europe, subsequent air strikes lost even symbolic value. The Bosnian Serbs rejected the "contact group's" division of the nation with impunity. Not even the putative influence of Milosevic or his Russian ally made a difference.

Despite the acrimonious transatlantic divide over the Balkans, the war was regional, not continental or global. There were countervailing forces against the American wish to stay aloof from the conflict and Europe's wish to maintain an exclusively humanitarian presence in Bosnia. There was room for compromise over the Bosnian tragedy without wholly abandoning the victims of that conflict. The United States refrained from a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo and Europeans moved toward enforcing access to protected zones under UN auspices. The Clinton administration offer in December 1994 to supply up to 25,000 troops to help extricate, if necessary, UN peacekeepers reflected an effort toward accommodation with its European partners that was not present earlier. And Britain's and France's intention to provide more effective lines of communication and supply to

their forces in Bosnia was an earnest of their new resolve. The election of Jacques Chirac as successor to President Francois Mitterand in May 1995 seemed to indicate more vigorous European activity, particularly after Bosnian Serbs humiliated France by holding French troops temporarily hostage. France pressed Britain and the Netherlands in June 1995 to invigorate the role of UNPROFOR.

This new sense of purpose notwithstanding, the fact remained that there was no "NATO method" to deal with Bosnia. The United Nations, which NATO had hoped would solve their problems, stood in the alliance's way. Although the United Nations had asked for more NATO help after the marketplace bombing in February 1994, the international organization imposed a "dual-key" requirement before military operations could take place. NATO's SACEUR held only one of the keys.

NATO's and the UN's stasis in the Balkans ended in the summer of 1995 but only after a brutal Serb attack against one of the UN-protected enclaves in Sre- brenica that led to a massacre of presumably protected civilians. Almost as horrifying to the West was the spectacle of Dutch UNPROFOR peacekeepers who witnessed the scene but were too lightly armed to intervene. Pressure to react with more than the spasm of activity that followed the marketplace killings in Sarajevo in February 1994 reached the breaking point when a Serb mortar attack on 30 August 1995 killed 38 people, again in a Sarajevo marketplace. This brought on massive NATO air strikes over a 22-day period that not only removed the heavy weapons from the heights overlooking the city, but also pushed the warring combatants to the negotiating table. The allies were aided by a vigorous Croat assault that resulted in their occupation of a large swath of Bosnian Serb territory. After the Serb siege of Sarajevo was broken, Milosevic saw no alternative for his country and his Bosnian Serb clients but to position himself as a peace broker at a conference in Dayton, Ohio, under U.S. auspices.

When the Dayton agreements were initiated in November 1995, the United Nations was conspicuous by its absence. Its limited contribution to peace efforts was an unarmed police force to monitor Bosnian police and, even in this limited sphere, NATO had to intervene. Yet the successful

campaign was more an American than a NATO accomplishment. Although the North Atlantic Council congratulated itself in its communique of 5 December, welcoming "the agreement initialed in Dayton for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," the Dayton agreements were largely the work of Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke, the chief U.S. negotiator in Bosnia. They were not a council action. The fact that the meeting of Croat, Muslim, and Serb leaders took place in a midwestern American city conveyed a message to the European allies.

The success of the Bosnian mission momentarily alleviated the friction between the United States and its allies. Britain and France were well represented in the operation, with 14,000 and 10,000 troops respectively, although American dominance was evidenced in the airpower it displayed. When the Implementation Force (IFOR) was established, Bosnia was divided into three sectors in which troops from the United States, Britain, and France would take responsibility for keeping order. NATO's informal involvement was not confined to the three major allies. A fourth leading member, Germany, whose constitutional restrictions and memories of a shameful past had hitherto limited its involvement in the Balkans, sent some 5,000 noncombat personnel to the NATO command, and later included combat troops in its mission. Smaller allies, such as Belgium and Spain, were also present, and Italy served as a major staging area for NATO-and U.S.-forces. Considerable credit for NATO's continuing commitment to peace in Bosnia belonged to SACEUR General Wesley K. Clark, who had been deeply involved in working out the Dayton agreements.

Such success as NATO had in keeping the lid on violence in Bosnia arguably has obscured the ability of the allies to collaborate under the SACEUR in a major military operation. "Operation Joint Endeavor," as IFOR was labeled in 1996, also benefited from many non-NATO countries that participated in the operation. They were members, however, of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program created at the Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council in January 1994. Eighteen nations, ranging from former members of the Warsaw Pact to current members of the Arab League, sent troops to serve under the NATO command. But the most

important contribution to the peacekeeping effort came from Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia, that nevertheless dispatched an airborne brigade to Bosnia. In deference to Russian pride, its brigade nominally had an autonomous status, but in reality was under NATO command in an American-administered sector.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE

Although the EU failed in a test of its ability to manage the Balkan crisis, the Brussels summit of 1994 did open the way not only for new partners but also for a division of labor between America and Europe in crisis management. This was the establishment of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). "Combined" meant that two or more military services would be involved, and "joint" meant that two or more NATO members would contribute to the task force. The very linking of such loaded terms as "combined" and "joint" evoked expectations that a meaningful solution had been found to resolve the conflicting interests of a uniting Europe and the United States. Even the term task force raised expectations; it implied a limited operation in the post-Cold War era, in which NATO's power could be carefully concentrated on contingencies of all kinds, inside or outside NATO boundaries.

The problem with the CJTF was how to activate it without also accentuating the differences between the European and American conceptions of the task force's assets. When the North Atlantic Council bestowed its blessings on the CJTF in 1994, it noted that the military capabilities of the WEU and NATO would be "separable but not separate" Although it was no trouble for the allies to declare that a task force would not be separate from the organization, translating "separable" into a meaningful form was more problematic. This issue during the Bosnian operation was theoretical. Although the tensions in the summer of 1995 should have been the occasion for Europeans to mount a CJTF, it was unable to act. The trouble at this point was not with its mechanics; the CJTF

offered a genuine means of fulfilling the European partners' aspiration to manage crises of greater concern to them than to the American partner. Rather, it was the lack of will on the part of European leaders that inhibited them in the Bosnian war.

The peacekeeping mission following the Dayton agreements was another occasion for Europeans to use the CJTE The United States, uncomfortable with its role in the IFOR, created to maintain the uneasy peace secured at Dayton, was anxious to leave most of the responsibility to the allies. IFOR was terminated in December 1996, to be replaced by a Stabilization Force (SFOR) with the American contingent reduced from 20,000 to 8,000. Still, this was more than the United States wanted. Why not use this opportunity to place the CJTF front and center, as the North Atlantic Council recommended in June of that year? The WEU could use NATO facilities to command an all-European force in an SFOR context. The development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to be transformed into a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was a by-product of the Brussels summit in 1994 and should have prospered in an environment in which Europe, not America, was the primary actor. But the European agencies failed once again to take up the challenge. There were too many questions about the composition of the CJTF that were not answered, most notably, which ally would command the force.

For France in particular, the existence of the CJTF was both an opportunity to exercise its influence and a symbol of European inferiority. On the one hand, it opened an opportunity for France to participate in and lead a European force separable but not separate from NATO without having to return to NATO's integrated command. On the other hand, the Bosnian experience displayed the inability of the Europeans to use the CJTE U.S. airpower under NATO command dominated the action against Serbia. Chirac's response to this impasse was to reprise a position France had taken in the Gulf War of 1991 supporting the American operation informally as a willing ally. France had participated in the denial of Bosnian air space to Serbian planes. It recognized that more intimate relations with NATO, and particularly with the United States, were necessary for influence in out-of-area problems as well as for potential access to the technology that

lay behind America's domination of the alliance. With Bosnian independence achieved, France and Britain would be major actors in the peacekeeping mission and presumably in a position to strengthen their authority in the alliance. To accelerate this process, France announced that it would return to NATO's international Military Staff in Brussels and participate in meetings of NATO defense ministers. It appeared that France in 1995 was on a path to rejoin SHAPE in Casteau in 1996.

France did not pursue this path, and its decision touched on the continuing problem of transatlantic relations. How much freedom European countries would have to use NATO assets without being subjected to NATO control was the nub of the issue. The United States was more than willing to have Europeans fulfill their ESDI aspirations without American involvement as long as it was understood that the WEU or the EU directly would be responsible to the SACEUR. The Americans also understood that their facilities-from sophisticated communications to airlift providers-would revert to NATO once the particular operation was terminated.

This was not the French interpretation of the CJTF. For them, and other Europeans, the ESDI would function with NATO resources but not with NATO supervision. The argument turned not just on their ability to function freely but also on their need to free themselves from dependence on the United States. France as Europe's leader in this search found solutions in either elevating a European to the position of SACEUR or, if this was not acceptable, replacing the American commander of Allied Forces, South (AFSouth) in Naples with a European. The United States refused to accept either of these propositions. The senior partner was no more willing to cede overall command in Europe in 1996 than it had been willing to have a British admiral as SACLANT in 1951. The consequence was the termination of what seemed to have been progressive steps in France's full reintegration into NATO's military structure.

By the time of the Madrid summit in 1997, when NATO agreed to enlarge its membership by the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, the French government suspected that American pressure for enlargement was not just the result of politicians wooing ethnic lobbies in

the United States or of liberals seeking to erase the stain of the Yalta concessions to the Soviets in 1945 by bringing former Warsaw Pact countries into the Western fold. Some Europeans sensed an American plot to subvert European military autonomy by conferring membership on countries presumably more subservient, or at least more receptive, to American wishes. Resentment over America's seeming disregard for European sensibilities helps explain France's futile championship of Romania's candidacy for membership at the Madrid meeting.

NATO, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE KOSOVO CRISIS

The blocking of European plans for the CJTF and the tilting of NATO's composition with the adherence of pro-American East Europeans stimulated France to seek new approaches to free Europe from American control. One avenue was to formalize what had been in the works for much of the decade, the incorporation of the WEU as the military arm of the EU. As long as Britain under Prime Minister Tony Blair continued to oppose Franco-German efforts to create a European defense entity that could duplicate NATO's, the EU's military progress was limited. Britain, the key American ally in Europe, was wary about undermining NATO's authority.

The expanding turmoil in the Balkans, however, was a major factor in affecting Britain's disposition toward the continental allies. It underscored the dilemma facing Europeans by the continuing reluctance of America to commit ground troops when Europe itself was not equipped to fulfill that mission. Without signaling any intention of weakening the special Anglo-American relationship, Blair took the initiative in 1998 to bring British military power into the European Union, thereby giving substance to European assertions of autonomy. Given Britain's unwillingness to participate in the monetary union that was to be consummated in 2000, involving the nation more closely in defense of the EU would be proof of its affiliation with a united Europe. Blair envisioned Britain as a bridge between Europe and America.

This was not an original idea. Britain in the past had often considered itself as a transatlantic interpreter, with the expectation that its special relations with both America and Europe would enhance its own authority in NATO. Only rarely were its expectations met. But in 1998 France appreciated the new British attitude. It opened an opportunity to breathe life into the ESDI at a time when Serbia was abusing the Albanian population in its Kosovo province. At St. Maio in December of that year Britain and France spoke to the common defense of Europe, and advanced the prospect of the WEU becoming the official arm of the EU, an outcome made final in November 2000. The Franco-British joint summit was intended to implement Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy by granting to the EU, in the words of the communique, "the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises." The other European allies welcomed the St. Maio declaration as much for its psychic value as for the actual changes it would make in the defense capabilities of the European Union.

U.S. reaction was less welcoming. Inevitably, questions would arise in Washington over what effect an energized European defense force would have on NATO, particularly after the EU had won the allegiance of Britain with its nuclear arms and its experience in out-of-area operations. At the very least the merger of the WEU with the EU could lead to duplication of resources, of commands, and of functions. The end product of a competitive European military force could be the decoupling of America from its transatlantic allies. In brief, if Europeans persisted in demanding NATO assets without NATO provenance, the United States, which controlled the resources the WEU needed, could withdraw from the alliance.

This was a scenario that no member wanted, including France. No European partner was prepared to supply the funds needed to make their ESDI truly independent of the United States. But despite their reluctance or inability to match NATO's capabilities, the European allies had been carrying the manpower burden of peacekeeping in Bosnia while the size of the American contingent was being drastically reduced. If there were to be future actions against Milosevic, Europeans would provide the force on the

ground while Americans once again would supply airpower. Under these circumstances resulting casualties would be largely European.

Just as Bosnia offered a challenge that Serbia's European neighbors could not meet, so the Kosovo province of Serbia offered a second challenge-and encountered the same frustrations. Milosevic may have lost in Bosnia and Croatia, but he was determined to suppress the Kosovar Albanians' aspirations for autonomy, if not independence, from Serbia. In light of Serbia's historic roots in Kosovo, it was not surprising that the Serbian dictator would try to compensate his losses by ensuring control of the Kosovo province at any cost. Revolt had been brewing there since its autonomous status had been revoked in 1989 and, by 1998, had produced the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) with its objective of winning full freedom from Serbian rule. The scene replicated some of the horrors inflicted on Bosnia six years before as 250,000 refugees fled into Albania and Macedonia.

Once again the NATO allies and the European Union tried to stop the carnage, and once again they turned to the United Nations for moral if not physical support. Neither an arms embargo nor a call for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo impressed Milosevic. Nevertheless, the European allies had a stake in resolving this crisis that was more compelling than in 1992. They had thousands of troops on the ground in neighboring Bosnia who would be vulnerable to Serbian retaliation in the event of a war over Kosovo. Transatlantic divisions inevitably would be more acute if the United States confined its role to airpower.

Given Serbia's repeated violations of an agreement Ambassador Holbrooke had made with Milosevic for partial withdrawal of Serbian troops, it appeared likely in the winter of 1999 that NATO might have to apply force. Unlike military actions in Iraq and Bosnia, the war against Serbia that began on 24 March 1999 was exclusively a NATO affair, justified under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Its command center was in Casteau under SACEUR General Wesley K. Clark.

NATO's last-minute efforts in March 1999 at Rambouillet to reach a binding settlement between the Serbs and the KLA ended without a signed agreement. Milosevic was bent on continuing his ethnic cleansing, and an increasing number of Albanians were demanding a referendum on independence. Assured of a Russian veto in the UN Security Council and confident of his ability to manipulate uneasy allies, Milosevic resisted granting NATO forces access to all of Yugoslavia. He assumed that no ground troops would be engaged in any action against Serbia.

He was partly right. The allies initially ruled out a ground campaign. The United States was convinced that an air campaign would bring Milsosevic down in less than a week. This was also the fervent hope of the North Atlantic Council. They were mistaken. Instead of surrendering, Milosevic accelerated his ethnic cleansing, dispatching more troops across the border and terrorizing more Kosovar Albanians into flight. He was counting on conflicts within the NATO establishment and the diplomatic support of Russia to survive the assault. He expected to wait out the air attacks until the allies lost their nerve. With NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit just four weeks away, the Serbs appeared to conclude that they could win merely by standing still.

General Clark recognized the possibility of such an outcome as he observed that airpower by itself was no guarantee of success. But whether bombing Yugoslavia was the right strategy or not, the allies feared that failure to act in light of NATO's repeated threats would have destroyed the alliance's credibility. The nightly television images of Albanian refugees driven out of Kosovo made it impossible for NATO to back away from its objective, despite misjudgments about Milsosevic's staying power. The outcome was a 78-day war that found the SACEUR in the middle of conflicts with both his masters in the Pentagon and the civilian leaders in the North Atlantic Council. Clark was caught between the U.S. wish to intensify air strikes in and around Belgrade and the European anxiety to limit the strikes to Serb forces attacking ethnic Albanians. The war uncovered all the weaknesses implicit in decisions made by committee but with responsibilities laid on the shoulders of a single commander. General Clark could not carry out his mission without submitting his plans to two

superior entities-the Department of Defense in Washington, represented by the secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the member nations of the alliance in the North Atlantic Council.

From the outset, the SACEUR recognized the importance of ground forces, or at least the threat of deploying ground troops, to complement airpower. But both President Clinton and Secretary-General Javier Solana had made it clear that the campaign was to be conducted solely by air. Clark did request Army Apache attack helicopters to hunt down Serb forces inside Kosovo. Although he never won approval for the deployment of ground forces, he had the support of Britain to send a signal that a ground invasion might develop. It was likely that the perceived likelihood of an eventual ground operation, combined with the aggressiveness of the Kosovo Liberation Army as well as the diplomatic pressure from Russia, persuaded Milosevic to lay down his arms. This does not mean that airpower had failed; the belated assaults on the vital centers of Belgrade aided in the final outcome.

THE IMPACT OF THE KOSOVO WAR

The lesson in this conflict derived from the command-and-control failure caused by decisions made not by military leaders in Casteau but by a NATO body in Brussels-and, for different reasons-by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. A war by committee could be a disaster. Every member nation had reasons to avoid the kind of action that might have won the war in March as early as the optimists had predicted. The Clinton administration's initial adamancy about ground war had its origins in the political repercussions that would follow from soldiers returning home in body bags. But they might have moved earlier to the British position had not the European allies been so opposed to an invasion. Greece would have faced strong domestic protest if troops and equipment were dispatched to Kosovo through the port of Thessaloniki. More than 90 percent of the country even opposed an air campaign, with the Greek Orthodox Church a major element in generating opposition. German support was also tenuous,

with the Green Party in the governing coalition bitterly divided over the air campaign. The possibility of German troops being dispatched to the Balkans once again evoked ugly memories of their role in World War II. A NATO ground operation might have toppled the coalition.

As the war continued without apparent success, France and Canada spoke of reviving diplomacy while Italy raised the prospect of a bombing moratorium as an incentive for Milosevic to abandon his Kosovo policies. In May, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder threatened to exercise Germany's veto in the North Atlantic Council to block a ground war in Kosovo.

The ending of the war in June sidelined this particular problem but transatlantic collaboration in the air war had revealed new fault lines between the United States and its European allies. The trouble did not arise from lack of European involvement. Every one of the 19 member nations officially supported "Operation Allied Force," opening where applicable their air space and offering bases for the allied air forces. A Rand study of European contributions to the Kosovo campaign observed that 13 countries provided military aircraft, with Britain and France using precision-guided weapons as well. Germany's stance on ground forces notwithstanding, the German air force flew over 600 sorties in the effort to suppress enemy air defenses, employing reconnaissance drones for intelligence tasks. Although Italy was the third largest contributor to the NATO operation, its most valuable support was its air bases.

This exercise in coalition warfare might have been an example of NATO collaboration at its best. Instead, the war exposed fissures in the transatlantic relationship that had been evident in the Gulf and Bosnian crises but without the traumatic effect its revelation had in the Kosovo war. Just how far ahead of its European allies the United States was in military research and development, in advanced weaponry and intelligence-gathering systems, became painfully obvious in 1999. Since the end of the Cold War, European governments had slashed their defense budgets, and had been reluctant to transform standing armies into more flexible units designed to handle such situations as Kosovo presented. They turned down opportunities to buy at bargain prices the U.S. air-to-ground surveillance

system. Disputes over cost sharing aborted France's and Germany's plans to build a satellite reconnaissance system and heavy-lift air transport planes that would have given them some measure of equality with the United States military.

That the United States dominated the air war was undeniable; it deployed most of the aircraft, flew most of the missions, and provided the bulk of the airlift capabilities. Small wonder that the disproportionate presence of America in the Balkans bred resentment among the partners. American unwillingness to share sensitive information exacerbated their sense of grievance. Targeting data and battle-damage assessments were denied to the allies for fear that such information would be quickly leaked. With some justice, the French could complain that France was not the only ally that did not subordinate its military to the integrated command.

Although there was no clear-cut demonstration of European discontent over its inferior position in the Kosovo war, the Allied Occupation Force in Kosovo (KFOR) did provide an occasion for an outburst against American military leadership that was usually sublimated in other forums. British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, commander of the Allied Command Rapid Reaction Corps in the immediate aftermath of the war, openly defied the SACEUR's attempt to prevent the Russians (who had agreed to serve in an American sector of Kosovo) from occupying the Pristina airfield without authorization. He was not going to risk a conflict with Russia, whatever American instructions might require. This was a small European victory but, like the contributions of Europeans to KFOR, Jackson's stand represented Europe's push for independence from U.S. control.

The experience in Kosovo had political implications as well. The European Union meeting in Cologne in early June shortly before the end of the Kosovo campaign reaffirmed in stronger language than used earlier its determination to achieve the capacity for autonomous action, although "without prejudice to actions by NATO" To underscore the seriousness of its intentions, the EU formally announced that it would not only absorb the functions of the WEU, but would also create a new office, the High

Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy under the leadership of Javier Solana, the retiring secretary-general of NATO. Solana's appointment, to take effect in October 1999, symbolized the EU's concrete steps toward autonomy while maintaining its links to NATO. By December the EU announced plans to create a European rapid-reaction force of 50,000 to 60,000 troops, to be deployed within 60 days of a crisis. When mobilized, this new force would be able to conduct operations that hitherto had been dependent on U.S. support. Such was the impact of the Kosovo War on the European allies.

This 6-month whirlwind of EU activities met with considerable skepticism in the United States. It raised the familiar question of duplication. What was NATO, and especially its senior partner, to make of these new obligations the EU was undertaking? When both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate expressed alarm in November at the direction the EU was following, the Europeans meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 made an effort to defuse the tensions by reaffirming the centrality of NATO, and assuring Americans that the new rapid-reaction force would be used only in situations in which NATO chose not to be involved.

Credibility of the EU plans was still at stake at the end of the decade. Historian Charles Cogan has identified three options for out-of-area operations as they were presented by France's defense minister at Georgetown University in February 2000. The first has been the pattern in Bosnia and Kosovo when NATO, primarily with American assets, led the way. The second would be an EU initiative wherein NATO assets would be borrowed, subject to some NATO monitoring, under the direction of the European Deputy SACEUR in his role as a SHAPE official. Although this arrangement might create awkward situations in which the gray areas between NATO and EU responsibilities may generate mutual irritation, it did meet the U.S. conception of the ESDI in action. But a third option, inspired by France, assumed that NATO would remove itself from the scene in favor of a European chain of command employing only European resources. Granted that this was a theoretical situation, it did disturb British and German allies. One direction it could logically take was a European

action in conflict with U.S. objectives, a direction that could lead to the dissolution of the alliance. This was not the scenario France envisioned. Rather, the third option would be the logical outcome of Europe assuming responsibilities commensurate with its potential political and economic power. The United States and France at last would be equal partners.

In one sense, an air of unreality pervaded the notion of an effective European rapid deployment of substantial numbers of troops drawn from the EU members. Despite all the pronouncements emerging from EU summits in 1999 and 2000, no serious efforts had been made to evaluate the cost emanating from a defense buildup. The record in 2000 showed that defense expenditures by European NATO countries continued to decline-by 6.7 percent between 1999 and 2000. Was there any evidence of a turnaround in defense spending? On research and development alone, European spending remained about one-quarter of that spent by the United States and the gap appeared likely to increase in the future unless a drastic change took place in EU priorities.

Still another problem should be noted, which the European allies have not addressed except in the most superficial terms. Who would lead the new European force? The only answer to date was the Deputy SACEUR, always a European in the history of SHAPE. But if this officer functioned outside the NATO framework, or even within it under a different hat, would there be dissention within European ranks over the nationality of this commander? The only time Europeans had to face this question was in 1948 when the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO), created under the Brussels Pact, established a host of military committees. These were earnests of their commitment to self-defense, demonstrating to the United States when the North Atlantic Treaty was being framed that the future European allies could cooperate in military as well as economic matters. Some of these committees were later integrated into NATO, but one committee was never adopted by NATO. This was the Commander-in-Chiefs Committee that presumably would manage any military operation. There was no single commander because both the British and French generals wanted the command. Lord Montgomery won the contest with General de Lame de Tassigny, but the name of the committee on which they

sat suggests problems that would arise if WUDO had to be tested. Would a similar contest over which national would lead the force be in store for the EU?

These questions have not been answered. When one delegate to a Paris conference in June 2001, celebrating the new ties between the WEU and the EU, raised these questions, he was greeted with an embarrassed silence. On the European side, optimism for the moment overwhelmed experience. Because the Deputy SACEUR was invariably a European, presumably he would take command of an EU force. On the American side there was both doubt about the ability of Europeans to achieve a third option and a resentment over their interest in doing so.

Despite all the tensions displayed in allied actions in the Balkans, the post-military operations have been the scene of genuine sharing of responsibilities. America's daunting superiority in weaponry, particularly in the air, was not sufficient to manage affairs on the ground after hostilities ended. Here Europeans had a preponderance of troops, both in the Bosnian SFOR and the Kosovo KFOR. There was mutual dependence in every Balkan peacekeeping situation that belied the transatlantic split. More than NATO personnel were involved; the United Nations authorized its own mission to facilitate the return of Kosovo refugees, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) succeeding CSCE, participated in the training of judges and police officers. A year after the Kosovo War began, Eurocorps under the command of a Spanish general took charge of KFOR, even as KFOR itself reported to SACEUR, and through him to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. De facto cooperation between the EU and NATO on the ground did not preclude differences among the allies but they were managed under conditions of relative equality, unlike relations between Washington and Brussels, or Washington and Paris.

As NATO entered the new millennium, the transatlantic relationship could be considered in terms of plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose (the more things changes, the more they stay the same). Almost from the inception of the alliance, Europeans have sought to get out from under American domination and chafed at their inability to free themselves. The

Soviet menace was a unifying factor for the first 40 years but their subsequent unwillingness to come to grips with the costs of a viable European defense system helps to explain a continuing dependence on U.S. military power. That the 1990s witnessed the creation of the EU and a common currency in the euro may be an earnest of a future in which the dormant strength of a united Europe would establish a genuine second pillar of NATO-or make NATO itself irrelevant. Until that time, it seemed in 2000 that America's presence as a European power continued to be a necessary engine for the management of out-of-area crises.

7

INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM

NATO in 2000

The new millennium more accurately should be identified with the year 2001 than 2000, but from a NATO perspective, particularly in transatlantic relations, the year did not matter much. On both sides of the Atlantic familiar complaints were heard. Europeans were resentful over American unwillingness to maintain their troops on the ground in Bosnia, Kosovo, and in neighboring Macedonia. Of the 65,000 military personnel in the Balkans, only 11,400 were from the United States; in Kosovo only 5,900 out of 37,000. The allies were providing peacekeepers not only through NATO but through their contributions in the OSCE and the United Nations. They received little credit from the senior partner.

On the contrary, the politics of an American presidential election year inevitably exacerbated relations as both parties exerted themselves to chastise the European allies for continuing to exploit American generosity. The Senate had some difficulty in May 2000 striking down legislation that would have imposed a deadline for the departure of all U.S. forces in Kosovo. Congressmen in the House of Representatives in the spirit of the Mansfield resolutions pressed for reductions of troops unless the allies assumed a greater share of the burden. In October 2000, the Republican presidential candidate, George W. Bush, recommended the complete removal of U.S. forces from the Balkans. The general tenor of his campaign embodied a criticism of the overactive foreign policy of President Clinton

and suggested a retreat to a more modest view of America's role in the world.

The former governor of Texas had little experience with Europe and even less interest in remedying this condition. His first foreign visits as president were to Mexico and Canada, two American neighbors he seemed to value more highly than he did the European allies. His first visit to Europe was not until June 2001, when he had an opportunity to evaluate relations with Britain and France. These visits were not successes. The Bush administration had sent signals that were bound to antagonize the allies. At a time when concerns about global warming had aroused most nations, the United States chose to refrain from endorsing the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, which Bush's predecessor had accepted. Europeans found the grounds for rejection to be specious, namely, that there was insufficient evidence that global warming was a threat to the planet. Moreover, the administration objected to the absence of restraints on pollution emitted by developing nations.

If this had been an isolated act, it would have agitated the allies, but when combined with a unilateral approach to other multinational programs, the transatlantic partners grew alarmed at the behavior of the United States. American opposition in 2002 to the European-backed International Criminal Court was symptomatic of the Bush approach. Although the court was designed to serve as a forum to try individuals charged with genocide and crimes against humanity, the United States saw it as a vehicle to single out Americans vulnerable to politically motivated prosecutions. It was not that a fear of neo-isolationism animated the allies; America was not going to withdraw into its shell. On the contrary, the superpower had military resources that not even the combined forces of the world could match, and appeared to feel that NATO was essentially irrelevant. The Bush presidency was not to be bound by its ties to the allies.

It is likely that no matter how amenable the United States might have been to European interests in the first nine months of the Bush administration, the impulse for European unity, with the United States as the implicit adversary, would have progressed under its own steam.

ARTICLE 5 AND THE DEFENSE OF AMERICA

The terrorist assault on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 transformed the transatlantic relationship overnight, with an afterglow that lasted through the fall of that year. NATO's rally to the defense of its senior partner under the rubric of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty appeared to revitalize the North Atlantic Treaty and give it a relevance it had lacked before. For the first time in its long history, the member nations had invoked the mantra that an attack against one was an attack against all, and the nation so attacked was not a vulnerable European ally, but the superpower itself.

There are two ironies in NATO's response that should be noted: first, the reversal of the initial purpose of the treaty in 1949, which was the protection of defenseless western Europe by the powerful United States; and second, the purposely elliptical language of Article 5, designed by American policymakers to allow the United States to choose its own terms of engagement if a member nation were attacked. The escape mechanisms built into the article could have been exploited by Europeans to water down their support of the embattled transatlantic partner. They were not used.

The immediate reactions of both NATO and the European Union were instantaneous and supportive, reflecting the emotions of their constituent peoples. One day after the attacks, the North Atlantic Council responded to Secretary of State Colin Powell's assertion that the terrorists' actions were nothing less than a declaration of war against democracy by formally setting Article 5 in motion. The European Union, so frequently at odds with the United States, was equally strong in its professions of readiness to assist with every means at its disposal. NATO's former Secretary-General Javier Solana, now the EU foreign policy chief, pointed out that terrorism, which had afflicted European nations as internal problems (witness the Basques in Spain, the Red Brigade in Italy, the IRA in Britain), was now an international problem and a grave threat to NATO.

These sentiments were repeated by every ally, but none was more vocal than Britain Prime Minister Tony Blair. When Afghanistan was targeted as the headquarters of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda, Blair was even more insistent than President Bush in demanding full-scale war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Britain was not alone in its verbal support. Canada, Germany, and France also pledged forces for the operation against Afghanistan.

To implement Article 5, NATO allies took such steps as intelligence sharing, increased security of U.S. facilities on their territories, overnight clearances of U.S. and allied aircraft, and access for the United States to ports and airfields in all member nations for operations against terrorism. Impressive as these offers were, they were dwarfed by specific actions that matched their words. The most spectacular was NATO's dispatch of five AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) to patrol the eastern coastline of the United States. NATO's AWACS force, based in Geilenkirchen, Germany, was NATO's only multinational aviation unit, and was composed of airmen from 12 member nations, including the United States. They were intended to replace the U.S. AWACS fleet now required for service in the war zones of Afghanistan and for patrols over Iraq. Whether this gesture was a necessary part of the common war effort was immaterial. Europe's deployment of planes to American shores may be considered the equivalent to the psychological stimulus of the stationing of American troops in Europe in the early days of the Cold War. It contained both symbol and substance.

THE LIMITS OF CONSENSUS

The wave of good feeling toward America based on the empathy that Europe extended to a shocked nation inevitably subsided. There would have been softening, if not abandonment, of solidarity in the war against terrorism if the military campaign against the Taliban in the fall of 2001 had bogged down or if civilian casualties had reached an intolerable level. The definition of "intolerable" would vary, of course, from country to country

and from party to party. The Green parties of Europe began to express their reservations about military action almost as soon as the American assault against al Qaeda bases began in November 2001. Less than a week after the destruction of the World Trade Center towers and only a few days after Le Monde declared that "We are all Americans" now, France's premier Lionel Jospin cautioned that his country would not automatically support the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. president increased European uneasiness in December when he sought greater defense expenditures from the allies as well as a promise of support if the war against terrorism should spread to other rogue nations.

Ironically, however, it was the American rejection of European military involvement in the Afghanistan campaign that annoyed Europeans at the same time that American leaders were pressing for the allies' help. The issue devolved on the command and control of the military operation. One advantage of the loose construction of Article 5 that the United States had imposed on its allies in 1949 was the freedom of the members to interpret according to their own judgments. Some members would be more active than others in executing their roles under Article 5. To energize public opinion in their countries, French and German officials offered to do more than the ancillary provision of intelligence information and rooting out of terrorist cells; they were ready to send military forces to join with the United States in combat against the Taliban.

This offer met mixed reactions in the United States, which served to exacerbate tensions. While invigorating the NATO partnership was heartening on one level, on another, the European offers appeared to be a devious way for them to exercise leverage over military operations in Afghanistan. Granted, military cooperation could mobilize European public opinion in favor of the war, an outcome welcome to the U.S. military. Less welcome were memories of command and control problems with alliance partners in previous crises. NATO's war over Kosovo less than three years before had witnessed the confusion that usually characterizes divided authority. The United States feared that anything more than a token contribution from the European allies would lead to interference with the American conduct of the war.

The campaign against al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts was run from MacDill Air Force base in Tampa, Florida, without reference to SHAPE or to the civilian authorities in Brussels. General Tommy Franks, operating out of the Central Com mand in Florida, controlled the air war. There were problems coordinating actions with CIA operatives on the scene in Afghanistan as well as differences between Franks and the Pentagon. But the rifts that developed after air operations began were not as debilitating as those the SACEUR had endured in Kosovo in 1999. The successes of the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces in taking control of most of the country in the first two weeks of November were due in large measure to a successful command-and-control arrangement overseen by the U.S. Central Command thousands of miles from the scene.

American reservations about allied involvement were understandable, particularly because much of the assistance given was seen as cosmetic. Even the touted British partnership, activated on the day after the attacks against New York and Washington, amounted to little more than a firing of a few missiles. Would French or German forces have made a positive difference in the outcome of the war? It was obvious to Europeans and Americans alike that there was little they could add to the firepower, intelligence gathering, and communications network that the United States had brought to bear in support of the Northern Alliance forces and those of the Pashtun opponents of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.

EUROPE'S CONTRIBUTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

If the United States held reservations about the interposition of unnecessary allied assets, the Europeans themselves were conflicted over their position on the war. Germany underwent a major debate over the dispatch of some 3,900 troops to Afghanistan. It turned on the symbolic importance of German soldiers engaging in combat for the first time since World War II, and almost undid the uneasy alliance between Social Democrats and the Green Party in the Bundestag.

The opposition to the war in the German peace camp was shared in varying degrees by all the major allies. Their governments recognized limitations placed by public opinion. At a time when Italy's Silvio Berlusconi was offering 2,700 service personnel as well as an aircraft carrier to ensure an Italian military presence in the war against terrorism, more than 240 sports figures-from racing car drivers to football players-signed a petition on 7 November asking for a halt to the bombing and aid to civilian victims. There was also an assumption among the European publics, more cautiously expressed by their leaders, that the American war, with its collateral damage, would lead to a dangerous alienation of the Muslim world. Moreover, there was a question of how far afield the war on terrorism would carry NATO. If it encompassed Iraq and Syria, it could not only stretch resources excessively, but also harm economic interests in the Middle East.

These caveats notwithstanding, the European allies stood behind the United States in the Afghanistan campaign, and the United States in turn accepted allied aid in the region. Europeans wanted to have a voice in the conduct of the ongoing war on terrorism, while the Americans wished to avoid a sense of isolation in conducting the assault against the Taliban. The differences, for the moment, were reconcilable as 2001 came to a close.

The problems confronting the European-American relationship, particularly the ability of the EU to maintain a military establishment independent of the U.S.- dominated NATO remained unsolved; the anticipated 60,000-strong EU Rapid Reaction Force was no closer to realization in December 2001 than it had been prior to 9/11, and for the same reason that had plagued the European military in the past: the lack of funds. In October 2001, less than three months before the euro was to become the concrete symbol of European unity, the allies remained unwilling to reduce their expensive social security systems in favor of enlarged defense budgets. George Robertson, NATO's secretary-general, observed that the United States was proposing to spend $328.9 billion on defense in 2002, while France was projecting $35.5 billion, Britain $34.9 billion, and Germany $21.7 billion for the same period. These figures help

explain why the war against al Qaeda in the fall of 2001 was essentially an American war.

Distressing as these figures were to European defense ministers, their implications were not necessarily harmful to the survival of the Atlantic alliance. No matter how annoying the lagging European defense efforts were to the Bush administration and no matter how dismissive the U.S. military establishment was of European capabilities as active partners, the allies had roles to play in the mobilization against international terrorism, and even in the specific arena of Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the strident unilateralism that had marked the Bush administration on such issues as global warming was considerably subdued.

American misgivings about European interference in the conduct of the war were misplaced. Although their contributions were too modest to permit the North Atlantic Council the authority it was able to exercise in the Kosovo campaign, the allies filled gaps in equipment and personnel that Americans appreciated. The support they extended to the United States in the wake of the first American missile attacks against the Taliban on 4 November was consistent with the earlier dispatch of NATO AWACS to patrol the Atlantic coast. Germany's 3,900 personnel were designed to serve carefully targeted needs in response to American requests. These included some 250 troops to evacuate wounded, 500 more for air and materiel transport, and up to 800 soldiers to operate specially equipped armored vehicles capable of checking terrain for nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination.

Central Europeans, as new members of NATO, displayed a special readiness to provide immediate help to the U.S. war effort. Poland offered an elite command unit, and the Czech Republic an anti-chemical weapons component that had detected traces of nerve gas in the Saudi desert during the Gulf War. Not surprisingly, the more recent NATO allies felt a responsibility to show their fidelity to the nation that had championed their admission to the alliance so vigorously. Unlike some of the older allies, they did not attach conditions to their aid, and conspicuously refrained from interfering in the U.S. management of the campaign.

These modest additions to the U.S. arsenal in Afghanistan would fit comfortably into a vision of NATO projected by planners in the Pentagon under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. It evoked a pattern of behavior as old as the treaty itself. Under the first strategic concept promulgated in January 1950, the United States would supply the strategic airpower while the European members would provide ground forces, a lesser role. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson underscored the inferior position of the smaller allies two months later at an early meeting of the Defense Committee when he proposed the merger of the Dutch navy with the British navy. Secretary of State Colin Powell seemingly envisioned a different role for the European allies, an approach that would confer more equality among those nations engaged in a common struggle against terrorism and threats of mass destruction.

IMPACT OF BUSH'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, 2002

Transatlantic frictions were fired up once again early in 2002 when the president seemingly followed the Pentagon line in his State of the Union address. Its focus was not on shared NATO responsibilities for the war against al Qaeda or on appreciation for allied contributions to peacekeeping in the Balkans, or on their collaboration in building a post-Taliban Afghanistan. There was little recognition that the European allies provided 85 percent of NATO forces in the Balkans and approximately half the personnel in Afghanistan. Rather, the speech appeared to revive a unilateral approach to the world based on a superpower's prerogative that had been soft-pedaled in the course of the campaign against the Taliban.

The president's language was harsh as he spoke of an "axis of evil" that embraced Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. These rogue nations with their potential for mass destruction did not exactly remove at Qaeda from the list of enemies but it did reduce both its visibility and putatively its threat to the United States and its allies. The shift in the nation's objectives may have

been more apparent than real. Rumsfeld's Pentagon had targeted Iraq ever since 11 September 2001, and had assumed that close links existed between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden's network. But the tone of the president's language suggested that this was an American action that Europe should support whether or not it was consulted.

Frictions between America and Europe worsened in 2002 as resentment against American unilateralism, identified as the arrogance of a superpower, manifested itself in the form of rising anti-Americanism throughout western Europe. Some of the conflicts were familiar and inevitable, particularly in the economic sphere. Special interests in the United States provided the incentive to set up new barriers to protect America's steel industry, which had its counterpart in the agricultural policy of the EU. But there was an edge to the economic rivalry that was less apparent in the past. The decision of the EU to exclude genetically engineered food products imported from the United States was more than a measure to protect the health of Europe's citizens; it was a declaration of Europe's independence and a promise of future economic power that would successfully challenge America's past supremacy. One French analyst speculated that decline of the American empire would come from its future loss of economic hegemony despite its dominant military power. This assumption of a united Europe, with both population and resources superior to those of the United States, aroused American anxiety once again over having created a Frankenstein monster through long-standing encouragement of European unity.

But Europe's concern at this time was deeper than America's, as it witnessed the Bush administration reverting to the unilateral behavior exemplified in 2001 by rejection of the Kyoto approach to global warming. The United States seemed now to go out of its way to provoke the allies-as well as its former adversary, Russia-by pressing ahead with ballistic missile defense (formerly the Strategic Defense Initiative). To revive what many on both sides of the Atlantic regarded as a futile attempt to insulate America from a ballistic nuclear attack, the Pentagon emphasized the dangers from rogue regimes, such as North Korea, rather than fear of revival of a threat from a revanchist Russia, but Russia was a central figure in the U.S. effort, by virtue of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. U.S. officials asserted

that the 30-year-old treaty, which had imposed severe limitations on missile defense installations, had lost its meaning with the end of the Cold War, and that it should be scrapped. If the administration's plans for Star Wars redivivus could materialize, the treaty would have to be voided. Although the new comity between East and West should have made this change a matter of course, it evoked protests among the allies and the Russians over the abandonment of one of the pillars of nuclear stability. The United States was moving ahead, irrespective of European objections.

Arguably, the American position on the International Criminal Court, the pride of the European Union, was even more irritating to Europeans than the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty obligations. The court was intended to deal with individuals charged with genocide or crimes against humanity. Crimes in the Balkans and Rwanda understandably aroused Europeans and Americans alike to seek new means to deter future Milosevics. But the United States was adamant in its refusal to have its nationals subject to the authority of this court. The Bush administration's opposition was based on the fear that Americans could be singled out unfairly in politically motivated prosecutions. The global presence of representatives of the superpower would provide an easy target for governments hostile to the United States. The administration consequently has asked for and received waiver agreements from a number of allied nations that would exempt Americans from the jurisdiction of the new court. This pressure in turn has antagonized the European Union, whose foreign ministers in August 2002 attempted to keep its members from signing any agreement that would allow an American exemption. To the EU, the American stance smacked of an imperial behavior that seemed to characterize the attitude of the Bush administration, while the administration berated the EU for its insensitivity to the problems of the superpower.

THE IRAQ QUANDARY

The most prominent transatlantic rift in the early twenty-first century has been over how NATO should deal with Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Throughout 2002, the Bush administration, led by its Pentagon planners, had linked Saddam Hussein with the terrorist network of al Qaeda. Although proof of a clear link has not been clearly made, Iraq fitted the image of a rogue nation, part of the "axis of evil," justifying the doctrine of "preemption" which also surfaced in 2002. The United States and its allies should strike down terrorists before they could strike, as the Islamic fanatics did on 9/11, and as Saddam Hussein may be preparing to do with biological and chemical as well as nuclear weapons.

The shifting emphasis from al Qaeda to Iraq in the war on terrorism opened a schism in the alliance that worsened when the United States prepared for war with a coalition of the willing, or alone if necessary. Perhaps the unilateral stance was even preferable to some officials on the assumption that a Europe unwilling to raise its defense budgets would only be a drag on the American effort. The superpower could take on the Iraqi dictator on its own. Weaker than it had been at the time of the Gulf War, Iraq was an easier and more manageable target than the elusive al Qaeda. Skeptical Europeans-along with some skeptical Americans-deprecated the Bush administration's rush toward war on a variety of grounds. Was the United States acting to gain control of Iraqi oil, or to complete what Bush pere failed to do in 1991, or to display a presidential leadership that would ensure Republican victory in the 2002 elections, or to divert American-and the world'sattention from the failure to rout the al Qaeda network? Or was it a display of a superpower's ability to go its own way and expect its allies to follow?

European allies, aided by elements of the Bush administration, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, tempered the president's drive for immediate and unilateral action, if not his intemperate language, to work through the United Nations, even as he and the administration's hawks continued to say that they would not be bound by UN decisions. That Saddam Hussein was a persistent threat to stability in the Middle East was no more in question than his violation of UN resolutions since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. The allies recognized this challenge by an ultimatum to Iraq in November 2002 to accept intrusive inspections of weapons of mass destruction or face the consequences of war. Secretary Powell crafted this

arrangement in a way that brought France, Russia, and China into agreement at the Security Council.

The apparent victory of diplomacy over military action only papered over divisions between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one side and France and Germany on the other. The old NATO adversaries, Russia and China, were quietly opposed to an American war, but remained in the background as NATO allies separated over the wisdom of a forceful overthrow of Saddam Hussein. France and Germany had placed their faith in the inspection teams that the Security Council had dispatched to discover if the Iraqis still possessed weapons of mass destruction; the United States and Britain were convinced of the futility of the mission, no matter how much more intrusive it would be compared with the failed inspections in the 1990s. The suspicion of many in the West and most in the Muslim world was that the United States had predetermined the failed outcome of the inspections and only wanted to use the United Nations as a cover for its invasion. President Bush's insistence that the United States was justified if necessary to wage war unilaterally was sufficient proof for critics to doubt America's good faith in accepting inspections while engaged in a military buildup on Iraq's borders.

Anger over American behavior manifested itself on the European street, and could be found in the editorials of most newspapers. Germany vied with France to display its independence of the United States. European resentment over American pressure to participate in a war against Iraq was fueled by their claim that the United States was supporting an aggressive and destructive Israeli war against Palestinians. Speaking through the European Union, they asserted that the plight of Palestine took priority over Iraq's transgressions.

Popular opposition to an American-led war was grist for Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's election campaign in 2002 when he promised that under no circumstances would Germany provide troops or aid in the war effort whether or not a member, such as Turkey, might be attacked. In a sense, this was a reprise of a posture held in 1991. But in 2002, antiwar and anti-American sentiments went deeper. There was a truculence implicit in

Schroeder's behavior that announced Germany's freedom from its habitual deference to America. World War II was long past, and so was the feeling of gratitude for the sustenance American provided the fledgling democracy. Schroeder talked about a "German way" that resonated with voters unhappy with the American hegemony. But it also had echoes of a German Weltanschauung that could awaken memories of a "German way" under the Third Reich.

Problems with a newly assertive Germany, however, were on the back burner in 2002. Europe's attention at this time was on the American threat of a preemptive war against Iraq and its demands for allied compliance. The Franco-German connection was solidified by a common anti-American posture, shared by the major ity of European public opinion. This division was manifested in the inability of the North Atlantic Council to reach a consensus over an American request for support in the event of war. Even more divisive than refusing to back the American ally was the reluctance of France and Germany to guarantee solidarity with Turkey if it were attacked by its Iraqi neighbor.

American officials' responses to European dissent were often provocative, particularly when they accused the French and Germans of the kind of weakness that led to Munich. Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested at one point that his French counterpart suffered from the "vapors." Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went even further, suggesting that the two countries and their followers in the West represented "Old Europe." The NATO that had expanded in 1999 and again in 2002 had become the new Europe, which was composed of allies more understanding and more appreciative of American leadership. The Iraq issue conceivably could have been the rock on which the Atlantic alliance might split in two, or collapse altogether.

RUSSIA AS NATO UNIFIER?

Still, there were centripetal factors that weighed against the breakup of the Atlantic alliance. Some of them stemmed from ongoing transatlantic cooperation that has coexisted with the tensions of the last decade. No matter how badly the European allies mismanaged the Bosnian crisis and subsequently hampered the conduct of the Kosovo campaign, their role after each of these conflicts was vital to the peacekeeping process. Their numbers far exceeded those of the United States whose contributions to IFOR and KFOR in the last half of the 1990s steadily dwindled. Europeans picked up a burden that was more appropriately theirs. None of the military operations led by the United States was solely an American affair. In a similar way, although the war against the Taliban was managed from the United States, the postwar rebuilding of Afghanistan was shared by the allies. Even as Germany figuratively thumbed its nose at America over Iraq, it sought to rebuild bridges with the United States by assuming the cochairmanship in February 2003 with the Netherlands of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, replacing Turkish leadership in that city.

Europeans have been supportive as well in the war against al Qaeda, and not simply as a service to the superpower. Their own security was at stake because Europe appeared to be a target of the terrorist network and certainly the site of terrorist conspiracies. Here was an example of a war in which transatlantic allies could find a common foe and could respect the mission of Article 5. It is worth noting that high among the criticisms of U.S. policy toward Iraq was the European complaint about diversion of energy and resources from the primary enemy, the al Qaeda terrorists. Granted that Islamic fundamentalists have found safer havens in western Europe than they have in the United States, credit should be given to those allies whose investigators have been increasingly active in rooting out terrorist networks as vigorously and, arguably, even more effectively than their American counterparts.

A conspicuous example of transatlantic collaboration was evident in NATO's deft handling of its relations with Russia. As the alliance moved closer to Russian borders, there was visceral anxiety on the part of that nation's leadership. First the admission of Hungary, the Czech Republic,

and particularly Poland in 1997 aroused opposition and awakened visceral fears of NATO as a hostile entity. NATO in turn attempted to soothe Russian nerves and undercut a nationalist backlash by signing a "Founding Act" in 1997 promoting cooperation and security between the Atlantic alliance and the Russian Federation. There was an expectation of close cooperation on matters of mutual concern, summed up in the mantra that the Russians would have a voice but not a veto in NATO affairs. A weakened Russia under volatile President Boris Yeltsin had little choice but to accept this promise of good intentions on the part of the West.

But the increasing pressure from other remnants of the Warsaw Pact put new strains on the relationship with a Russia under the leadership of a stronger president, Vladimir Putin. Admission of the Baltic nations to the Atlantic alliance was even more delicate than the membership of Poland; Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had been part of the Soviet Union, and their inclusion in NATO was perceived as especially insulting to an ascendant Russia. NATO attempted to assuage Russia's feelings by scrapping the Founding Act of 1997, which turned out to give the Russians neither a voice nor a veto. It was as meaningless as the North Atlantic Coordinating Council, established in 1991, or the Partnership for Peace, established in 1994, as vehicles to give Russians an active voice in NATO affairs without offering membership itself. Actually, the efforts of the 1990s did bear fruit, as seen in Russia's intervention with Serbia's Milosevic to help end the Kosovo War and in its participation in subsequent peacekeeping in that Serbian province. But because a new enlargement was in process in 2002, something more was needed. NATO rose to the occasion by establishing a NATO-Russia Council that enlisted Russia as an equal partner in NATO decision making when such vital issues as combating terrorism was on the agenda. Whether this new arrangement will succeed remains to be seen.

The outreach to Russia over the past decade has been a collective effort, lacking the transatlantic tensions found elsewhere in the NATO community. The United States arguably was the prime mover in both moving NATO eastward and in winning Russian acquiescence in the process. It was important for all the allies to appreciate the benefits of that nation's compliance, given its vocal opposition in the past and given nationalist

unrest in the present. Why Russia complied with only murmurs of dissent lies in part in its need for a close Western connection to ensure the future of its capitalist economy.

The war on terrorism is another element in the relationship with the United States; the Chechen conflict has made Russia as conscious of the terrorist menace as the United States has been since 9/11. President Putin could also count on his personal relations with President Bush to minimize criticism of the brutal campaign against Chechen rebels. These factors have paid dividends for American foreign relations in what had been a pro forma Russian opposition to American policy on Iraq until it joined France and Germany in 2003 to oppose armed intervention.

Yet there should have been some reservations on the part of NATO, and certainly on the part of the United States, about their connections to Putin's Russia. The Russian president's continuing campaign against a free press, his tolerance of still-rampant corruption, and an ongoing willingness to allow Russian support for Iran's nuclear program, suggest limits to a permanent Western link with Russia, more from the American than European perspective. Russia remains a country possessing a still powerful nuclear capability under a regime that may not have fully reconciled to its lesser role in world affairs. Putin has shown a disposition as well to play off Europeans against Americans without tipping his hand about where Russia's future allegiance will be. Whether or not there is an irredentist spirit alive and active in the former Soviet Union, Russia has the potential of raising one more obstacle to a harmonious transatlantic relationship in the future.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRAGUE SUMMIT

The NATO summit in Prague in November 2002 centered on the admission of seven new nations into the alliance in April 2004. That the presence of 26 as opposed to 19 members will tilt the balance in Europe away from the West to the East is moot. Certainly, the former Warsaw bloc members in the alliance have a more positive view of the United States than

the older allies, but even if their presence does not reduce the level of anti-American sentiment, the adherence of seven new allies in the immediate future heralded a number of changes in the character of the organization.

First, it becomes apparent that the tradition of consensus may have limited value in the future; the community is too large to have decisions based on unanimity. One nation's dissent can undo a decision accepted by the other allies. Although there has always been an informal recognition that some members were more equal than others, NATO in the future may have to use a formal weighted system of decision making in which the larger powers have a greater voice than the smaller.

Turkey's invocation of Article 4 in February 2003, asking for consultation in light of Iraq's potential threat to its security, focused attention on the initial refusal of France, Germany, and Belgium to dispatch AWACS and Patriot missiles for its protection. The dissident members' reason centered on the destabilizing effect of war preparation on the success of continued UN inspections of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. This challenge could signal the formal end of the "NATO method" of consensus. In February 2003, the potential damage to the alliance, however, was sufficient to close ranks behind Turkey, although it should be noted that Belgium's and Germany's decision to withdraw their objections was made in the Defense Planning Committee on which France has not sat since 1966.

A second change was more explicit, although less explosive. The council at its Prague meeting agreed to expand its scope to encompass the globe. "Out-of-area" is the world at large, as long as terrorism is a threat to the organization's members. Without identifying any particular region or country, the NATO leaders promised at Prague "to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations, and territory, from wherever they may come" NATO's reach would extend to Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. As an earnest of these intentions, NATO in August 2003 officially took over the peacekeeping functions of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that the first goal expressed in January 2004 by Jaap de Hoop Sheffer, Lord Robertson's

successor as secretary-general, was to expand the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Afghanistan as part of NATO's war against terrorism. When the NATO summit meeting convenes in Instanbul in June 2004, the United States hopes to have the alliance extend military cooperation with the Islamic world. A NATO role in Iraq would be an important part of the expanded mission.

A hesitant start had begun in the fall of 2003 when NATO was to provide logistical help to a Polish-led division of some 9,000 international troops in Iraq. The NATO presence, however, would be significant only when French and German forces participate in the peacekeeping operation. Their absence, understandable in the tense European-American relations stemming from the war against Iraq, nevertheless inspired a Senate resolution in July 2003 urging the president to seek help from NATO to reduce U.S. military presence in that country. As Senator Joseph R. Biden of Delaware, the author of the resolution, noted about the daily attacks against American soldiers in Iraq: "I don't want every kid blown up at a checkpoint being an American soldier. This is the world's problem. Not just ours." Rather belatedly, the Bush administration came to recognize the need for alliance support, but not on the terms the French and Germans demanded. If they or others such as India and Japan joined the United States, the NATO flag would have to be flown under a UN umbrella. The United States was not yet prepared to turn over a share of authority that would follow UN authorization of multinational intervention in Iraq, but as the difficulties over establishing an Iraqi government mounted in the winter of 2004, the United States was more inclined to seek UN help in legitimizing plans for a new democratic Iraq. In this context, NATO supporters such as Senator Biden recommended, in the summer and fall of 2003, that the administration of a post-Saddam Iraq be placed under a NATO command. It would then have the authority of a Security Council mandate, as most of the allies have wanted, and yet through SHAPE be under the operational command of an American general who would report to the North Atlantic Council.

Actually, NATO had made Iraq an out-of-area responsibility in 1991. Even though that "coalition of the willing" was not formally under the

North Atlantic Council's provenance, the attack was led by the United States and NATO allies essentially comprised the coalition in 1991. It was obvious that the new members lacked the military capabilities of the senior allies, but it was equally obvious that there was no need in 2003 for addition of large numbers of divisions. The "niche" capabilities, such as those provided by the Poles and Czechs in assault against the Taliban in Afghanistan, could serve the alliance in future crises.

Yet more conventional military forces were recognized as necessary, not in the numbers that confronted the Soviets a generation ago, but in the form of a relatively small force quickly mobilized and quickly deployed to a troubled area. The North Atlantic Council at Prague created a NATO Rapid Response Force, 21,000 strong, to be operational by 2004. Although the communique emphasized its close relations with the EU, it also exposed fissures between the two organizations that mirrored the larger divisions between the United States and its major continental allies. The primary problem stemmed from the putative competition between the projected NATO Rapid Response Force and the EU counterpart, projected originally to have 60,000 troops available by 2003. This was as unrealistic-and unnecessaryan aspiration as was the short-lived decision in April 2003 of Luxembourg, Belgium, France, and Germany to establish a headquarters for non-NATO operations.

Why such an EU force was needed has been a subject of controversy since the Franco-German brigade morphed into the Eurocorps, and then merged with the Western European Union when the EU absorbed that organization. A military identity was important for the EU's sense of its rising power, particularly if it was to contest American hegemony successfully. But conflict was not necessarily a byproduct of the EU-NATO relationship. The EU has the capability, anticipated in the CJTF proposal in 1994, of complementing NATO objectives. An example of cooperation were plans in 2004 for the transfer of NATO peacekeeping operations in Macedonia to the EU.

What hampers the EU-and undermines the integrity of its rapid-reaction force-has been its continuing unwillingness to invest funds in the military

budgets of its members. NATO's Secretary-General Robertson repeatedly had urged injecting monies into their military establishments if they were to catch up with the technological advances of the United States. Europeans were spending an average of only 2 percent of their gross domestic products, down from 3.2 percent in 1989. The United States spent some 6 percent in 1989, which declined to 3 percent. Both figures in 1989 reflected Cold War budgets, but Europe's inability or unwillingness to do more forecloses opportunities to win equality with the United States. Instead, there was mounting resentment in Europe over U.S. superiority and its reluctance to share NATO assets with the allies. Correspondingly, the United States was irritated over Europe's demands for sharing while refusing to carry its share of the burden, a familiar American refrain.

The transatlantic division over Iraq actually was only the most dramatic occasion for an open break that had been in the making since the end of the Cold War. The EU under Franco-German domination was flexing its muscles in challenging the hegemony of the American "hyperpower" (to use a current French term). France in particular opposed the United States at every opportunity. Its threatened veto at the UN Security Council in March 2003 of any resolution authorizing the use of force for the removal of Saddam Hussein symbolized the depth of European alienation from America. President Bush's bellicose language seemingly reflected values and views alien to the newly unified Europe. The war against Iraq that followed the deadlock in the Security Council further estranged France and Germany, and particularly the publics of even those NATO governments that accepted American leadership in the successful effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

Given the sharp exchanges over Iraq in the winter and spring of 2003, it was hardly surprising to find speculation once again about NATO being at the point of dissolution. Or, if it survives, it might be a rump Atlantic alliance of central and eastern European countries along with Italy and the Iberian countries as partners of the Anglo-Americans. France and Germany might still lead the EU, but even here, the admission of more East European countries could dilute a Franco-German condominium. The end product

may be a return to the fractured West of pre-World War II, with the United States permanently following a path of unilateralism.

But termination of the transatlantic alliance is not inevitable. Tensions and frictions were built into NATO by virtue of a free association of its component parts. The presence of the United States as a centerpiece of the alliance is important for the very military strength that many of its members deplore. NATO is the only international organization with a military capability, and American participation has provided Europe with a relative freedom from having to pay for its own defense system. Beyond this economic benefit is an unstated concern that without the United States, a resurgent Russia, still a nuclear power, might disturb the stability of the West once again.

Even more submerged is an understanding that the United States in NATO stands as a counterweight to Germany. Germany, not France, would be the dominant force in Europe if America withdrew. Despite its genuine democratic credentials, the chancellor's evocation of a "German way" would have a more sinister resonance without the United States in Europe.

As for the American partner, a retreat into isolationism would have dangerous ramifications for the superpower. A chaotic Europe would be as damaging to America's well-being as it was between the world wars of the twentieth century. The European Union without a symbiotic relationship with NATO would be as open to fratricidal conflict as the Brussels Pact powers were in 1948 when they had trouble deciding which nationality would take the leadership. Equally important, the United States cannot manage world affairs alone. The partnership with the allies has been vital if not always respected for the services they have provided in the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as for the support the United States seeks from Europe in a reconstructed Iraq. Granted the ongoing frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a mutual dependence that has kept the alliance together in the past and should continue to do so in the future. What is needed is mutual respect for the role each ally plays, and a civilized rhetoric when tempers flare.

IN RETROSPECT

The North Atlantic Treaty was formed in 1949 to correct the inability of the United Nations to provide the security the West had expected after the havoc of World War II. The Atlantic alliance drew its strength from a perceived need to contain the Communist threat to the Western democracies and to facilitate the political and economic integration of a divided Europe. The implosion of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the rise of the European Union at the end of the twentieth century were tributes to the success of a common transatlantic effort.

Yet no year in the Cold War had passed without revelations of strains between the United States and its European allies; some were minor, others serious. In most of the conflicts, Europe stood relatively united against perceived acts of discrimination or neglect, of insensitivity, or of intimidation committed by the senior partner. On occasions, frictions within Europe itself manifested themselves, between France and most of its allies in 1966, and between Greece and Turkey in 1974 (although the United States was a principal player in both these controversies). There were instances, too, in which European governments lined up with the United States against their own citizens, as in the their support of deploying cruise missiles in the 1980s. But for the most part, Europeans could and did display common grievances against the United States, and were ever ready to display them. The numerous congressional resolutions urging troop withdrawal from Europe suggested an American counterpart to Europe's grievances.

Yet the transatlantic bonds were never severed. Greece did remove itself from NATO's military structure, but not permanently. France did not return to the military fold, but made sure that its military was closely connected to SHAPE'S command centers. In the headquarters of AFSouth in Naples, for example, a French "mission" was intimately involved in NATO planning. The nomenclature did not matter; the intimacy did. For political reasons, France has remained outside the integrated military structure, but its

hostility to American leadership had never been as virulent as it was under de Gaulle. Britain has always chafed at its assignment as a junior partner in NATO, but its dissatisfactions, expressed in the Suez adventure of 1956 and in the Skybolt confrontation of 1962, never rose to the breaking point.

The United States, for its part, growled regularly over its sense of unfair distribution of the military and financial burdens of the alliance, but its bark was always sharper than its bite. None of the many Senate resolutions contemplating withdrawal of American troops from Europe was implemented. As long as the Cold War was in force, the United States maintained a strong military presence on the Continent, and continued to remain in place in a post-Cold War Europe, although in reduced numbers.

Arguably, the most compelling sign of transatlantic solidarity has been the allies' silence over terminating membership in the alliance. Under Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty, any member could "cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation." No member has chosen to take advantage of this way out of the alliance. The danger in the future, however, lies less in the likelihood of an abrupt dissolution than in the possibility of NATO becoming as irrelevant as the League of Nations was in the 1930s if America and Europe fail to share the responsibilities of crisis management beyond the boundaries of the alliance.

Bibliographical Essay

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The linkages were never more clearly demonstrated than in the protracted debate over the framing of the treaty. The problem of fabricating an American identity with Europe was the primary purpose of the alliance's founders, and with the success of this effort there developed strains that persisted into the twenty-first century. The most important contribution to an understanding of the origins of the alliance arguably was provided by the Canadian statesman Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty (Toronto: McClellan and Stewart, 1977), a member of the Canadian delegation at the Washington treaty talks in 1948. Nicholas Henderson, second secretary to the British embassy in Washington in that year, provided not only an account of the proceedings but also of the tripartite talks in March 1948 that preceded the negotiations as well as a useful description of the dramatis personae in The Birth of NATO (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1963). Dean Acheson presented a U.S. perspective in his authoritative, if often sardonic, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969). On NATO's twentyfifth anniversary, the official NATO Review published commentaries of observers from all 12 members of the alliance who were also "present at the creation." These brief pieces were intended to celebrate their national contributions to the treaty process, and were subsequently published by Andre de Staercke et at., NATO's Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).

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As noted in Chapter 2, the transatlantic relationship was under strain in the 1950s even though-and often because-the European partners were so dependent at this time on U.S. military strength. Lord Ismay, NATO-The First Five Years (Paris: NATO, 1954), saw the evolution of the organization from his perch as the first secretary-general. An important work raising questions about the challenges facing the United States in its support of Europe was Klaus Knorr, ed., NATO and American Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). The Chatham House Study Group, Atlantic Alliance: NATO's Role in the Free World (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952), raised the problem from a British perspective of reconciling European integration with the Atlantic Community. Mary Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (New York: Praeger, 1959), examined the impact of the developing European Union on NATO and the United States in the 1950s. Edgar Furniss, France, Troubled Ally: De Gaulle 's Heritage and Prospects (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), explored the sources of France's difficulties with the American partner at the end of the decade. Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959), showed how the Federal Republic's membership in NATO resolved a major source of tension in the mid-1950s.

Transatlantic relations grew more tense in the 1960s because Europeans felt more secure after the resolution of the Berlin and Cuban crises. Robert E. Osgood's NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) was the first major scholarly work to place the

transatlantic conflict over nuclear weapons into a historical context; Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), urged the United States to help make the European allies genuine partners in light of a changing relationship, as did German statesman Kurt Birrenbach, The Future of the Atlantic Community; Toward European-American Partnership (New York: Praeger, 1963); Ronald Steel, The End of the Alliance: America and the Future of Europe (New York: Viking, 1964), had a different point of view; the increasing vulnerability of the United States made the "pledge" of 1949 invalid. William T. R. Fox and Annette B. Fox, NATO and the Range ofAmerican Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), saw NATO as a valuable instrument of U.S. foreign policy in applying diplomatic pressure on its allies. David Calleo, The Atlantic Fantasy: The US., NATO, and Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), agreed with the Foxes' judgment but with a pejorative spin: he saw NATO as a means of dominating Europe. France's opposition to America's hegemony was dramatized in the 1960s by its withdrawal from NATO's military structure. A measured presentation of the French view may be found in Andre Beaufre's NATO and Europe (London: Faber and Faber, 1967). John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (London: Andre Deutsch, 1970), discussed the consequences of France's actions. Richard Kugler, The Great Strategy Debate: NATO's Evolution in the 1960s (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1991), explained the fundamental transatlantic differences over nuclear and conventional defense in those years. Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), head of the U.S. delegation to NATO in the late 1960s, was more optimistic about the future of the alliance. Thomas A. Schwartz, Lyndon B. Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), writing a generation later, contrasted failure in Asia with relative success in Europe.

Detente and disillusionment characterized much of the spirit of the 1970s. The title of James Chace and Earl Ravenal, eds., Atlantis Lost: US-European Relations after the Cold War (New York: New York University Press, 1976) signaled the disappointment of its contributors over the state of the alliance in mid-decade. Simon Serfaty, Fading Partnership: America and

Europe after 30 Years (New York: Praeger, 1979), was particularly critical of the Nixon-Kissinger NATO policies. Agryris Andrianapoulous, Western Europe in Kissinger' Global Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1986), followed the logic of Kissinger's linkage of economic and security issues. Karl Kaiser, Europe and the United States: The Future of the Relationship (Washington, DC: Columbia Books, 1973), offered a European perspective on the relationship in the Nixon years. Physicist Samuel T. Cohen, The Neutron Bomb: Political, Technological, and Military Issues (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1978), defended the use of the neutron bomb, one of the most controversial issues in the Carter administration. Sherri L. Wasserman, The Neutron Bomb Controversy: A Study in Alliance Politics (New York: Praeger, 1983), was critical of Carter's management of the controversy. Philip H. Tresize, The Atlantic Connection: Prospects, Problems, and Policies (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975), found resiliency in NATO relations but urged pragmatic rather than grand designs for the future.

The 1980s witnessed both new transatlantic crises and the winding down of the Cold War. Both developments received considerable scholarly attention. The significance of nuclear politics may be seen in such important studies in the 1980s as Lawrence Freedman's The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981; David N. Schwartz's NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washin- gon, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983); and Richard W. Stevenson's The Rise and Fall of Detente: Relaxation of Tension in US.-Soviet Relations (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985). Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of the Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987), an influential German journalist who emphasized the presence of the United States as a unifying force in NATO, and Robert A. Levine, NATO: Subjective Alliance: The Debate over the Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1988), categorized the many debates over the functions of NATO in the 1980s. John Palmer, Europe Without America?: The Crisis in Atlantic Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), worried that the fractious transatlantic relationship in the Reagan administration could destroy NATO. Geoffrey Lee Williams and Alan Lee Williams, The European Defense Initiative: Europe's Bid for Equality (London: Macmillan, 1986), advocated

the Europeanization of NATO as a means of maintaining European support of the alliance; and Melvyn B. Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), presented a neoconservative American view that the United States should leave Europe to the Europeans. Gregory F. Treverton opposed this solution with his Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe (London: Macmillan, 1985). Writing during the Gorbachev era, Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne, 1988), claimed that NATO retained its role as guarantor of transatlantic security.

The end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet empire removed the major centripetal force uniting the allies. The result of these changes was a sharpening of the divisions within the alliance, portending, as many feared, the dissolution of NATO in the 1990s. Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, eds., The Art of Conflict Resolution (London: Brassey's, 1994), concentrated on the means of settling conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO: The Challenge of Change (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), recommended that the alliance make European stability a major raison d'etre. Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of Europe (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), raised problems associated with the enlargement program of the 1990s. James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), and Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NA TO s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itselffor a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), explained why expanding NATO into eastern Europe would strengthen the alliance. The case against enlargement was made by Michael Mandelbaum in his Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996). For some scholars such as Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: American Alliances after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1992), NATO, has outlived its usefulness and should disband. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), was convinced that as the only superpower, the United States had an obligation to lead in maintaining the security of Europe. A promise of transatlantic equality was presented in Charles G. Cogan's The Third

Option: The Emancipation of European Defense, 1989-2000 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

The events following 9/11 have exacerbated tensions between America and Europe, most notably over how to deal with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. On the one side, there has been a spate of articles and books criticizing Europe for its failure to accept American leadership in the war against terrorism, as in Robert Kagan, Of Policy and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003), who castigated Europe for its weakness in the face of global threats. A mirror image of the current transatlantic feud was Emmanuel Todd, Apres l 'empire: Essai sur le de composition du systeme americaine (Paris: Editions Galli- mard, 2002), who foresaw Europe's future challenge to America through economic rather than military power. Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of United States Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) and Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Knopf, 2002), shared some of Todd's expectations without his biases.

More optimistic speculations about the future of transatlantic relations were offered in David S. Yost's NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998); Wallace J. Thies's Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002); and Stanley R. Sloan's NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

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